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Sommario
In questa tesi si indaga la possibilità di impiegare una versione dell’aritmetica (primitiva)
ricorsiva allo scopo di costruire le rappresentazioni semantiche degli enunciati delle lin-
gue naturali. L’idea deriva dal fatto che un sistema formale di questo tipo si differenzia
sotto diversi aspetti significativi dai formalismi tradizionalmente impiegati in semantica
formale, basati sulla logica predicativa classica. In particolare, nel caso dell’aritmetica
ricorsiva, i quantificatori non sono termini primitivi del linguaggio, ma vengono defini-
ti come specifiche funzioni ricorsive; inoltre, essi non possono esservi definiti in modo
analogo a come vengono classicamente concepiti, ossia come quantificatori “illimitati”, il
cui dominio non è necessariamente finito. Nell’aritmetica ricorsiva è possibile, tuttavia,
esprimere l’equivalente di asserzioni generali, che riguardano cioè un qualunque individuo
arbitrariamente scelto, mediante l’uso di variabili libere; crucialmente, queste variabili
non stabiliscono rapporti di portata con altri termini del linguaggio, e la loro interpre-
tazione è per gran parte assimilabile a quella dei quantificatori universali tradizionali
con portata ampia. Alla luce di questo fatto, si sostiene che diversi fenomeni linguistici,
attestati in lingue appartenenti a famiglie diverse, possono essere spiegati in modo parti-
colarmente naturale assumendo che gli elementi lessicali e le strutture sintattiche che vi
sono coinvolti siano correlati alla presenza di tali variabili libere con valore generico nella
forma logica dell’enunciato. In particolare, vengono analizzati gli indefiniti generici, i
condizionali e le frasi abituali, nella loro interazione con la negazione e, nei primi due
casi, con i sintagmi nominali quantificati; in connessione con questi aspetti, viene toccato
il problema della struttura interna degli indefiniti negativi; infine, in termini di variabili
generiche viene offerta una possibile analisi del fenomeno del Neg-Raising. Molte delle
proposte avanzate sviluppano idee già apparse nella letteratura, in Löbner (2000, 2013)
e, soprattutto, in Goodstein (1951, 1957) e Hornstein (1984). Alcuni apparenti proble-
mi della teoria delineata vengono spiegati facendo appello a uno specifico trattamento
delle frasi incassate motivato indipendentemente. Si suggerisce quindi che i fenomeni
analizzati, considerati nel loro complesso, confermino la validità del progetto iniziale,
lasciando intravvedere nuovi potenziali scenari per un fecondo scambio tra filosofia della
matematica e semantica linguistica.

Abstract
In this dissertation, the possibility of employing a version of (primitive) recursive arith-
metic to build the semantic representations of natural language sentences is explored.
This idea derives from the fact that such a formal system differs under several respects
from formalisms which have been traditionally employed in formal semantics, based on
classical predicate logic. Specifically, in the case of recursive arithmetic, quantifiers are
not primitive terms of the language, but they are defined as peculiar recursive functions;
additionally, within it they cannot be defined in a way which corresponds to how they
have traditionally been conceived, i.e. as “unbounded” quantifiers, whose domain is not
necessarily finite. In recursive arithmetic, however, it is possible to convey something
equivalent to general assertions, regarding any arbitrarily chosen individual, by using
free variables; crucially, such variables do not establish relations of scope with other
terms of the language, and their interpretation can to a large extent be assimilated to
that of wide scope standard universal quantifiers. In the light of this, it is argued that
several linguistic phenomena, attested in natural languages of different families, can be
explained in an especially natural way by assuming that the lexical elements and syn-
tactic structures involved are correlated with the presence of these free variables with
generic value in the logical form of the sentence. In particular, generic indefinites, con-
ditionals and habitual clauses are analyzed, in their interaction with the negation and,
as for the first two, with quantified noun phrases; in connection with these aspects, the
problem of the internal structure of negative indefinite is also addressed; finally, a pos-
sible analysis of the Neg-Raising phenomenon in terms of generic variables is offered.
Many of the proposals made here have already appeared in the literature, in Löbner
(2000, 2013) and, moreover, in Goodstein (1951, 1957) and Hornstein (1984). Some
apparent counterexamples to the theory outlined are explained by making appeal to
an independently motivated treatment of embedded clauses. It is suggested that the
analyzed phenomena, when collectively considered, confirm the validity of the initial
project, letting one glimpse new potential scenarios for a fruitful exchange between the
philosophy of mathematics and linguistic semantics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the possibility, and to argue for
the opportunity, of applying a version of a certain mathematical formalism to
the study of meaning in natural language. The formalism is that of Primitive
Recursive Arithmetics, also simply Recursive Artihmetic (hereafter, also RA), first
introduced in Skolem (1923) but improved in Goodstein (1954) and especially
defended, from a foundational perspective, in Goodstein (1951, 1957).
In the first part of the dissertation, I will briefly explore the philosophical
background underlying the proposal. First of all, in Ch. 2, I will deal with the
main motivations that had led to the formulation and the development of RA.
Then, I will introduce the system I am going to discuss in three successive steps:
in Ch. 3, I will describe a system PR which can compute primitive recursive unary
functions; in §4.1, I will extend the previous system to obtain a formal system RA
which is a logic-free version of RA; in §4.2, I will define a minimal extension RAt
of RA obtained by simply adding a special term to its vocabulary.
In the second part, I will try to show how one could look at RAt as a for-
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mal language with which to build suitable semantic representations for natural
language sentences and I will argue for its superiority, for that purpose, over stan-
dard formalisms based on (extensions of) classical first order logic. After briefly
addressing some general issues of natural language semantics in §5.1 and §5.2, I
will illustrate somewhat more precisely the central claim of the dissertation in §5.3.
Then, in §5.4, I will define the role of an illocutionary operator in shifting from
semantic representations to equations of RAt.
In Ch. 6, I will define, as terms of RAt, the meaning of some classes of linguis-
tic expressions in a way which closely parallels definitions which are already on
the market or which, however, do not provide any evidence supporting the main
theoretical claim: in §6.1, I will deal with verbs, nouns, adjectives and adverbs;
in §6.2, I will deal with conjunction and disjunction; in §6.3, I will say something
about the variegate class of anaphoric elements in natural languages; in §6.4, I will
link the issue of indexicals and their function in communication, owing very much
to Russell’s theory, to the inferential properties of the term t introduced in RAt;
in §6.5, I will deal with plural morphology and some features of numeral modifiers
and similar; in §6.6, I will deal with negation, which will come to play a crucial
role in the subsequent part of the dissertation and whose syntactic properties, for
this reason, will be analyzed in more detail; finally, in §6.7, I will address the issue
of dependent clauses, developing a proposal, inspired by sententialist accounts of
attitude reports, which will prove necessary to articulate an important distinction
made in the following central chapter.
Ch. 7 will be, in fact, the core of this dissertation: first of all, in §7.1, I will
defend the viability of a treatment of natural language quantifiers as bounded
quantifiers (the only special sort of quantifiers available for RAt); then, after
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addressing, in §7.2.1–7.2.3, three issues potentially interfering with the ongoing
discussion, I will rapidly review two standard approaches to genericity widely
attested in the literature and I will present a different approach independently
advocated by Goodstein (1951, 1957) and, in some more length, by Hornstein
(1984). In §7.2.7, I will develop their insights by formulating an analysis of generic
indefinites in terms of free variables. I will then take into account, in §7.2.8,
an apparent counterexample to the analysis just offered, relying on the semantic
characterization of dependent clauses outlined in the previous chapter. Then, in
§7.3, I will give a semantics for conditionals in terms of that peculiar notion of
genericity. Finally, in §7.5 and §7.6 I will consider two issues concerning the verbal
domain: habituals and Neg-Raising, respectively, suggesting how that conception
of generic arguments can shed some light even on them.
Ch. 8 will draw the conclusions, set some open questions within the framework
developed before and underline the interdisciplinary connections behind it.
Finally, in Appendix A, I will very briefly outline an account of quantity impli-
catures, one important and pervasive pragmatic phenomenon I alluded to at some
points in the dissertation. Then, in Appendix B I will provide some simple ex-
amples of basic derivations both in the system PR and in RA (the latter holding
also in RAt).
The linguistic data employed in this work are almost always taken from English
and Italian, my first language.1
1As for the glosses in linguistic examples, I strived to follow the Leipzig Glossing
Rules as stated in the version of February 2008, which can be found at the web address
‘http://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/resources/glossing-rules.php’. Furthermore, I decided to even-
tually follow all and only the following “optional” rules: 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D and 4E. See the glossary
there for the meaning of the abbreviations employed here.
In any case, the glosses are minimal, showing only the grammatical features, if any, that are
relevant to the ongoing analysis. To this extent, quite often I used ambiguous glosses (for instance,
3
the verb have may appear in them, without any specification of mood, person or number): when
this is case, I take it for granted that the translation suffices to disambiguate the gloss, under the
implicit assumption that the translation and the glossed material share as many grammatical
features as possible.
4
Part I
A system of recursive arithmetic

Chapter 2
Finitism (and predicativism)
Wszystko -
słowo bezczelne i nadęte pychą.
Powinno być pisane w cudzysłowie.
Udaje, że niczego nie pomija,
że skupia, obejmuje, zawiera i ma.
A tymczasem jest tylko
strzępkiem zawieruchy.
Wisława Szymborska, Wszystko1
This section deals with some rather philosophical issues in the foundations
of mathematics and the history of logic. It cannot be nor is meant to be in
any way an exhaustive treatment of such issues; its main purposes are to sketch
the historical background which gave birth to the formal system I am going to
base myself upon (which I will introduce in some detail in the next section), and,
moreover, to describe some features of finitism, a philosophical doctrine about the
1Everything - / a bumptious, stuck-up word. / It should be written in quotes. / It pretends
to miss nothing, / to gather, hold, contain, and have. / While all the while it’s just / a shred
of gale (Wisława Szymborska, Everything; translation from Polish by Stanislaw Baranczak and
Clare Cavanagh).
Yes, I know that this quotation is something of a boomerang, for this dissertation!
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nature of mathematics and reasoning strictly associated with that formal system
and enlightening some of its most interesting properties.2
Two main notions of ‘infinite’ have been counterposed throughout history: that
of an actual infinite, corresponding to an infinite amount of something which could
be captured by the thought at once, and that of a potential infinite, i.e. a process
developing indefinitely through time. The idea that only the latter, among the two
notions, could find any correspondence in reality was probably, at least implicitly,
held by most thinkers until the second half of the Nineteenth century. Just to cite
a well-known example, the great mathematician Carl Friederich Gauss, in a letter
to Schumacher written in 1831 (Gauss (1900a)), expressed his worries about his
friend’s mathematical work with the following words:
I must protest most vehemently against your use of the infinite as
something consummated, as this is never permitted in mathematics.
However, with the foundation of set theory by Georg Cantor in the 1870s,
and in particular with his “discovery” of “transfinite” numbers, the notion of an
infinite totality as an object which was capable of being grasped by the mind at
once began, slowly but constantly, to gain acceptance among mathematicians and
philosophers, and it is nowadays customary. This is not to say, of course, that
the debate between sustainers and opposers of the actual infinite has come to an
end. Since the very time when Cantor was making his views on infinite sets and
transfinite numbers public, he found the strong opposition of one of his teachers
at the University of Berlin, Leopold Kronecker. Kronecker is a key figure in the
history of some ideas that lay at the core of RA. He too explicitly maintained
2For a recent brief but in-depth survey on the relations between RA and the foundations of
mathematics, see Tait (2012).
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that in mathematics, as more generally in any field of reality, there was no place
for an actual infinite, and expressed his deep disappointment towards such alleged
mathematical objects as so-called “transfinite” numbers, this position being well
testified by the following quotation, probably the best known by him:
Die ganzen Zahlen hat der liebe Gott gemacht, alles andere ist Men-
schenwerk.
God created the natural numbers, all else is the work of man.3
This quotation testifies to Kronecker’s ontological view inspiring his philosophy
of mathematics (described by several scholars as “concrete”, “algorithmic” and
“computational”; see, for instance, Edwards (1987, 1988, 1989, 1995) and Gana
(1986); Gana (1986), in particular, offers an in-depth reconstruction of Kronecker’s
attempts to realize his project of reducing all mathematical entities to natural
numbers): aside from natural numbers, there are no mathematical entities at all,
but, at best, ways to describe “some aspects of the ‘natural’ calculus” (Gana
(1986: 260)).4
Another interesting quotation from Kronecker (1895-1930: 156) reflects the
way he borrowed and elaborated Gauss’ insight (English translation from Edwards
(1989: 71)):
The general concept of an infinite series itself, for example a power
series, is in my judgement permissible only with the reservation that in
each particular case the arithmetical rule by which the terms are given
3As it is said in Boniface (2005: 144), “[t]his sentence was stated in a lecture for the
Berliner Naturforscher-Versammlung (1886) and was quoted by Weber in his obituary” (We-
ber (1893: 15)).
4Translation from Italian mine.
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satisfies, as above, conditions which make it possible to deal with the
series as though it were finite, and thus to make it unnecessary, strictly
speaking, to go beyond the notion of a finite series.
Besides, Kronecker was the first, at least in the modern age (one possible
predecessor of his in the ancient age being Proclus) to make the claim that the
existence of a mathematical object bearing some specified properties could only be
stated by actually providing an object of that kind, after having “constructed” it
according to certain suitable mathematical rules (hence the label of constructivism
attributed to the complex of philosophical theories of mathematics sharing this
fundamental position).
Der Standpunkt, welcher mich von vielen andern Mathematikern trennt,
gipfelt in dem Grundsatz, dass die Definitionen der Erfahrungswissen-
schaften, — d.h. der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaften, welche
man neuerdings unter jenem Namen von den übrigen Wissenschaften,
den sogen. Geisteswissenschaften trennt, — nicht bloss in sich wider-
spruchsfrei sein müssen, sondern auch der Erfahrung entnommen sein
müssen, und was noch wesenlicher ist, das Kriterium mit sich führen
müssen, durch welches man für jeden speziellen Fall entscheiden kann,
ob der vorliegende Begriff unter die Definition zu subsumieren ist, oder
nicht. Eine Definition, welche dies nicht leistet, mag von Philosophen
oder Logikern gepriesen werden, für uns Mathematiker ist sie eine bloße
Wortdefinition und ohne jeden Wert.5
The point of view on which I d[i]sagree with most mathematicians
5From Kronecker’s 1891 lectures, the last ones he did; in Boniface & Schappacher (2002: 240).
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resides in the basic assertion that mathematics and the natural sciences
— which have recently been separated by this name from the remaining
sciences, the so-called sciences of the mind [. . . ] — must not only be
free of contradiction, but must also result from experience and, what
is even more essential, must dispose of a criterium by which one can
decide, for each particular case, whether the presented concept is to
subsume, or not, under the definition. A definition which does not
achieve this, can be advocated by philosophers or logicians, but for us
mathematicians, it is a bad nominal definition. It is worthless.6
The link between Kronecker’s “algorithmic” standpoint towards the founda-
tions of mathematics and his refusal of the notion of a completed infinite is further
explored in Edwards (1987, 1988, 1989, 1995) (see also Gana (1986)). See, in
particular, the following quotations from Edwards (1989):
[B]ased on my reading of Kronecker over the years, I regard it as a
certainty that he would have regarded it as essential to show that this
problem [the problem of deciding whether two given A’s are equivalent
modulo a given set of M ’s]—which he put at the heart of his formula-
tion of mathematics—can be solved algorithmically, that is, by a com-
putational procedure which can be shown to terminate after a number
of steps for which an a priori (finite) upper bound can be given.7
Kronecker did not believe in arbitrary infinite series, only in infinite
series explicitly and constructively given.8
6English translation from Boniface (2005: 149).
7Edwards (1989: 69); emphasis mine.
8Edwards (1989: 71).
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Kronecker would probably have said that it was ridiculous to let
the ultimate reality be the field [generated by the square root of -3,
or the cube root of unity, over the rationals]—a completed infinite set
that could never be explained to anyone but a mathematician[. . . ].
Kronecker’s insistence on the specific and the algorithmic led him to
one position that is too extreme even for most modern constructivists.
Kronecker believed that a mathematical concept was not well defined
until it had been shown how to decide, in each specific instance, whether
the definition was fulfilled or not.9
Already in Greek times, mathematicians understood very well that
infinity was, as Gauss said, a “façon de parler,” and that limits can be
described—in fact are best described—without any mention of infinites.
[. . . ] [Kronecker’s] principles, [. . . ] in his mind and in fact, were no
different from the principles of his predecessors, from Archimedes to
Gauss.10
Finitism can be related to a broader current in the philosophy of mathematics,
namely predicativism. Predicativism was first advocated by Jules Henri Poincaré,
who, like Kronecker, felt a huge disappointment towards the emergence and dif-
fusion of set theory as a foundation for mathematical sciences and towards the
idea of the so-called “logicist” school, mainly represented by Frege and Russell,
that logic took precedence over mathematics and was the proper basis on which
to found the latter.11 Poincaré’s main claims in the philosophy of mathematics,
9Edwards (1989: 72); emphasis mine.
10Edwards (1989: 74).
11For a survey in English of Poincaré’s philosophical positions about mathematics, see Gold-
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first expressed in written form in his Poincaré (1905) and Poincaré (1906), reduce
essentially to two. The first is the idea that any attempt of founding arithmetic
on something else would have been unsuccessful;12 in several places he points out,
in particular, that the principle of mathematical induction should be presupposed
by any logical theory (Poincaré (1905: 817–8)):
«[L]e principe d’induction complète» me paraissait à la fois nécessaire
au mathématicien et irréductible à la logique. On sait quel est l’énoncé
de ce principe:
«Si une propriété est vraie du nombre 1, et si l’on établit qu’elle est
vraie de n + 1 pourvu qu’elle le soit de n, elle sera vraie de tous les
farb (1988), on which I mostly base myself. Poincaré’s philosophy of mathematics was highly
influenced by Kant’s (1787), who conceived arithmetic as the science of pure time.
12Despite the fact that I feel sympathetic with the idea that logic cannot serve as a foundation
for mathematics, I find quite misleading (and ungenerous) the picture that Poincaré offers of
logic. In this regard, there is a sense by which I agree with the conclusion of the following
passage from Poincaré (1906: 315–6), but, under this sense, the conclusion, to me but certainly
not to Poincaré, extends also to mathematics.
Une démonstration vraiment fondée sur les principes de la Logique Analytique se
composera d’une suite de propositions; les unes, qui serviront de prémisses, seront
des identités ou des définitions; les autres se déduiront des premières de proche en
proche; mais bien que le lien entre chaque proposition et la suivante s’aperçoive
immédiatement, on ne verra pas du premier coup comment on a pu passer de la
première à la dernière, que l’on pourra être tenté de regarder comme une vérité nou-
velle. Mais si l’on remplace successivement les diverses expressions qui y figurent
par leur définition et si l’on poursuit cette opération aussi loin qu’on le peut, il ne
restera plus à la fin que des identités, de sorte que tout se réduira à une immense
tautologie. La Logique reste donc stérile, à moins d’être fécondée par l’intuition.
A proof truly grounded on the principles of Analytical Logic will be compounded
by a collection of propositions; some of them, which will play the role of premisses,
will be identities or definitions; the others will be deduced from the premisses step
by step; but even if the link between each proposition and the following one can
be seen immediately, it won’t be apparent at first how it has been possible to pass
from the first proposition to the last one, which we could be tempted to view as
a novel truth. But if we replace the different expressions that appear there in
sequence by their definitions and if we repeat this operation as long as possible,
nothing will remain other than some identities, so that everything will reduce to a
huge tautology. Hence, Logic remains sterile, until it is fecundated by intuition.
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nombres entiers.» J’y voyais le raisonnement mathématique par excel-
lence.
«[T]he principle of complete induction» seems to me at the same time
necessary to the mathematician and irreducible to logic. We know
what the enunciation of this principle is:
«If a property is true of number 1, and if we have established that it
is true of n+ 1 provided that it is true of n, then it will be true for all
integers.» I see here the mathematical argument par excellence.
Poincaré’s second claim is his vicious circle principle, which forbids definitions
that are “non predicative” or, as it is nowadays more common to say, impredicative.
The notion of an impredicative definition that Poincaré has in mind is that of a
definition where in the definiens essential reference is made to the definiendum
(Poincaré (1906: 307)):
[L]es définitions qui doivent être regardées comme non prédicatives sont
celles qui contiennent un cercle vicieux.
Definitions that must be seen as not predicative are those that contain
a vicious circle.
Definitions of this kind had already been considered as illegitimate for a long time.
However, it is unclear if, before Poincaré, there was the same awareness that the
problematic cases were not simply definitions where the same predicate appears
both in the definiendum and in the definiens, like perfectly acceptable (and even
necessary) inductive definitions, but rather definitions where reference to the same
(generic) individual that should be defined is also made in the definiens.
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Poincaré derived his notion of impredicativity from Richard (1905), where the
homonymous paradox was introduced. To Poincaré, the source of all paradoxes
that were shaking the mathematical building by its foundations in those years was
that peculiar illegitimate sort of definitions, and, interestingly, a special case of
this definition was obtained, according to Poincaré, by making essential reference
to infinite totalities (Poincaré (1906: 316)):
C’est la croyance à l’existence de l’infini actuel qui a donné naissance
à ces définitions non prédicatives. Je m’explique: dans ces définitions
figure le mot tous [. . . ]. Le mot tous a un sens bien net quand il
s’agit d’un nombre fini d’objets; pour qu’il en eût encore un, quand les
objets sont en nombre infini, il faudrait qu’il y eût un infini actuel.
Autrement tous ces objets ne pourront pas être conçus comme posés
antérieurement à leur définition et alors si la définition d’une notion
N dépend de tous les objets A, elle peut être entachée de cercle vicieux,
si parmi les objets A il y en a qu’on ne peut définir sans faire intervenir
la notion N elle-même.
Il n’y a pas d’infini actuel; les Cantoriens l’ont oublié, et ils sont tombés
dans la contradiction.
It is the belief in the existence of the actual infinity that gave birth
to these non predicative definitions. Let me explain myself: in these
definitions the word all appears [. . . ]. The word all has a very precise
meaning when it applies to a finite number of objects; in order for it
to have one more, when the objects are an infinite number, an actual
infinity would be necessary. Otherwise all these objects could not be
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known as established before their definition and so, if the definition of
a notion N depends on all the objects A, it can be affected by a vicious
circle, if among the objects A there is one which cannot be defined
without the intervention of the notion N itself.
There is no actual infinite; Cantorians forgot it, and they fell into
contradiction.
At this point, it is worth mentioning another prominent figure in the history
of constructivist philosophies of mathematics, namely the Dutch mathematician
Luitzen Egbertus Brouwer (1881–1966), because he was the founding father of
intuitionism, today by far the most common and widely followed variety of con-
structivism, which nevertheless should be viewed as separate from the philosophi-
cal perspectives embodied in RA.13 Maybe, Brouwer’s most original claim on the
foundations of mathematics is his refusal of a logical principle with a respectable
and long-dated pedigree, namely the so-called Principle of Excluded Middle (EM),
which was first stated by Aristotle himself in his Metaphysics (see Aristotle (1984))
and which states, in one of its formulations, that, given a certain proposition, either
the proposition or its negation must hold. Many people working on the philosophy
of mathematics seem to endorse the view that this refusal is a coherent result of
constructivism. To suggest that this may not be the case, it may be useful to quote
the enlightening preface of Goodstein (1951: 9), where Goodstein assigns a cru-
cial role to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in contrasting
Brouwer’s refusal of EM:
13In his famous doctoral thesis, Brouwer, who stressed the kantian conception of arithmetic as
the science of pure time extending it to all mathematics, endorsed constructivism in a peculiar
way, by claiming that mathematical objects are the product of the activity of a creative sub-
ject. He shared Poincaré’s disappointment with logicism and similarly defended the priority of
mathematics over logic (and, in the same regard, over language).
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The main forces which have shaped the foundations of mathematics
over the past twenty-five years have been antithetical in purpose but
complementary in effect. To Hilbert’s formalism we owe the detailed
analysis of the structure of mathematical systems and the imaginative
conception of mathematics as its own object of discourse; to the con-
structivism of Brouwer, the critique of classical logic and the intuitive
notion of a finitist proof.
The formalist-finitist controversy in the foundations of mathemat-
ics was resolved, in principle, by Wittgenstein’s analysis of the char-
acteristics of a formal language. Wittgenstein showed that in a formal
language the meaning of the signs is a purely functional property of
the language; it follows that Brouwer’s denial of the validity of a formal
axiom—the tertium non datur—was totally mistaken. The conclusion
to be drawn from the finitist critique is not that certain parts of math-
ematics are incorrect but that the currently accepted interpretation of
the signs, in particular the interpretation of the quantifiers A and E14
in terms of universality and existence is untenable. One cannot dispute
a formal equivalence like
∼ Ax(P (x)) = Ex(∼ P (x))15
but one may well be able to show that the use of the quantifiers A
and E in the formula is not consistent with the ordinary usage of the
terms “for all” and “there exists”, so that in a system in which this
14Today, they would normally be indicated as ‘∀’ and ‘∃’, respectively [A/N ].
15Again, the sign ‘∼’ for negation would be more normally written, today, as ‘¬’ [A/N ].
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formula holds, “A” and “E” are not synonymous with the universal
and existential operators.
Wittgenstein too, who was Goodstein’s teacher and was cited several times in
his writings, can be viewed as endorsing finitism in his so-called “middle period”,
i.e. the period when he wrote his Philosophical Remarks (1929–30; Wittgenstein
(1964)) and his Philosophical Grammar (1931–33; Wittgenstein (1969)). Relevant
quotations testifying Wittgenstein’s finitist attitude may be the following ones:
An irrational number isn’t the extension of a decimal fraction, [. . . ]
it’s a law. (Wittgenstein (1975: §181))
[T]he mistake in the set-theoretical approach consists time and again
in treating laws and enumerations (lists) as essentially the same kind
of thing. (Wittgenstein (1974: 461))
It is senseless to speak of the whole infinite number series, as if it, too,
were an extension. (Wittgenstein (1975: 144))
It is interesting to note that in his middle period, Wittgenstein rejected his own
earlier view, expressed in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, that universal and
existential quantifiers amount, respectively, to infinitary conjunction and disjunc-
tion.16 In other words, he came to reject the notion of an “unbounded quantifier”
which is at the basis of classical first order logic (CL), in this way aligning with
the spirit feeding RA:17
16See the discussion on unbounded quantification in §7.1.
Curiously, this theory was quoted as a source of inspiration for GB theory by Chomsky in his
Pisa lectures (see Graffi (2001: 451)).
17Wittgenstein probably went a step further with respect to RA in apparently rejecting gen-
eralizations tout court, as the following quotations seem to suggest:
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What is the meaning of such a mathematical proposition as ‘(∃n)4+n =
7’? It might be a disjunction — (4 + 0 = 7) ∨ (4 + 1 = 7) ∨ etc. ad
inf. But what does that mean? I can understand a proposition with a
beginning and an end. But can one also understand a proposition with
no end? (Wittgenstein (1975: §127))
The important point is that, even in the case where I am given that
32+42 = 52, I ought not to say ‘(∃x, y, z, n)(xn+yn = zn)’, since taken
extensionally that’s meaningless, and taken intensionally this doesn’t
provide a proof of it. No, in this case I ought to express only the first
equation. (Wittgenstein (1975: §150))
The setting just described can explain why the emergence of paradoxes in
naïve set theory and related formal systems (for instance, Frege’s logical founda-
tion of arithmetic), such as Cantor’s (1895), Burali-Forti’s (1897), Russell’s (1902),
Richard’s (1905), König’s (1905), Bernstein’s (1905), Berry’s (1906), Grelling &
Nelson’s (1908), together with the first mathematical results which formally repro-
duced some features of these paradoxes, starting with the famous Gödel incom-
pleteness theorems (stated in Gödel (1931)), encountered little surprise among
constructivist and finitist mathematicians. In the words of Hermann Weyl:
According to [Brouwer’s] view and reading of history, classical logic
was abstracted from the mathematics of finite sets and their subsets.
[. . . ] Forgetful of this limited origin, one afterwards mistook that logic
[O]ne [should not] say a general proposition follows from a proposition about the
nature of number. (Wittgenstein (1975: §126))
[I]t seems to me that we can’t use generality—all, etc.—in mathematics at all.
(Wittgenstein (1975: §129))
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for something above and prior to all mathematics, and finally applied
it, without justification, to the mathematics of infinite sets. This is
the Fall and original sin of set theory, for which it is justly punished
by the antinomies. It is not that such contradictions showed up that is
surprising, but that they showed up at such a late stage of the game.
[italics mine]
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Chapter 3
Primitive recursion
One, two, three, four!
Dee Dee Ramone
In 1888, Richard Dedekind published a seminal work on number theory, De-
dekind (1888), where for the first time a suitable set of axioms for arithmetic was
presented:1 it was equivalent to a more famous set of axioms developed a little
later by Giuseppe Peano and which, accordingly, are now both universally known
under the label of Peano axioms or Dedekind-Peano axioms. Furthermore, Dede-
kind (1888) also introduced the notion of a primitive recursive function (at that
time, simply called recursive function; henceforth, also p.r. function),2 and showed
1Dedekind’s work was actually a substantial improvement of the work done on the same
subject by the mathematician and linguist Hermann Grassmann in Grassmann (1861).
2Actually, as Tait (2012) points out, “Dedekind proved the principle of definition by iter-
ation, not the general principle of primitive recursive definition. As Peter Aczel pointed out
in conversation, the latter principle does seem to have appeared explicitly for the first time in
Skolem (1923)”. However, as Tait (2012) further remarks, Robinson (1947) built a reduction of
primitive recursion to pure iteration. In the same regard, Meyer & Ritchie (1967b,a), showed the
equivalence between p.r. functions and functions computable by ‘for’ programs, programs in a
programming language including instructions of the shape ‘for Y do S’, meaning ‘iterate S for Y
times’, but not free iterations without an upper bound (see also Odifreddi (1989: 70 f.)). Much
work by Giorgio Germano and Stefano Mazzanti is also devoted to this topic; see for instance
Germano & Mazzanti (1988), where it is said that “the motivation for investigating prim(N,N)
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that many mathematical functions employed in everyday mathematical practice
were definable in terms of primitive recursion.3 The more general notion of ‘prim-
itive recursion’ which mathematicians and logicians are acquainted with, however,
was developed by Skolem (1923) more than thirty years later; for some years, this
notion must have appeared so natural and elegant that Hilbert (1926) even for-
mulated the conjecture that it corresponded formally to the intuitive notion of a
computable function.4
I will describe here a first formal system, which I will call PR, which allows
one to formally derive equations with p.r. functions and which requires only a
simple and natural extension to be transformed into a system of primitive recursive
arithmetic, as we will see in the next chapter.
The alphabet AlphPR of PR is the following one:5
AlphPR = {0, g, ?, S,=, [, ]}.
The symbol ‘S’ corresponds to the successor function, which is assumed to be
the only basic function of PR; besides, we have also one and only one basic term,
namely ‘0’.
I will call any sequence of ‘g’s generic variable and any sequence of stars
[i.e., the class of primitive recursive unary functions] may be found in the beauty and simplicity
of the underlying data structure” (Germano & Mazzanti (1988: 218), italics mine; to be paired
with Odifreddi’s quotation at p. 35 below).
3Grassmann (1861) had already defined sum and product in primitive recursive terms.
4This was, however, before Gabriel Sudan in 1927 and, with greater notoriety, Wilhelm Ack-
ermann in 1928 had described their homonymous alleged functions, which are not primitive
recursive and would hence show the computational limitations of primitive recursion.
5Here and in the following, I often borrow the notation and terminology of set theory, since it is
widespread and almost standard when dealing with such subjects. This could appear incoherent,
given my sympathies for kroneckerian finitism; however, it should be noted that, since, when I use
set-theoretical notions, I am always dealing with finite sets only, their employment is absolutely
innocent in this respect.
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placeholder .
A is a term iff one of the following cases holds:
a) A is 0;
b) A is a generic variable;
c) A is SB, where B is a term;
d) A is [B ϕ(p)]pC, where B and C are terms, p is a placeholder and ϕ(p) is a
string obtained from a term ϕ〈p〉 not containing p by replacing at least one
term in it with an occurrence of p.
Something is an equation iff it is ‘A = B’, where A and B are terms.
I will call both the symbol ‘S’ and any sequence of symbols ‘[A ϕ(p)]p’ primitive
recursive unary function (hereafter, also simply p.r.u. function), where A is a term,
p is a placeholder and ϕ(p) is a string obtained from a term ϕ〈p〉 not containing
p by replacing at least one term in it with an occurrence of p. Given a term A
containing a p.r.u. function, if f is the leftmost occurrence of a function contained
in A and B is the rightmost occurrence of a term contained in A, I will say that
B is the argument of f .
The notion of scope is defined here among terms, as simple containment: an
occurrence o(A) of a term A is in the scope of a term B iff B contains o(A).
I think that the choice of restricting the field only to p.r.u. functions, i.e. (p.r.)
functions with one single argument, has several welcome consequences: first of all,
it allows for a more compact and elegant description of the whole formal system;
secondly, it also allows for a much more natural treatment of quantification in
23
natural language.6
But what do we lose when we decide to deal only with unary functions? Of
course, the viability of such an option presupposes that there is a relevant sense
under which the right answer to this question is “nothing”. And so it is, in fact:
given a suitable formal system PR′ for p.r. functions without limitations of ariety,
we can build an effective procedure m : LPR′ 7→ LPR mapping equations of PR′
into equations of PR such that, if ‘`PR’ is the relation of entailment between
equations of PR and ‘`PR′ ’ is the relation of entailment between equations of
PR′ and α and β are equations of PR′, then α `PR′ β iff m(α) `PR m(β). Thus,
we can say that the inferential properties of the system do not change by allowing
functions of ariety greater than 1.
This fact can be seen as a primitive recursive version of an observation first
made by Schönfinkel (1924). Moreover, it extends readily to the expansions of PR
I am going to discuss below (in particular, to the system of recursive arithmetic
RA).
However, there is also a sense in which something gets lost. In fact, given again
a suitable formal system PR′ for p.r. functions without limitations of ariety, we
cannot build an effective procedure m : FPR′ ∪ N× 7→ FPR ∪ N mapping n-ary
p.r. functions into p.r.u. functions, n-tuples of numbers into numbers and terms
of PR′ into terms of PR such that, if ‘`PR’ is the relation of entailment between
equations of PR and ‘`PR′ ’ is the relation of entailment between equations of
PR′, then 0 = 0 `PR′ fn(N) = A iff 0 = 0 `PR m(fn)(m(N)) = m(A) for any
fn, N and A. As Robinson (1947) showed, such a result would only be possible
6Besides, a connection can even be seen between this issue and the need for simply binary
branching advocated in generative syntax in works like Kayne (1981, 1994), Larson (1988) and
Chomsky (1993, 1995).
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by adding at least one binary recursive function to the system. In any case, I
cannot see how this last circumstance could be viewed as a limitation, especially
for present purposes.
I will almost always use some abbreviations to designate terms of PR. As an
example, we may see the definitions of some elementary arithmetic operations such
as sum (in symbols, ‘+’) and product (in symbols, ‘·’), which will play a crucial
role in the following (the symbol ‘:=’ is used here for definitional identity):
(D1) (A+B) := [A S?]?B;
(D2)
(A ·B) := [0 (?+ A)]?B
:= [0 [? S ? ?]??A]?B.
I will call a term containing only ‘S’ and ‘0’ as symbols number ; I will call both
a generic variable and a number index. I will say that a term of PR is a closed
term if and only if it does not contain variables. Similarly, I will say that a p.r.u.
function not containing variables is a closed p.r.u. function.
The central notion of PR, as a deductive system, is that of a rule of inference,
that I am going to define through some schemata. In those schemata, a capital
Latin letter stands for a term, v is a generic variable, φ(A) is an equation containing
A, φ(A/B) is the equation obtained from φ(A) by substituting all occurrences of A
in it with a term B such that B does not contain placeholders contained in φ(A),
ϕ(A) is a term possibly containing A, ϕ(A/B) is a term obtained from ϕ(A) by
replacing any occurrence of A in it with B, α is an equation, p is a placeholder,
ϕ(p) is a string obtained from a term ϕ〈p〉 not containing p by replacing at least
one term in it with an occurrence of p and ϕ(p/A) is a term obtained from ϕ(p)
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by substituting all occurrences of p in it with A.
So, each syntactic object obtainable by substitution of equals with equals from
the following schemata is a rule of inference of PR.
Rule 3.1 (Transitivity: Goodstein’s (1954: 247) T)
A = B A = C (T )
B = C
Rule 3.2 (Particularization: Goodstein’s (1954: 247) Sb1)
φ(v) (P )
φ(v/A)
Rule 3.3 (Substitution: Goodstein’s (1954: 247) Sb2) 7
A = B (S)
ϕ(C/A) = ϕ(C/B)
Rule 3.4 (Function Application)
α (F0)[A ϕ(p)]p0 = A
α (FS)[A ϕ(p)]pSB = ϕ(p/[A ϕ(p)]pB)
A rule of inference is, thus, a syntactic object consisting of an horizontal line,
an equation-schema immediately below it and one or more equation-schemata
7This rule may be seen as a formal version of Leibniz’s Principle of the Indiscernibility of
Identicals, despite contrary opinions. This principle is taken to be part of the meaning of what
is known as Leibniz’s Law, expressed in his Discourse on Metaphysics, Section 9; see Leibniz
(1969: 308). For the problem of establishing if Leibniz explicitly held this principle attributed to
him, see Feldman (1970).
26
immediately above it. The equation-schemata above the line are also-called the
upper equation-schemata of the rule, while the one below the line is called the
lower equation-schema.
A derivation consists of a rooted tree (in the technical sense this expression has
in graph theory) in which the nodes are equations and the edges are labeled lines
interposed to the equations they connect as in a rule of inference. Each equation
α in a derivation, except from its leaves, at the top of the tree, is inferred by one
of the rules of inference given above, i.e. there is a rule of inference r such that α is
obtainable by substitution from the lower equation-schema of r and its daughters
can be accordingly obtained by substitution from the upper equation-schemata of
r8 in such a way that, taking into account α and its daughters collectively, the
same metavariables of r have been replaced by the same items. The tag of the
rule of inference is the label of the edge connecting α to its daughters; I will write
it on the left of the lines horizontally separating the equations.
If ~α are all the equations, without repetitions, appearing in the leaves of a
derivation in PR whose root is the equation β, then I will say that β has been
derived in PR from ~α and I will write ‘~α `PR β’; if in all the leaves of a derivation
there is the equation ‘0 = 0’ and its root is the equation α, then I will also call
that derivation a proof and I will say that α has been proved in PR.9 If α `PR β
and β `PR α, I will also write ‘α a`PR β’.10
8As for the upper equation-schemata, which are possibly more than one, this precisely amounts
to saying that α’s daughter in the ith position from left to right can be obtained by substitution
from the ith upper equation-schema, again from left to right, of r.
9The equation ‘0 = 0’ plays, in a system of RA employed to model human reasoning, the
same role that ‘>’ plays in CL, i.e., more or less, that of an autoevident truth, from which any
truism may be derived (see Goodstein (1957)).
10In the following, I will always use metavariables over syntactic objects of PR, still speaking
simply of “derivations” and “proofs” instead of derivation-schemata and proof-schemata respec-
tively, as would be more correct.
27
An example of derivation in PR can be found in §B.2.
We could prove that there is an effective procedure to establish, for any (finite)
set of equations ⋃ni=1{αi} of PR and any equation β of PR, if ⋃ni=1{αi} `PR β.
This result, even if limited to equations not containing terms other than closed
ones, arises as a consequence of a theorem stated in Meyer (1965) and Ritchie
(1965) and proved in Meyer & Ritchie (1967b,a) (based on results in Axt (1963,
1965) and Cobham (1964); see also Odifreddi (1999: 297)).
Now, we are in a position to define the behaviour of a p.r.u. function in accor-
dance with the standard terminology: we can say that the value of a closed p.r.u.
function f for the closed argument A is the number N iff 0 = 0 `PR fA = N .
In the following, I will conform to a quite standard usage by employing the
first of the two notations below in place of the latter one:
(1)

f0 = A
fSx = ϕ(p/x)
:= f := [A ϕ(p)]p 11
The usual notion of “function” of course does not correspond to that of a “p.r.u.
function”, nor does the usual notion of “operation”. However, I will continue to
employ both these terms quite freely, since they are very common, but with the
specification that here they are conceived as simply denoting term-schemata. In
accordance with the standard convention, I will also possibly employ the terms
“functor” and “operator”, meaning the syntactic object which is used to build,
respectively, a certain function or a certain operation, but again with the implicit
11Note that the identity of two terms differing only in the placeholders they contain (i.e., such
that each one can be obtained from the other by substitution of equals with equals among the
placeholders it contains) cannot still be proven in PR: it needs (U) (combined with (S)), the
rule of inference introduced in RA, to prove it.
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assumption that the function and the operation are interpreted as above.
The following functions, called respectively the predecessor function (with func-
tor ‘P ’) and the integer difference function (with functor ‘ ·−’), are crucially em-
ployed, following Hilbert & Bernays (1934), to define in primitive recursive terms
some central logical operators like connectives and bounded quantifiers (see §6.2
and §7.1, respectively):
(D3)

P (0) = 0
P (SA) = A
(D4)

A ·− 0 = A
A ·− SB = P (A ·−B)
It is useful to already introduce the following abbreviations, which I will employ
further in many semantic representations. They are, respectively, the standard
logical conjunction, logical disjunction, logical negation and material implication
and the relation of being less than or equal to:
(2) (A ∧B) := (A+B);
(3) (A ∨B) := (A ·B);
(4) ¬A := 1 ·− A;
(5) (A→ B) := (¬A ∨B);
(6) (A ≤ B) := (A ·−B).
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The following ones are, instead, the definitions of new functors, namely bounded
universal and existential quantifiers, respectively:
(D5)

(∀x ≤ 0)ϕ(x) = ϕ(0)
(∀x ≤ SA)ϕ(x) = ϕ(SA) ∧ (∀x ≤ A)ϕ(x)
(D6)

(∃x ≤ 0)ϕ(x) = ϕ(0)
(∃x ≤ SA)ϕ(x) = ϕ(SA) ∨ (∃x ≤ A)ϕ(x)
Subsequently, I will adopt the usual conventions to reduce the number of paren-
theses. In particular:
a) the pair of outermost parentheses is omitted;
b) product takes precedence over sum and integer difference; hence, for instance,
‘A+B · C’ is shorthand for ‘A+ (B · C)’;
c) conjunction and disjunction take precedence over material implication; hence,
for instance, ‘A→ B ∧ C’ is shorthand for ‘A→ (B ∧ C)’;
d) in all cases not covered by (b) and (c), operators associate on the left; hence,
if • and ◦ are binary operators, then ‘A•B ◦C’ is shorthand for ‘(A•B)◦C’.
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Chapter 4
Recursive arithmetic
4.1 A logic-free system of recursive arithmetic
Building on Dedekind’s work, Skolem (1923) developed a formal deductive system
for arithmetic which was intended to avoid the paradoxes which emerged in the
foundations of mathematics at the end of the Nineteenth century and the beginning
of the Twentieth; this system and other formal systems equivalent to it are now
known as (Primitive) Recursive Arithmetic (henceforth, also simply ‘RA’).
Basing himself on insights first formulated in Hilbert & Bernays (1934) and
developed in Gödel (1931), Goodstein (1954) simplified Skolem’s (1923) original
system by formulating it in a logic-free shape, overcoming a philosophical problem
raised by an analogous system of Curry.
The possibility of building RA dispensing with the incorporation of some logical
notions as basic may be viewed as giving substance to Poincaré’s claims about
the priority of mathematics over logic and the irreducibility of the principle of
mathematical induction to any set of logical principles. Something close to this
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view can also be found in the following quotation from Hilbert (1926: 376):1
Kant already taught—and indeed it is part and parcel of his doctrine—
that mathematics has at its disposal a content secured independently of
all logic and hence can never be provided with a foundation by means
of logic alone; that is why the efforts of Frege and Dedekind were bound
to fail. Rather, as a condition for the use of logical inferences and the
performance of logical operations, something must already be given to
our faculty of representation, certain extra logical concrete objects that
are intuitively present as immediate experience prior to all thought. If
logical inference is to be reliable, it must be possible to survey these
objects completely in all their parts, and the fact that they occur,
that they differ from one another, and that they follow each other, or
are concatenated, is immediately given intuitively, together with the
objects, as something that neither can be reduced to anything else
nor requires reduction. This is the basic philosophical position that
I consider requisite for mathematics and, in general, for all scientific
thinking, understanding, and communication. And in mathematics, in
particular, what we consider is the concrete signs themselves, whose
shape, according to the conception we have adopted, is immediately
clear and recognizable.
Actually, for some scholars logic-free systems of RA not only show that there
are mathematical concepts independent from logical ones, but, moreover, that the
latter ones depend on the former.
1The reference is to the English translation.
32
The RA system of recursive arithmetic introduced here is an extension of the
previous PR system, obtained by simply adding the following rule of inference (and
modifying accordingly, when necessary, the definitions of the syntactic objects of
PR), where Φ(A) (with Φ equal to either ϕ or ψ or χ) is a term containing the
term A and Φ(A/B) is a term obtained from Φ(A) by substituting all occurrences
of A in it with a term B:
Rule 4.1 (Uniqueness of Recursion: Goodstein’s (1954: 248) U1) 2
ϕ(0) = ψ(0) ϕ(S(v)) = χ(A/ϕ(v)) ψ(S(u)) = χ(A/ψ(u)) (U)
ϕ(A) = ψ(A)
The resulting system corresponds to Goodstein’s (1954) system of RA, apart
from the peculiar way I adopted to syntactically represent functions defined by
recursion.
Examples of derivations in RA can be found in §B.3.
It is worth quoting the following passage from Goodstein (1951: 9–10), where
the link between RA and Poincaré’s idea that logic should be considered as re-
ducible to mathematics, while not vice versa, is made clear:
2This is not precisely Goodstein’s (1954) original formulation, but it can be immediately
obtained from it by successive applications of (S) and is intended to make some derivations
easier.
Given the other rules of inference, the Uniqueness of Recursion can be derived from a suitable
formalization of the more common induction principle, and vice versa (see Goodstein (1945) for
a proof). For the informal characterization of this principle given by Poincaré, see the quotation
at p. 14 above (even if nowadays it is far more common to enunciate it by making reference to
the number 0 instead of 1).
As far as I know, the induction principle, applied very early in the history of mathematics,
was first explicitly stated in Grassmann (1861). The uniqueness of primitive recursion, however,
appears to be, in Goodstein’s (1972: 281) words, “a far more intuitively acceptable notion”
than induction; Goodstein (1972: 280–1), besides, attributes the justification of induction in
terms of the uniqueness of the function defined by the recursive definition to Wittgenstein (see
Wittgenstein (1969)).
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Constructivism and formalism found a point of contact in recursive
number theory which was developed by Skolem, and by Herbrand and
Gödel in their construction of non-demonstrable propositions. Recur-
sive number theory plays a fundamental part in the fusion of these two
modes of thought in the present work.
The aim of constructive formalism is to replace the intuitive notion
of a finitist proof by the strictly formal property of demonstrability in
a formal system. This is accomplished by the construction of a mathe-
matical system—the equation calculus—which operates independently
of the axioms and constants of logic. This system affords a means
of proving certain types of logical formulæ and consequently effects a
reduction of logic to mathematics.
The necessity for some equivalent of the theory of types involves any
system founded upon the concept of class in intolerable complications,
but even apart from questions of expediency there are good grounds
for denying the class concept a primary part in a mathematical system.
The equation calculus gives to function the fundamental role that clas-
sical analysis assigns to related classes. A function is defined by the
introductory equations of its sign, which by means of the transforma-
tion rules of the calculus, serve to transform the function-sign into a
definite numeral, when definite numerals are assigned to the argument
places in the function-sign.
Anticipating what will turn out to be one crucial issue in this dissertation, one
main difference between RA and classical logic (hereafter, simply ‘CL’) is that,
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in RA, quantifiers are no longer primitive symbols of the formal language, but
can only be defined as special recursive functions and, moreover, they can only be
defined in a way which makes them have a different property with respect to tra-
ditional quantifiers, namely that of being bounded. A bounded universal quantifier
ranging over natural numbers, for instance, can be used to convey the information
that all numbers up to a certain one have a given property: it cannot be used
to say, however, that any natural number has that property. To say something
like that, the only way that RA has at its disposal is that of employing generic
variables (which, in fact, can be substituted by any number through Particular-
ization): but, crucially, generic variables are not p.r.u. functions and, thus, they
are scopeless.
Despite the apparent limitations derived from not having the unbounded ver-
sions of quantifiers at its disposal,3 RA turns out to be a very powerful system.
Tait (1968, 1981, 2002, 2005) defended the idea thatRA can capture all finitist rea-
soning. Besides, Feferman & Strahm (2010) provided further technical support to
that claim and Feferman (1990) demonstrated that one can design a theory which
is expressive enough to capture computational practice but which has “only” the
computational strength of RA.4 In a similar vein, Odifreddi (1999: 286) states
3Which, however, can be seen as meaningful only from a theory-dependent perspective.
4Actually, several scholars have advanced the idea that even strictly weaker systems can do the
job. I should mention at least Harvey Friedman’s “grand conjecture”, which implies that many
mathematical theorems, such as Fermat’s last theorem, can be proved in Elementary Function
Arithmetic (also-called “Exponential Function Arithmetic”; abbreviated, EFA), a system strictly
weaker than RA. The original statement of the conjecture, formulated in 1999, is the following:
Every theorem published in the Annals of Mathematics whose statement involves
only finitary mathematical objects (i.e., what logicians call an arithmetical state-
ment) can be proved in EFA. EFA is the weak fragment of Peano Arithmetic based
on the usual quantifier-free axioms for 0, 1, +, ×, exp, together with the scheme of
induction for all formulas in the language all of whose quantifiers are bounded.
35
that “[t]he class of p.r. functions is probably the most natural subrecursive class”.
Finally, notice that rule (P ) of Particularization, essentially involving generic
variables, formally corresponds to the familiar rule of Elimination of the Universal
Quantifier (∀E) in CL; for this reason, and for the technical result in 4.1 below
showing that, under certain conditions, generic variables behave exactly like uni-
versal quantifiers as definable in primitive recursive terms, I will say that generic
variables are universal-alike. Besides, since generic variables are not functions, the
rule can apply taking as its premise any equation containing a generic variable,
unlike (∀E), which cannot directly apply if the universal quantifier is embedded
under another logical operator: in other words, generic variables behave like widest
scope quantifiers, while they behave, between themselves, as if they were scope in-
sensitive (this last fact is analogous to what happens with traditional universal
quantifiers, since, if there is no other logical operator taking intermediate scope
between them, inverting their reciprocal scope makes the starting equation turn
into an equivalent one).
Theorem 4.1 v ≤ n→ ϕ(v) a`RA (∀x ≤ n)ϕ(x).
The sense from right to left corresponds to Goodstein’s (1957: 84) theorem 3.832,
given his Deduction Theorem (Goodstein (1954: 255) and Goodstein (1957: 114)).
The sense from left to right arises as an immediate consequence of Goodstein’s
(1957: 84–5) theorems 3.81 and 3.95 (via, again, the Deduction Theorem). 2
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4.2 Grounding the formal system
Finally, I also define an extension of RA, leading to the definitive system which
I will adopt as the background formal system below and which I will dub RAt.
RAt differs from RA only in a minimal way, starting from the introduction of a
new symbol in the alphabet:
AlphRAt = AlphRA ∪ {t}.
t is called the indexical term, and it is a (basic) term of RAt: all the definitions
of the other syntactic objects of RAt are identical to those of the syntactic objects
of RA, since t does not play a particular role in any rule of inference; the reasons
behind its introduction will be explained in §6.4.
However, we can already observe that, because its both playing the role of an
argument within RAt terms and also not being essentially involved in any rule of
inference of the system, it is the only element of RAt which has the features of a
pure rigid designator (in Kripke’s (1980) famous sense). For this reason, it is after
its introduction that I want to define (somehow in a still mysterious fashion, for the
moment) a notion of consistency for a set of formulæ ⋃ni=1{αi} of RAt: ⋃ni=1{αi}
is consistent iff, for some number N and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, t = N `RAt αi.
Note that this notion of consistency somewhat differs from the standard one,
according to which a set of formulæ is consistent iff it does not derive both a
formula and its logical negation. First of all, we should observe that, in the logic-
free version of RAt I am adopting, negation is not a primitive symbol and so
needs to be defined as a p.r.u. function (as in §(4)): it would be, thus, quite odd
if such a general metalinguistic notion should have to rely on a derived concept.
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Secondly, and much more importantly, the problem with the standard definition is
that, from a finitist point of view, no one sees how the relevant notion of derivation
should be bounded there, i.e. up to what length (arguably defined in functional
terms) derivations should be checked in order to decide if a given entity bears the
property or not.
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Part II
Recursive arithmetic and natural
language semantics

Chapter 5
Terms of recursive arithmetic as
semantic representations
5.1 A remark on ontology
Considerations of ontology may play a central role in developing a semantic theory
for natural languages. In particular, this has been the case within the dominant
paradigm of modern semantics, namely model-theoretic semantics, as conceived,
for instance, by Davidson and Montague.
The first thing to keep in mind before trying to outline a semantic theory built
upon RA is probably, thus, the kind of objects RA is designed to deal with, i.e.
natural numbers. Prima facie, this feature may appear as a severe limitation af-
fecting a similar enterprise from the very beginning. Natural numbers, however,
have been shown for a long time to be capable of suitably representing a wide range
of empirical data:1 in particular, given whatever (finite) set of atomic entities (no
1Gödel’s (1931) famous arithmetization of the syntax of Peano Arithmetic can be viewed as
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matter, here, if they have to be conceived as perceptual atoms or not) and what-
ever (finite) set of operations combining tokens of these atoms to obtain (finite)
combinations, the objects thus obtained may be effectively (i.e., by a specified al-
gorithmic procedure) put in a bijective correspondence with natural numbers. We
say that, in so doing, we have coded our objects through natural numbers, and that
the procedure we have followed for that purpose is a coding function.2 This can
be done, for instance, by considering a total order of the objects and associating
its ordering number to each of them. The most common total order employed
for that purpose is by far the shortlex order (also, “quasi-lexicographic order”,
“radix order” and “length-plus-lexicographic order”), which assigns priority to the
shortest objects (under a relevant specified parameter of length) and then, to the
objects with the same length, assigns priority following a given alphabetical or-
dering (see for instance Quine (1946: 113), and Kantrowitz (2000: 41) for more
explicit descriptions).
Coding procedures are entering into the folk culture, in an era where computers,
which are able to handle an impressive amount of different data (some of which
happen to have a perceptual correlate, given that computers make one see images
in their monitors and hear sounds through their woofers) by ultimately coding
them with natural numbers in a binary numerical base, play such an important
role in everyday life.
Hence, given this state of affairs, the ontological problem significantly shifts to
that of establishing if an ontology entirely based on discrete finite entities suffices
an early example of procedures designed for that purpose. I will come back to this subsequently.
2Given the standard terminology, this is not a precise way of stating. However, it seems to
me that, under finitist assumptions, no other status can be assigned to functions than that of
procedures (of a peculiar sort, maybe).
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for the aim of building a suitable semantic theory for natural languages. If this
problem and the ontological problem of determining if there are only discrete finite
entities in reality coincide, it is a much more intricate and, thus, debatable subject;
I suspect that they do, however, and this should be taken, I believe, as the default
assumption. Moreover, note that, if they do, the problem is, once again, that of
determining if a potential infinite is all we can get, or we effectively also need
actual infinities, conceived as special objects populating our real world; in other
words, the problem is still that of accepting or refusing the existence of classes as
defined by modern set theory.
The assumption that an ontology entirely based on discrete finite entities suf-
fices for the aim of building a suitable semantic theory for natural languages is not,
of course, an innocent one, but it seems to me (as well as to many others) very
reasonable. If one disagrees with this assumption and at the same time considers
the ontological issue for a theory of meaning essential, then he should probably
believe that the project of founding natural language semantics over RA is under-
mined from the very beginning; at best, he could look at a formalism like RAt as
possibly being employed to model a proper subpart of natural language semantics.
Most linguists, however, usually assign the precedence to features different from
ontological ones, in evaluating the sins and virtues of a given semantic theory.
In particular, a topic of major and still increasing interest is the way a certain
semantic theory shapes the interface between semantics and syntax. This topic is
strictly interlaced with that of the format of semantic representations, which I am
addressing in the next section.
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5.2 Semantic representations
Today, there are several different theories of meaning on the market. As I said
before, probably the dominant paradigm in formal linguistics is that of model-
theoretic semantics (also, “referential semantics” or “truth-conditional seman-
tics”), originated in the work by Donald Davidson and Richard Montague in the
Sixties, but rooted much earlier at least in some of Frege’s, Wittgenstein’s, Tarski’s
and Carnap’s writings. This paradigm has come under attack from several lin-
guists, especially some of those trained in the tradition of earlier generative syntax
(one among many examples being Hornstein (1984), on which I will importantly
rely in the following), for the essential use it makes of extralinguistic notions like
those of “truth” and “reference”.
It is also still alive, however, the tradition often labeled as the “meaning as use”
paradigm, which can be traced back to the second Wittgenstein and which has
recently found new life and moved from the philosophy of ordinary language to the
field of formal semantics thanks to the increasing work in so-called proof-theoretic
semantics, a branch of research rooted in Gentzen’s, Prawitz’s and Dummett’s
writings and now especially promoted by Peter Schroeder-Heister and, in linguis-
tics, by Nissim Francez and Roy Dickhoff.
Finally, there is a wide and varied galaxy of so-called representationalist (some-
times, “mentalist”) approaches, which encountered great success in the Sixties and
Seventies among linguists and are still dominant among cognitive scientists and AI
researchers,3 and which can be traced back at least to Katz & Fodor (1963) and
3To mention but a few, see the works by Jerry Fodor, Steven Pinker, or William J. Rapaport.
Also Kamp’s Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), which attracted a considerable following
in formal semantics, is a kind of representational theory of meaning.
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Katz & Postal (1964): the fundamental idea of this paradigm is that meanings are
nothing more than combinations of symbols in some special language physically
realized in the human brain (with no exceptions I am aware of, scholars belonging
to this school postulate that this language must be universal for all human beings;
Katz & Fodor (1963) dubbed it “Markerese”, while Steven Pinker “Mentalese”).4
Even if I feel sympathetic with this latter approach, here, it is of course impos-
sible to do even partial justice to the huge and difficult question of what meanings
actually are; rather, I simply want to stress the fact that, in spite of such a variety
of approaches in formal semantics (and the ones I have mentioned do not exhaust
the list), these approaches all share one notable feature, namely that of associating
natural language sentences to some semantic representations (usually expressed in
some suitable formal language).5 Moreover, independently of the fact that they
identify these semantic representations with meanings or with syntactic objects
isomorphic to meanings (like in the representationalist approach) or not (like in
the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic approaches), all these theories make an
essential use of these semantic representations; in other words, whether or not
they assign the status of theoretically relevant objects to semantic representations,
all these theories nevertheless must at least rely on their indispensable heuristic
contribution.6
4Procedural semantics can be viewed as a special branch of this line of research.
I assume that an important consequence of a representationalist theory of meaning, which
distinguishes it from both the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic approach, is that, on the
basis of its assumptions, two sentences established as logically equivalent under a suitable notion
of logical equivalence do not necessarily have the same meaning.
5The requirement that the language in which representations are built be a formal one is not,
however, essential.
6There seems to be a strong connection between finitism in the philosophy of mathematics
and the representationalist paradigm in semantics, since typical non-representationalist notions
of meaning are not (primitive) recursive.
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See, in this regard, what Dowty (1994: 114) says:
It is [. . . ] a truism that humans do not carry anything analogous to
infinite sets of possible worlds or situations around in their heads, so
the study of deduction—inferential relations based on syntactic prop-
erties of some kind of “representations” of denotations—are potentially
of relevance to the psychology of language and to computational pro-
cessing of meaning in a way that model-theoretic semantics alone is
not.
Needless to say, stressing this quite trivial fact does not imply that notions
such as those of “entailment” or “truth” do not play any role in doing semantics:
even if one is not forced to commit himself to the claim that such notions play a
role in any proper definition of what meanings are, I think that nobody can deny
their fundamental methodological contribution to the development of a theory of
meaning.7 To be less vague, consider the obvious fact that patterns of entailment
relations holding between sentences in a certain natural language do also regularly
hold between proper translations of those sentences into another language. This
is clear evidence that the surface form of sentences does not play a direct role in
determining its entailment relations with other sentences. But since there must
be some property of the sentences which directly determines these relations (oth-
erwise, we should call for an oracle to come to our aid), it seems natural to look
at their meaning for that purpose. Hence, we can naturally expect that different
inferential properties ultimately relate to different meanings.8 As it is standard
7As for the notion of “reference”, however, things are probably different, since it seems im-
possible to entirely abandon it at least when addressing the problem of the meaning of indexical
expressions.
8The opposite is not at all obvious. In particular, under any plausible representationalist
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practice, thus, I will freely make use of judgements about entailment relations to
illustrate differences in meaning between sentences. Notice that judgements of this
sort allow the derivation with absolute certainty of only negative conclusions, i.e.
conclusions stating that the meanings of two sentences are not the same, and not
positive ones, stating that the meanings of two sentences are the same.
Let me say also that, as I see it, judgements about so-called “truth conditions”
are actually a special sort of judgements about entailment relations.9 Anybody in
semantics, notwithstanding his idiosyncratic preferences for one theory of meaning
or another, commonly argues for two sentences having different meanings by show-
ing that they have different “truth conditions”, i.e. that there is a certain scenario
in which one of them is true while the other is false. This is best understood, I
believe, by saying that in this case what he does is simply build a certain consistent
set S of premisses (it does not matter for this argument if they are sentences or
logical forms), which collectively describe the intended scenario, and showing that
the first sentence and the (logical) negation of the second both logically follow
from it.10
For this reason, I also considered it necessary to define the rules of inference
governing deductions between formulæ of RAt, whose language I will try to show
as adequate for the building of semantic representations of natural language sen-
tences, even if, strictly speaking, the specification of such rules pertains to logic
theory of meaning, it is plainly false, at least setting aside phenomena of pragmatic nature.
9In this respect, I think that I am closer to proof-theoretic semanticists in conceiving the
notion of “truth” as less fundamental than, and dependent on, the notion of “proof”. However,
as it is clear from what I have just said, this does not imply that the notion of “proof” should
be seen as taking part in the definition of meaning.
10The specification that S must be consistent is not a dispensable one, otherwise the Principle
of Explosion would apply, trivializing the deductive machinery to the extent that all derivations
from S would be valid. For a formalization of the relevant notion of “consistency” in primitive
recursive terms, see §4.2 above.
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rather than to semantics.
In particular, I assume that one of the goals of a semantic theory (be it the final
one, as I believe, or a preliminary one) is that of providing, for any given natural
language L, an explicit algorithm, namely a function J KL,11 such that J KL maps
each syntactic object of L (from single morphemes up to whole discourses) into a
semantic representation, i.e. a syntactic object of a suitable formal language, say
L. According to what I said before, J KL must be such that, given two discourses A
and B of L, A⇒L B (i.e., A entails B) iff JAKL `L JBKL. This is to be understood,
however, as a merely necessary condition, not a sufficient one: impressionistically
speaking, such a mapping should additionally be as harmonious as possible. I will
call J KL the interpretation function for L.12
I assume, however, essentially in line with standard assumptions held in the
literature, that, whatever formal language we choose to represent the meanings of
syntactic units of a given natural language is, it should formally assign the kind
of meanings which one can properly establish entailment relations between only
to whole discourses, among the syntactic units which have an overt realization
(consider, in this regard, the formal treatment of sentential boundaries as covert
conjunctions which is familiar in dynamic semantic theories: see, for instance,
Heim (1982: 40)).
11In the following, I will often omit the subscript denoting the particular language where no
possible ambiguity arises, or where I want to refer succinctly to properties that I assume to be
shared by such a function relative to any natural language.
12This is not, of course, an interpretation function in the sense of model-theoretic semantics.
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5.3 The theoretical claim
Once we have acknowledged that semantic representations play a crucial role in
any theory of linguistic meaning and we are inclined to neglect possible ontological
objections, I think we are in a position to appreciate the relevance of the questions
I am trying to address.
Actually, classical first order logic, which, however expanded or modified, is at
the base of standard modelizations of natural language semantics, was originally
designed to deal with exactly the same ontology as RA, i.e. with the set of natural
numbers. In particular, formal systems of arithmetic based on CL and incorpo-
rating into their language non-logical symbols to define p.r. functions have been
widely investigated and employed. Let FOA (First Order Arithmetic) be such a
language where no restriction on formulæ instantiating its induction schema has
been imposed13 and let FOAt be the system obtained from FOA by adding to its
alphabet the individual term t, which behaves exactly like in RAt, i.e. as a name
of an unspecified number: then we can build a function f : L(RAt) 7→ L(FOAt),
mapping equations of RAt into formulæ of FOAt, such that, for any two equations
α, β ∈ L(RAt), α `RAt β iff f(α) `FOAt f(β). However, the converse is not possi-
ble, i.e. we cannot build an analogous mapping function g : L(FOAt) 7→ L(RAt)
such that, for any two formulæ α, β ∈ L(FOAt), α `FOAt β iff g(α) `RAt g(β).
In particular, what would remain beyond the expressive power of RAt are, as I
have already said, unbounded existential quantifiers and, when they are embedded
within the scope of another operator, also unbounded universal ones.
13What I am going to say actually holds for much weaker formal systems imposing restrictions
on formulæ instantiating the induction schema; in particular, systems where restrictions on the
combinations of unbounded quantifiers appearing inside their formulæ have been well studied.
This point, however, is completely orthogonal to the one I am making.
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Now, if we could show that this extra expressive power is indeed needed once we
employ logical formulæ of a certain formal system to build semantic representations
of natural language sentences, then we would have shown ipso facto that RAt
cannot do the job. This would be the case, in particular, if we were able to show
one of the following things:
a) that at least some natural languages have verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs
or prepositions which cannot be translated as p.r.u. functions;
b) that at least some natural languages have determiners which must be trans-
lated as unbounded existential quantifiers;
c) that at least some natural languages have determiners which must be trans-
lated as unbounded universal quantifiers and which are within the scope of
another operator.
As for the first circumstance, I have no evidence that it holds for any language.
As for the other two, instead, I suspect that it would be pretty hard to empirically
prove them, since it is a well-known fact that there is an abundance of covert
arguments in natural language, and, besides, restrictors of DPs are known to be
often incomplete and in need of being contextually constrained (see Kuroda (1982)
and Sperber & Wilson (1986), among many others); so, it would be difficult to
clearly show that there are cases like the ones just mentioned where the determiners
in question truly come in an unbounded fashion.
Conversely, there is at least one way to suggest that a formalism like that
of RAt best serves natural language semantics rather than its CL competitors:
to show that in natural languages there are elements corresponding to generic
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variables, i.e. scopeless elements which are universal-alike and are interpreted as
if they had wide scope over functional operators while they were scope-insensitive
between themselves. This will be what I will argue in Ch. 7.
One could maintain that, even if I succeeded in showing that proper semantic
representations for natural language sentences need to have at their disposal some-
thing structurally analogous to generic variables, i.e. translating scopeless elements
which are universal-alike, still this would not be, per se, an argument in favour of
RA as the proper formal basis upon which to found natural language semantics,
since scopeless elements of this kind could be, for instance, easily incorporated in
a formal system like standard first-order or higher-order logic. However, I should
reply that the really crucial way to argue against the application of RA to natural
language is by showing that unbounded quantifiers (or, more generally, elements
which are not defined as p.r.u. functions) are indeed present in natural languages:
RAt, where (bounded) quantifiers are only some special p.r.u. functions and, thus,
are not primitives of the system, is indeed a very simple formal system, arguably
minimally simple and certainly much simpler than any possible version of CL; thus,
if no extra expressive power is needed, it should be preferred on the grounds of
general epistemological principles. Moreover, if we had a system with unbounded
universal quantifiers, there would be no need for generic variables, since all their
inferential behaviour could be reproduced by wide scope universal quantifiers: the
presence of those free variables in the system would thus require an independent
motivation showing what has been gained at the cost of such an anti-economical
move: the least we can say is that the task of providing such an independent
motivation would hardly be a trivial one.
The hypothesis I am going to partly explore, hence, is that the outputs of J K
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are terms of RAt.14
Of course, here I will give only a partial characterization of the interpretation
function: this is to say that I will equate the term resulting from the application
of the interpretation function to a compound linguistic expression to another term
where the interpretation function, whenever present, is applied only to components
of the previous expressions.15
Note, as well, that we should assume that something corresponding to indices
appears at the level of the syntactic representation which feeds the semantic com-
ponent (LF, for instance): I will assume that indices themselves do. The existence
of something playing this role at some suitable level of the syntactic representa-
tion is in line with most linguistic approaches to quantification, starting from the
Quantifying-In device of Montague (1970a,b, 1973) to Lakoff’s Quantifier Lowering
or the most famous Quantifier Raising by May.
The semantic theory I am going to sketch is a top-down semantics in the
technical sense defined, for instance, in Hodges (2012: §3): in other words, semantic
derivation is taken to procede from the meaning of the largest expressions to that
of their components, down to the semantic atoms.
14The assumption that what we need are terms of the system allows us to define the interpre-
tation function in a much simpler way with respect to what we should do by assuming that the
outputs were equations of the system, as in Goodstein (1957: Ch.3). Besides, the central intu-
ition informing the theory of illocutionary operators (see §5.4 below) suggests that this treatment
should be preferred also for independent reasons.
I believe that this assumption is in line with Partee’s (2009) suggestion (ultimately based
on Carstairs-McCarthy (1999)) of the viability of a semantic theory based on one single basic
semantic type. But, again, Schönfinkel (1924) can be viewed as a forerunner.
15Note that this requirement does not imply that the semantic theory I am arguing for is a
compositional one. In fact, I believe that, where fully developed, it would not be, like many
others on the market. In particular, what I consider to be the crucial obstacle to a compositional
theory of meaning, in agreement with nearly all scholars challenging compositionality, is the
proper semantic treatment of intensionality.
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5.4 The illocutionary operator ‘ASSERT’
One last thing has to be done before moving to semantic analyses proper. As I have
said before, judgements about entailments (among which, I argued, a prominent
role is played by those concerning truth conditions) are a precious methodological
tool in order to describe the meanings of natural language discourses or their
subparts. However, it is often assumed, following a line of thought inaugurated by
Frege (1918), that these judgements, rather than directly applying to the meanings
of discourses themselves, apply to their assertions, i.e. to a specific speech act
differing from others sharing which share with it the same semantic content.
To this extent, Frege (1918) introduced the notion of illocutionary force (Be-
hauptung, in the German original) in order to be able to distinguish different state-
ments that seem to share the same core content. This is the case, for instance,
with the following sentences:
(7) a. Gianni ate the potatoes.
b. Did Gianni eat the potatoes?
Frege said that sentences like (7a) and (7b) have the same content, but (7a) ex-
presses it with interrogative force, while (7b) expresses it with assertive force.16
After Frege, it has oftenbeen assumed, in formal semantics, that illocutionary
force is conveyed by a specific operator present in a suitable (pragmatic) repre-
sentation of the speech act and which is standardly conceived as a unary non-
embeddable operator (illocutionary force was expressed through operators first by
16This minimal list, of course, does not exhaust the inventory of illocutionary forces discussed
in the literature.
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Zaefferer (1982), whose analysis collocated itself within the framework of Mon-
tague’s grammar; for a simplified treatment, more in line with the one proposed
here and where the standard labels were introduced, see Jacobs (1984a,b)): in
the case of assertive force, it is usually labelled “ASSERT”, while for interrogative
force we usually have “QUESTION”. Besides than in Jacobs (1984a,b), ‘ASSERT’
has been adopted also by Krifka (1992, 1999) and, more recently, by Chierchia
(2006).
To maintain the assumption that all outputs of J K are terms of RAt, I treat
illocutionary operators, and in particular ‘ASSERT’, as mere symbols denoting
the operation by which one obtains a certain kind of speech act from a certain
semantic representation of a discourse in some natural language.17 In the case of
assertions, the operation can be formally represented in the following way (where
D is a discourse in the natural language under examination):18
(8) ASSERT(α) = JαK = 0.
Now, we are in a position to define a relation between terms of RAt which is
a formal equivalent of the intuitive notion of semantic equivalence between dis-
courses. The definition goes this way:
17The presence of a non-embeddable operator ‘ASSERT’ in declarative sentences allows us to
define the interpretation function in a simpler way compared with how we should do without
it. One can look at Goodstein (1957: Ch.3), where the logical operators are defined in a rather
more complex way as a consequence of having had to make propositions directly correspond to
equations of RA, to convince himself of this. I take this to be evidence enough that we should
assume the presence of such an operator even in the case it was not opposed to other illocutionary
operators like ‘QUESTION’.
18Notice that we could have made the machinery work also by choosing a number other than
‘0’, in (8). However, the choice of ‘0’ allows for the simplest treatment of the semantics and,
thus, has a considerable theoretical appeal and an a priori greater empirical plausibility.
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(9) α⇔ β = ASSERT(α) = 0 a`RAt ASSERT(β) = 0.
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Chapter 6
Neutral semantic representations
One of the aims of this dissertation is to show that the proper definition of the
semantic contribution of some classes of words or some syntactic structures in
natural languages is best explained by appealing to the kind of semantic represen-
tations which can be provided by a formal system likeRAt and which no formalism
of a different kind can provide. In doing so, I also need, first, to define in RAt
terms the semantic contribution of particular words, lexical categories and phrases
whose semantic analysis recast in RAt terms does not depart from standard ones
present already in the literature in any vital respect.
Most, if not all, classes of linguistic expressions I will consider in the following
have received several different syntactic analyses, sometimes without still having
reached a consensus among the majority of linguists as to which one of them should
be preferred; however, I will simply choose one of the analyses I am aware of (of
course, the one I feel more likely to be on the right track), without discussing
alternative proposals. I believe, however, that most syntactic frameworks are
compatible with the semantic treatment I am going to develop (even if I will offer
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no proof supporting this claim).
6.1 Lexical words
6.1.1 Verbs
At least since Tesnière (1959), it has become customary in linguistics to think that
each verb comes with a certain valence, corresponding to the number of arguments
that must associate with it in the clause in order to preserve grammaticality (a
correspondent idea already held in formal logic at least since De Morgan (1864)).
However the syntactic relation between the verb and its arguments has to be
specified, this does not imply, in natural languages, the overt realization of a certain
argument (see, among others, Carlson (1984)). Consider for instance a verb like
give, typically treated as a 3-valent verb, i.e. a verb associating with three different
arguments, namely a subject, a direct object and an indirect object.1 Look now
at the following sentences:
(10) Gianni gave an umbrella to Luisa.
(11) #Gianni gave an umbrella.
(12) #Gianni gave to Luisa.
(13) #Gianni gave.
1When referring to the valence of a verb, here, I am deliberately not taking into account, for
the sake of simplicity, the presence of at least the temporal argument and the event argument,
besides the other ones. As for the event argument, I will introduce it shortly below in §6.1.2.
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All the sentences where one or more arguments of the verb is missing (i.e., (11)–
(13)) would sound odd, as the gate symbol signals, when given out of the blue.
However, contexts that make them fine are not hard to find. Consider for instance
the following scenario:
(14) There has been an event called the “Mutual Support Day”, and partici-
pants have been asked to give a present to someone living in their neigh-
bourhood.
In the scenario described in (14) all the sentences (11)–(13) become felicitous. It
is important to note, however, that, for sentences (11)–(13), uttered in the sce-
nario given in (14), paraphrases where the covert arguments are overtly expressed
through bare nominals are by far better than alleged paraphrases where the covert
arguments are overtly expressed through indefinite DPs with overt determiners:
(15) a. Gianni gave an umbrella to people.
b. #Gianni gave an umbrella to someone.
(16) a. Gianni gave things to Luisa.
b. #Gianni gave something to Luisa.
(17) a. Gianni gave things to people.
b. #Gianni gave {something / things} to someone.
c. #Gianni gave something to {someone / people}.
I have intentionally chosen a verb like give, which has a strong tendency to be
associated with overtly realized arguments in the clause, to illustrate the pragmatic
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nature of the possible lack of overt arguments in a more general way, since it is well-
known that there are many verbs that can quite naturally dispense with having all
their arguments expressed in the surface. Here are some examples involving the
2-valent verb eat:
(18) Polly has just eaten two tomato sandwiches.
(19) Polly has just eaten.
a. Polly has just eaten a typical meal of hers.
b. #Polly has just eaten {something / it / that thing}.
I will give an outline explanation for the contrast above in the following §6.1.2.
Even if some arguments can sometimes be omitted, not all of them can: subject,
which always expresses an argument, in fact cannot (this fact may probably be
seen already stated in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione; see Aristotle (1831, 1984)).
This is true, of course, even for pro-drop (null subject) languages, like Italian or
Spanish, where the subject does not need to be overtly realized; as it is well-
known, inflection, among other things, proves that a covert subject is still present.
Moreover, on the interpretative side, in the absence of an overt subject we can never
supply an existential quantifier in the semantic representation of the clause, but we
always need to recover an element which is anaphoric to some proper antecedent
in the discourse (and this is why we find pro, i.e. a pronoun, in ordinary syntactic
representations within the generative framework). Here are three examples, with
a transitive, an unaccusative and an inergative verb respectively, and with a third
person pronoun to be recovered (with pronouns of other persons, the oddness of a
paraphrase with an existential quantifier would be trivial):
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(20) Ha
has
prestato
lent
un
a
aspirapolvere
vacuum
a
to
Luisa.
Luisa
a. 3 ‘{He / She} lent a vacuum to Luisa.’ It.
b. 7 ‘Someone lent a vacuum to Luisa.’
(21) È
is
arrivato
arrived
tardi.
late
a. 3 ‘{He / She} arrived late.’
b. 7 ‘Someone arrived late.’
(22) Ha
has
camminato
walked
lentamente.
slowly
a. 3 ‘{He / She} walked slowly.’
b. 7 ‘Someone walked slowly.’
6.1.2 The Davidsonian account
It has often been said, in the linguistic and philosophical literature, that verbs
predicate something of a certain event. This view can be ultimately traced back
to the ancient Indian grammarian Pa¯n. ini (see Pa¯n. ini (1989)). In more recent
times, this idea has been revived and made formally precise by Donald Davidson
in Davidson (1967), where he argued that we should assume that verbs provide
a variable ranging over events to the logical forms of the clause which they are
embedded in. Hence, for instance, he would have suggested something similar to
the informal semantic representation in (23a) for (23).2
2In all the following logical forms, I will avoid features concerning verbal aspect or the Ak-
tionsart: for these and other topics linked to the verb, the Italian reader is directed to Borgato
(2012).
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(23) Gianni quickly gave an umbrella to Luisa.
a. [some event: e] ([some umbrella: x] (e is a giving of x to Luisa by
Gianni) ∧ e is quick)
According to Davidson, logical forms of this kind are required to account for
the pattern of entailment relations determined by VP modification. Consider the
following (24)–(28), for instance:
(24) Polly buttered the cracker.
a. [some event: e] (e is a buttering of the_cracker by Polly)
(25) Polly buttered the cracker slowly.
a. [some event: e] (e is a buttering of the_cracker by Polly ∧ e is slow)
(26) Polly buttered the cracker slowly in the bathroom.
a. [some event: e] (e is a buttering of the_cracker by Polly ∧ e is slow
∧ e is in the_bathroom)
(27) Polly buttered the cracker slowly in the bathroom with a knife.
The standard account remains that due to Vendler (1957, 1967) (based on Ryle (1949)), who
identified four different classes of events: activities, accomplishments, achievements and states.
Kenny (1963) added empirical support to this distinction and put together accomplishments
and achievements in a unique class, that of what he called performances; even if its internal
subdivision is required on syntactic grounds, nevertheless performances seem to form a natural
class. Jespersen (1924: 273) formulated a two-fold classification of verbs anticipating some aspects
of Kenny’s taxonomy, and Garey (1957) did the same in a more accurate way. For the parallel
between performances and count nouns, on one side, and both activities and states and mass
nouns, on the other side, see Allen (1966) and Mourelatos (1978), while for the parallel between
perfective aspect and count nouns, on one side, and imperfective aspect and mass nouns, on the
other side, see Leech (1969) and again Mourelatos (1978).
Note, furthermore, that a completely formal semantic representation for sentences like (23) is
still not possible, since I have not yet discussed the semantics of quantifiers, which needs to be
addressed after that of predicates.
62
a. [some event: e] (e is a buttering of the_cracker by Polly ∧ e is slow
∧ e is in the_bathroom ∧ [some knife: x] (e is performed with x))
(28) Polly buttered the cracker slowly in the bathroom with a knife at midnight.
a. [some event: e] (e is a buttering of the_cracker by Polly ∧ e is slow
∧ e is in the_bathroom ∧ [some knife: x] (e is performed with x) ∧
e is at midnight)
Intuitively, (28) entails (24), (25), (26) and (27); (27) entails (24), (25) and
(26) but not (28); (26) entails (24) and (25) but not (26) and (27); (25) entails
(24) but not (26), (27) and (28); (24) does not entail any of (25)–(28). The same
pattern of entailment relations formally holds, by conjunction reduction, between
the correspondent representations in (24a)–(28a).
It is essential to notice that all these modifiers cannot be semantically associ-
ated with any of the arguments of the verb, except, of course, the event argument.
In (25), for instance, we cannot take Polly or the cracker to be slow, but only the
action of buttering performed by Polly to the cracker.
Coming back to the contrast between bare NPs and overt DPs in (15)–(17), con-
sider the following well-known contrast noticed by Dowty (1972) (see also Dowty
(1979: §2.3.3), Hinrichs (1985), Moltmann (1991) and Carlson (1977a) (Portner &
Partee (2002: 41–45)); see also Verkuyl (1972) for another early explicit observa-
tion that nominal expressions may have an impact on aspectual features of the
VP):
(29) Gianni ate a sandwich {in an hour / for an hour}.
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(30) Gianni ate some sandwiches {in an hour / for an hour}.
(31) Gianni ate sandwiches {* in an hour / for an hour}.
As the combinations of admissible adverbial modifiers suggest, sentences (29) and
(30) are about an accomplishment, in Vendler’s (1967) terms, and thus can have
a telic reading, that induced by the adverbial modifier introduced by in. They
can have atelic readings too, and, in accordance with my intuitions, there are two
different such readings in both cases: as for (29), for instance, modified by the for-
adverbial, it can mean either that Gianni spent an hour eating one and the same
sandwich (possibly still not having finished eating it at the end of that interval of
time) or that he completely ate one and the same sandwich several times during
a whole hour; given the obvious physical fact that there is no food which, once it
has been eaten, can rapidly (if at all) be brought back to its previous state, the
latter is especially odd. Sentence (31), instead, is about an activity, in Vendler’s
(1967) terms, and thus can only have an atelic reading.
Notice that the atelic readings of sentence (31) require the bare noun to be an
existential indefinite, not a kind-denoting definite.
Hence, we may assume that, when a bare noun is to be interpreted as an
existential quantifier, it must be in the scope of some quantifier provided by the
verb, for instance the existentially quantified event argument. This may well fit
with the insight, which can be found expressed in Longobardi (1991, 1994), that
bare nouns have a phonologically null determiner that is only licensed when it is
properly governed by a verb (for governing of bare nouns by the verb, see also
Contreras (1986); for the idea that reference to individuals is licensed only by a
D layer, on which Longobardi bases his analysis, see Stowell (1991)). This may
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also explain the following contrast observed in Ihsane (2008: 201) concerning the
anaphor others:
(32) John recommended {some / certain / three} books and Mary recom-
mended others.
(33) *John recommended books and Mary recommended others.
However, a problem for such an account seems to arise, which has interesting
links with the main topic of this dissertation and which I will come back to further
on in §7.1. As I said, it is natural to assume that both the event argument and bare
nouns introduce an existential quantifier in the logical form: but in standard logic,
when we have two existential quantifiers3 one of which takes scope directly over
the other, such a configuration is indistinguishable, as for its inferential properties,
from one where the scope of the two quantifiers is inverted. It would seem, thus,
a move against economy if a natural language provided a specific syntactic con-
struction which never differentiates on the inferential ground from other syntactic
constructions present in the same language.
In any case, for the moment it is important to stress only these two things:
a) there seems to be a connection between the aspectual properties linked to
bare nouns and the narrow scope features of the latter;
b) covert arguments behave like bare nouns.
As for this last remark, I will not hesitate to formulate the conjecture that
covert arguments do in fact correspond to DPs with both a null determiner and
3The same, of course, also holds for universal ones.
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an empty restrictor.
Now, let’s come back to the main path. As a straightforward consequence of
the introduction of the event variable, the valence of a verb in the davidsonian
framework is increased by exactly one unit with respect to its valence in, say,
Tesnière’s one. Since I am not aware of clear counterevidence to the strongest as-
sumption that all verbs do come equipped with an event argument in the semantic
representation, I will make such an assumption and maintain that the davidsonian
valence of any verb must be greater than 0. At this point, we could define the
following semantic representation for a completely saturated n-valent IPn, where
V n′ is a term of RAt containing at least n different types of placeholders:
(34) JIPnK ≡ V ′n.
Finally, it is worth remembering the quite standard assumption that the event
argument is always existentially quantified and that its quantifier is always within
the scope of those quantifiers possibly introduced by overt determiners in the same
clause and also within the scope of negation. This last point, due to Krifka (1989a),
can be expressed by saying that, while we can use negation to state that there are
not events of X-ing, we cannot use it, instead, to state that there are events of
not-X-ing (note that this does not exclude the possibility that an event of not-X-
ing is expressible by other syntactic means, for instance by employing the English
construction abstaining from X-ing or verbs encoding in their lexical meaning the
meaning of not-X-ing).
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6.1.3 Nouns and other lexical words
I will follow the tradition in formal semantics of translating nouns, adjectives, ad-
verbs and prepositions (when they are not case-markers) with logical forms sharing
the same structure of those I have just suggested for verbs (see, for instance, Hig-
ginbotham (1987) and Longobardi (1994), for a treatment of NPs as predicates).
In doing so, I will assume that they too have an argumental structure.
However, another important assumption I will make here is that these lexical
words, unlike verbs, have a fixed ariety depending on the lexical category they
belong to, and in particular that nouns, adjectives and adverbs logically translate
as unary predicates, while prepositions as binary ones.4 This claim, despite being
quite orthodox, would require an in-depth discussion I cannot even attempt here
(see Higginbotham (1985: 563–7) for nouns and adjectives and for the intersective
semantics of adjectival modification); in any case, it appears to be mostly contro-
versial when applied to the case of nouns, since relative nouns like daughter or
father, deverbal nouns like teacher or admirer and others typically seem to have
more than one argument (the daughter of Gianni, the father of Agnese; the teacher
of Michael, the admirer of Sonia). The solution I will implicitly adopt here is that
of treating these cases as cases of NPs with a semantically poor N head modified by
a relative clause, roughly along the following lines (for a semantic characterization
of relative clauses, see 6.7.1 below):
(35) the daughter of Gianni ≈ the female human being who Gianni generated;
(36) the teacher of Michael ≈ the person who teaches things to Michael.
4Things are obviously more complex with gradable adjectives and comparatives; see Cresswell
(1976), Hellan (1981), Kennedy (1997b,a) and Oda (2008) for some semantic insights.
67
Many things should be said in this regard: here, I will limit myself to high-
lighting two well-known facts. The first is that nouns, adjectives and adverbs,
unlike verbs, do not assign case to their complements; besides, despite standard
analyses of nominalizations, I think that one could maintain that the word of in-
troducing complements in the noun phrases in (35) and (36) is the complementizer
instead of the preposition, thus leaving open the possibility that a CP is at work
and possibly suggesting some analogies with control structures.5 Secondly, there
are many languages where nominalizations are used to form relative clauses (the
phenomenon is particularly pervasive in Tibeto-Burman languages: see Matisoff
(1972, 2003) and DeLancey (1999), among many others; see the recent Ntelitheos
(2012) for some cases in Malagasy).
6.2 Connectives: conjunction and disjunction
The semantic value of sentential conjunction and disjunction expressed in RAt
terms, in accordance with their boolean semantics (see Boole (1847: 51–3)), can
be ultimately traced back to Hilbert & Bernays (1934). The definitions we are
looking for are the following ones:
(37) Jα and βK = JαK ∧ JβK;
(38) Jα or βK = JαK ∨ JβK.
5On the complementizer of in English, see Kayne (1997) and, for the phenomenon of degrading
of particles shift in of-ing nominalizations, as well as for nominalizations in general, the classical
Chomsky (1970) (reacting to Lees (1960), where, however, a first comprehensive classification of
English nominalizations was offered).
On the phenomenon of recategorization of prepositions as complementizers, see Dubinsky &
Williams (1995), among others.
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The characterization of the meaning of connectives just given predicts their
semantic behavior exactly in the same way as it is predicted in the classical propo-
sitional calculus.
Of course, in the linguistic and philosophical literature there has been a huge
debate, still ongoing, concerning the proper semantic analysis of conjunction when
it connects two DPs instead of two VPs or two sentences. The problem is how to
deal with examples like the following one:
(39) Gianni and Luisa lifted the piano.
(39) has a reading saying that Gianni and Luisa managed to lift the piano together,
thus not entailing either the following (40) nor the following (41).
(40) Gianni lifted the piano.
(41) Luisa lifted the piano.
The interpretation suggested for (39) is an example of a collective reading. How-
ever, to model such a collective reading, a semantic representation like the following
(42) would not work, since it would correspond instead to sentence (43), actually
entailing both (40) and (41).
(42) JGianni lifted the pianoK ∧ JLuisa lifted the pianoK
(43) Gianni lifted the piano and Luisa lifted the piano.
There have been two general approaches to the problem of conjoined DPs: one,
dating back to Aristotle and famously formalized in Link (1983) (see also Hoeksema
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(1983b)), posits a lexical ambiguity for the conjunction; the other, instead, tries
in different ways to reduce the meaning of DPs connecting conjunction to that of
sentential conjunction.
There is of course an a priori reason which favours the last approach, namely
the fact that positing an ambiguity is always a move which goes against theoret-
ical parsimony and, hence, should be viewed as a last resort. Nevertheless, the
ambiguity account seems to be supported, among other things, by the fact that
languages like Japanese have conjunctions (to, oyobi, toka and others) which can
only join nominal expressions (see Hayashishita & Bekki (2012)). I cannot address
the question in all its complexity, but here I will assume the ambiguity theory as
a base, thus restricting the semantic representation given above for conjunction
only to the case of sentential (or VP) conjunction.
6.3 Anaphoric elements
As is well-known, several natural language expressions, like third-person pronouns,
definite descriptions, proper names, tenses, certain temporal adverbs, presuppo-
sition triggers and possibly many others, are used to refer to some expression
previously introduced in the discourse or to some entity or fact which is made
salient in the context of utterance.6 These two uses have sometimes been labeled,
6As is well-known too, third-person pronouns, the definite article and certain demonstratives
are crosslinguistically related together even on the morphological level: in fact, a quite commonly
held view is the one that takes pronouns to only be definite descriptions in disguise, i.e. definite
descriptions with no descriptive content (or a “poor” one, given that, in English as well as in many
other languages, they can nevertheless convey semantic features like ‘±human’ or ‘male/female’).
The assimilation between pronouns and descriptions can be traced back at least to Postal (1966).
Of course, a unified analysis of these elements may well lead to different assumptions: Elbourne
(2005), for instance, has argued in favour of a unified account of third-person pronouns and
definite descriptions extending the russellian quantificational analysis of definite descriptions
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respectively, as “anaphoric” and “referential” (or “deictic”). However, a recent
trend, mostly developed in the Lewis-Kamp-Heim framework of dynamic theories
of meaning (obvious references are Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982, 1983)), strived
to argue for an assimilation of the two (hopefully, even if not necessarily, for all
the syntactic categories listed above), usually obtained by reducing the referential
use to the anaphoric one by appealing to the phenomenon of accommodation (see
Karttunen (1974) for the global case and Heim (1982) for the general notion).
Quite often too, this has been understood as if in the semantic representation the
anaphoric element is actually coindexed with a suitable antecedent which lacks a
phonetic realization.
Standardly, anaphora is conceived as coindexing with a variable which is bound
by a quantifier: hence, anaphoric elements are viewed as bound variables them-
selves. This is, of course, because it is usually assumed that a new discourse
referent must be introduced by a linguistic expression (be it overtly expressed or
recoverable through accommodation) which corresponds to a quantifier in the log-
ical form or, at least, to a variable which is bound by a quantifier introduced in
some place of the derivation (as it happens, in dynamic frameworks, with exis-
tential closure or unselective quantification). However, this is not the case in the
present account, since there are linguistic expressions which introduce new refer-
ents but logically correspond to free variables instead of quantifiers and never come
to be bound throughout the syntactic derivation. Under the present account, thus,
also to the formers. Even a quick examination of his theories goes beyond the limits of this
dissertation; here, I can only point out the fact that Elbourne’s analysis essentially requires a
substantial amount of situation semantics at work.
Notice, finally, that in languages like Italian, in their substandard varieties, proper names too
can bear the definite article, especially in the case of female ones; and, in general, in all languages
I am aware of which have a definite article, all plural proper names must carry it.
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anaphora simply comes to be coindexing with an expression occupying a suitable
position (say, c-commanding it) at a certain level in the syntactic representation.7
There would be much to be said for properly defending an assumption like
that; here, however, I simply assume it as a point of departure, limiting myself to
quoting some early places in the literature where it has been advocated for with
reference to at least one of the categories mentioned above.
Heim (1982) emphasizes the debt that dynamic semantic theories owe to the
view held by some traditional grammarians like Christophersen (1939) and Jes-
persen about definites; this view is summarized by her in the following “nutshell”
from Heim (1983) (Portner & Partee (2002: 223)):
A definite is used to refer to something that is already famil-
iar at the current stage of the conversation. An indefinite is
used to introduce a new referent.
This has been labeled the “familiarity theory of definiteness.”
As Heim herself points out, a decisive step towards a tenable reformulation
of the familiarity theory was made by Lauri Karttunen in Karttunen (1968a,b,
1976) (see also Krifka (1992)). Karttunen, in fact, introduced there the notion of
a discourse referent, i.e. something which can play the role of an antecedent for
anaphora but which does not necessarily correlate with a (unique) referent in the
real world.
There seems to be, however, a requirement which must be fulfilled when the
antecedent of the anaphoric element is provided through accommodation. I will
illustrate it with two examples, the second of which is the classical example of a
7For the phenomenon of backwards anaphora, also-called “cataphora”, see Postal (1970).
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so-called paycheck pronoun (or pronoun of laziness, introduced in the linguistic
and philosophical debate by Geach (1962)):
(44) Gianni has a wonderful recollection of his primary school teacher.
(45) John gave his paycheck to his mistress. Everybody else put it in the bank.
In its most natural reading out of the blue, (45) is understood as saying that
everybody puts his own paycheck (not John’s one) in the bank. However, this
reading can only arise if it is presupposed that everyone, and John too, has one
but only one paycheck. In the same way, (44) presupposes that Gianni had one and
only one primary school teacher. In other words, in these cases anaphora seems to
be possible only if the antecedent is uniquely identifiable (but not necessarily at
the global level), in accordance with the classical analysis of definite descriptions
in Russell (1905) (see also Cooper (1979)), extended to cover also the case of plural
definites by Sharvy (1980) with his analysis in terms of maximal sets. Notice that
the unique identification does not need to take place at the global level, as in (45)
it is bound by the universal quantifier.8
I suspect that the reason behind this requirement is that, if it was not fulfilled,
we would not be able to recover the right antecedent between more than one
possible candidate. It remains to be understood if the particular case of donkey
anaphora is a case of unaccommodated or accommodated anaphora (I believe
that Elbourne’s (2005) proposal may be recast in terms of the latter; see also
Cooper (1979), Heim (1990) and Heim & Kratzer (1998) for other previous D-
8Given the well-known syntactic constraints limiting the interpretation of non-reflexive pro-
nouns (see below), this seems to imply that the subject of the second sentence in (45) must be
a topic, or, however, it must have a different local domain with respect to the pronoun.
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type approaches, i.e. approaches based on the assimilation between pronouns and
definite descriptions).
A unified treatment of pronouns as anaphoric elements can be found also in
Hausser (1974, 1979) and Lasnik (1976). Proper names are conceived as anaphoric
elements by Sommers (1982: 230) (but see already Burge (1973: 436)) and Yag-
isawa (1984) (who applied his analysis to solve the famous Frege’s (1892) puzzle
about identity; remind also Russell’s (1905) assimilation of proper names to def-
inite descriptions). The parallel between pronouns and tenses is illustrated and
developed in Partee (1973). Finally, van der Sandt (1992) (actually based on his
former van der Sandt (1989) and van der Sandt & Geurts (1991) and inspired by
some of the main works on presupposition, in particular works on the problem of
presupposition projection like Karttunen (1973) and the already quoted works on
accommodation; see also Geurts (1999)) developed a theory of presupposition as
anaphora.9
Even if the antecedent of an anaphoric element may be recovered in a wide
variety of ways, with contextual factors often playing a crucial role, it is constrained
by the linguistic environment not only through the descriptive content possibly
carried by the anaphoric element itself. The point is illustrated by the following
examples (which are Heim’s (1990: 75) (57) and (58) original ones, respectively;
see Heim (1982: 21–4, 80–1), crediting Barbara Partee for earlier examples of this
kind, and Heim (1990: §5) for discussion of this issue):
9Only a few years later Saul Kripke independently made public more or less the same funda-
mental idea.
For the early history of the notion of “presupposition”, the obvious reference is Strawson (1950),
who argued against Russell’s approach to definite descriptions relying on some suggestions already
contained in the seminal Frege (1892).
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(46) a. Every man who has a wife is sitting next to her.
b. *Every married man is sitting next to her.
Intended reading: ‘every married man is sitting next to his wife’
An obvious avenue to be explored to account for such a contrast is that of hy-
pothesizing that the anaphoric link between the pronoun and its antecedent must
be established before the meanings of lexical words have been unpacked (it seems
to me that this represents one further argument in favour of Chomsky’s (1965)
syntactic level of the deep structure as something distinct from the semantic rep-
resentation of the sentence). However, I will leave this problem aside completely.
As for the interpretation of pronouns, already Lees & Klima (1963) and Ross
(1967b) showed that the antecedent of a reflexive pronoun must be within the
same clause and that, if a pronoun linearly precedes its antecedent, then it must
be in a subordinate clause to that of the antecedent (see also Chomsky (1981)).
Of course, also PRO (Chomsky (1973, 1977b)) should be treated as an anaphoric
element.10
Finally, prominent linguistic expressions to be considered here are wh-pronouns
in free relative clauses. It may be controversial to treat them as anaphoric elements,
but, especially in view of the arguments I am going to develop in Ch. 7, there are
several features which wh-items share with standard anaphoric elements that are
worth highlighting.
wh-items are assumed to occupy a certain layer in a CP projection:11 it is
10In this regard, I want to mention here at least the theories of raising as control (cf. Bresnan
(1982a), Starosta (1997) and O’Grady (2005), this latter basing himself on Andrews (1982),
Jacobson (1990) and Culicover & Jackendoff (2001), among others) and causatives as control
structures (Bordelois (1988), among others).
11Sometimes interrogative sentences are analyzed as complements of performative verbs,
overtly realized through an interrogative morpheme which in many languages reduces, in the
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thus possible to conceive the CP as a restrictive relative clause whose head is the
wh-pronoun itself, more or less working as descriptively poor definite descriptions
like the one(s) or the thing(s). This is, in fact, the standard treatment at least for
dependent interrogative clauses.12
Both definite descriptions and wh-clauses trigger a presupposition (this fact
can also be seen in the answers to wh-questions, and it has been used to argue
for the presuppositional behaviour of focus/background structures at least since
Rooth (1985).):
(47) Gianni spoke to the one that was at the party.
>> Someone was at the party.
(48) Gianni spoke to whom was at the party.
>> Someone was at the party.
In both cases, there are linguistic environments where the properties of these
items with respect to projection suggest the viability (and, I would say, even the
desirability) of a treatment of their presuppositional features in van der Sandt’s
(1992) terms of anaphoric relations:
(49) If Luisa receives some roses, she knows the person who sent them.
>/> Someone sent some roses to Luisa.
(50) If Luisa receives some roses, she knows who sent them.
>/> Someone sent some roses to Luisa.
surface, to a prosodic feature: see Ross (1970), Karttunen (1977) and Higginbotham (1993).
12But see also the notion of “referentiality” to which Rizzi (1990) and Cinque (1990) appeal
to explain the cases of violation of some weak islands.
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Hence, under the present analysis, also wh-pronouns in free relatives must be
bound by a quantifier somewhere, in the logical form of the discourse. This clearly
appears to be the case when considering sentences like the following one (compare
(51) with (208) at p. 183):
(51) Every girl introduced a boy to who wrote to him in chat.
There is an unmarked reading13 under which the maximal set of people writing in
chat is possibly different from boy to boy, and the boy himself to whom each girl
introduced his chat-friends is possibly different from girl to girl. Hence, the wh-
pronoun must be bound by a quantifier in the scope of the existential quantifier
introduced by a, and a itself must introduce an existential quantifier which is
in the scope of the universal quantifier (thus ruling out an interpretation as a
specific indefinite, provided that it is semantically distinguishable at all from the
interpretation as an existential quantifier).
Reference to maximal sets is arguably related to the property of embedded
questions known, from Groenendijk & Stokhof (1981, 1982, 1983, 1984b,a) who
first observed it, as strong exhaustivity (see also Rullmann (1995), partly based on
Jacobson (1995), and Beck & Rullmann (1999), partly based on Heim (1994), for
strong exhaustiveness in degree questions). Weak exhaustivity is illustrated by the
following entailment pattern:
(52) a. John knows who was at the party.
b. Mary was at the party.
13I take the absence of markedness as an essential factor.
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c. ∴ John knows that Mary was at the party.
Strong exhaustivity, instead, is a stronger notion than weak exhaustivity: it im-
plies weak exhaustivity, but also determines entailment patterns like the following
one:
(53) a. John knows who was at the party.
b. Mary was not at the party.
c. ∴ John knows that Mary was not at the party.
Notice, however, that pragmatic restrictions on the relevant maximal set may be
in order also in the case of embedded questions, to the extent that they may make
an inference even like the one exemplified in (52) fail. This would happen, for
instance, in the following scenario: imagine that Ciro is some guy who became
the protagonist of some horrible actions which especially injured John; imagine as
well that the party has been organized by some of John’s friends and that John
could not join it because he was abroad during that period. Given this state of
affairs, John would be very offended to know that Ciro had been invited to the
party. Now, Ciro has been. Suppose that both Anna and Bice know this state of
affairs and that Anna says to Bice (52a): it seems to me that, in this scenario,
(52a) only entails that John knows that Ciro was at the party, possibly ignoring
anything about other people and Mary in particular; hence, the inference from
(52a) and (52b) to (52c) would fail in this case.
I will finish up the discussion on wh-pronouns here: what is important to retain
is that I take free relative clauses to be anaphoric elements which are covertly
78
bound somewhere in the syntactic structure of the sentence.
In the semantic representations I am going to give later, anaphoric elements
will be possibly rendered in two different ways: in the first one, corresponding to
what their specific function is, they will translate into variables (whether bound or
free, but coindexed with the variable provided by a higher element in the syntactic
structure); in the second one, they will translate as mere placeholders (not in the
technical sense of RAt). This is because often it will not be possible to fully
specify the linguistic or even contextual environment where a certain discourse is
embedded and where one should look to find the proper antecedent of a certain
anaphoric expression inside it: in this case, translations of the second kind will be
needed, but with the warning that they should be viewed as incomplete, improper
semantic representations, which may be safely employed because, in principle, they
only require easy and straightforward modifications to be embedded in a proper
one.
Notice that, in both cases, the implicit assumption is that the descriptive ma-
terial (i.e., that in the NumP projection; see p. 85 below, for the structure of DP I
am assuming here) of a definite DP does not contribute its usual semantic contri-
bution to the semantic representation of the whole sentence: rather, this semantic
contribution turns out to be relevant only for properly identifying the antecedent
of the definite DP and, hence, plays a role in the semantic processing but does not
manifest itself in the semantic representation.
Finally, note that this view of definites provides a simple explanation for the
well-known facts discussed by Fodor (1979) in the context of her semantic compar-
ison between the plural universal quantifier and the plural definite article. Fodor,
in fact, noticed that, despite a certain closeness in meaning between (54a) and
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(54b), (55a), while not (55b), gave rise to oddness:
(54) a. I saw the boys.
b. I saw all the boys.
(55) a. #I didn’t see the boys but I did see some of them.
b. I didn’t see all the boys but I did see some of them.
A related contrast emerges when observing that, among the following (57a) and
(57b), only (57a) is a consistent answer to (56):
(56) Are the boys we met orphans?
(57) a. No, none of the boys we met are orphans.
b. #No, only some of them are.
Fodor (1979) explains these facts by pursuing a strategy which will prove quite
pervasively explored to account for empirical puzzles like most of the ones I am
going to address in this dissertation: namely, she postulates that plural definite
DPs come in the lexicon with an “all-or-nothing” presupposition, or, in Gajewski’s
(2005: 14) more recent terms, a “presupposition of Excluded Middle” (see, below,
pp. 182 and 222). In other words, if NPsx is the restrictor of the plural definite
article and IPx is its nuclear scope, then we would have what follows:
(58) [the NPsx]IPx ∨ [the NPsx]¬IPx.
I take this explanation to be inferior to one based on the anaphoric character
of definite DPs, for at least the following two reasons: first, it relies on a notion
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of presupposition which is not amenable to being reduced to that of anaphora (at
least, it is not clear to me how it would be) and which, hence, I take to lack some
interesting generalizations; secondly, and more importantly, it is not clear to me
why natural languages, moreover crosslinguistically, would need items coming with
such an ad hoc presupposition when they could obtain the same semantic effects
with other items they nevertheless have at their disposal, suitably merged in the
clause to obtain the desired scope configuration with respect to negation.
Despite some relevant differences, these objections also extend, as far as I can
see, to the other applications of the presupposition of Excluded Middle, advanced
in the literature, I am going to mention later.
6.4 Indexicals
In RAt, as we saw, there is a distinguished basic term of the system, namely t.
t behaves differently from generic variables in that it plays no role in rule (P )
of Particularization. t has, however, an important feature: that if 0 = 0 `RAt
ϕ(v/t), then 0 = 0 `RAt ϕ(v). In other words, informally speaking, we cannot
say anything about t which follows by logic alone that we cannot say also about
any generic individual. Hence, conversely, everything we say about t which cannot
be said of a generic individual, will not follow by logic alone: t is, thus, the basic
ingredient to formulate contingent statements (or, in the kantian terminology,
synthetic judgements).14 For this reason, I assume that t corresponds in RAt to
14Even if it has become famous from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the distinction between
“analytic” and “synthetic” judgements (as its further elaboration, much less clear to me, distin-
guishing judgements which are “synthetic a priori” from those which are “synthetic a posteriori”)
can already be found in the writings by Locke (and, after him, in Hume): see Locke (1964). As
this distinction is usually explained, analytic judgements are those judgements which are true
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what in natural languages is an indexical argument.
The intimate nature of communication itself suggests that there must be at
least one referent whose direct experience is available both to the speaker and to
the hearer, something which could be considered as a sort of basic indexical, at
least until we can use this expression in a restricted “cognitive” fashion, without
committing to the position that this indexical has a surface realization in any
natural language.15
If we take this fact as our point of departure, then we should explore the
strongest hypothesis one can make, namely that one basic indexical is also suffi-
cient. Actually, a reductionist approach to indexicals like that has been advocated
by Bertrand Russell, who spent several pages on the issue of indexicals, which he
called “egocentric particulars”.
Already Frege, in his Frege (1918), argued in favour of an indispensable “pri-
vate” core in a logical reconstruction of the meanings of sentences expressed in
a natural language and, further, he too maintained that only indexicals, among
natural language expressions, could play the role of providing such a core.
In both Russell (1940) and Russell (1948), however, Russell endorsed two
stronger theses than that of the necessity of having at least one indexical for the
description of the world: he claimed that indexicals were interdefinable and, more-
over, that exactly one of them could have been taken as primitive in order to define
and whose truth value is such only in virtue of their meaning, while synthetic judgements are
those judgements whose truth value also depends on facts in the world.
15Someone could object that the case of a communication which does not happen “in real
time” is very common, typically when someone is reading something that another person wrote
some time before, and that in this case it is hard to see what this common referent could amount
to. However, it seems to me that even in that case what the hearer would actually do would be
“translating” the written indexical expressions in a systematic way such that they come to pick
up a unique referent related to the actual point of reference, as if the speaker had it as his point
of reference too. For the relevant notion of “point of reference”, see below in the text.
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the others (he would have belonged, as Russell said, to the “minimum vocabulary”
of the language under examination). It is important to note that neither in Russell
(1940) nor in Russell (1948) does he explicitly state that one indexical in particular
should have been chosen as basic; on the contrary, he claims that “here-now” and
the demonstrative this would serve equally well for that purpose. Nevertheless, in
the concrete examples from Russell (1948), he always employs the demonstrative
pronoun this or one of the syncathegorematic and idiosyncratic expressions “here-
now” or “I-now” to obtain definitions of other indexicals.16 It is worth noting that
this is the only real English word among these three expressions. The following
ones are the first definitions suggested by Russell in the chapter titled “Egocentric
Particulars” (Russell (1948: 85)):
“This” might be taken as the only egocentric word not having a nominal
definition. We could say that “I” means “the person experiencing this,”
“now” means “the time of this,” and “here” means “the place of this.”
And later (Russell (1948: 92)):
“This” denotes whatever, at the moment when the word is used, oc-
cupies the center of attention. [. . . ] We may define “I” as “the person
attending to this,” and “here” as “the place of attending to this.” We
could equally well take “here-now” as fundamental: then “this” would
be defined as “what is here-now,” and “I” as “what experiences this.”
These quotations, even if clearly showing that Russell had the same kind of
problem that I am addressing in this section in mind, strongly suggest that the kind
16Frege, instead, in Frege (1918), devoted his attention almost entirely on the first person
pronoun I.
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of logical symbol we are looking for, which is intended to represent what hereafter
I will dub the “point of reference” of the discourse, does not have a corresponding
expression in (plain) English (nor in Italian): this, in fact, in Russell’s exposition,
receives an undoubtedly idiosyncratic meaning, completely detached from the huge
varieties of its actual usages; from the other side, “I -now” is of course an evocative
expression which, however, does not belong to English and, moreover, is made up
of two different English indexicals.
Hence, I will assume here that t denotes the point of reference and, additionally,
that, even if thus essentially involved in the logical translation of any contingent
statement of natural language, t lacks a proper lexical counterpart in the languages
I am dealing with and it should always be taken as an implicit argument, in these
languages.
Once we accept the idea that a point of reference does exist, then we can define
all other indexicals, be they pronouns, or adjectives, or tenses, or covert arguments,
as morphemes whose semantic representation contains t.17
6.5 Plurals
Before briefly addressing the problem of the semantics of plurals, and in considera-
tion of the fact that the nominal domain will provide the neatest data on the basis
17It should be remembered, however, that indexical elements like demonstrative DPs can typ-
ically have a non-indexical use too; in this case, this use is neatly separated from the indexical
one, since in the former the locative specification conveyed by the demonstrative changes into
a metalinguistic specification, with different pragmatic effects on the process of anaphora res-
olution. This non-indexical use of demonstratives, which is of course crosslinguistically at the
base of the process of formation of the definite article (see Lyons (1977)), was already implicitly
subsumed in Russell (1919: 201).
For the relation between demonstrative DPs and definite descriptions, the Italian reader is
directed to Vanelli (1989).
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of which I will argue in favour of the application of RA to natural language seman-
tics, it may be desirable to show the syntactic structure I am assuming (based on
Abney (1987), Hudson (1989), Longobardi (1994), Zamparelli (2000), and others)
for DPs:18
(59)
DP
NumP
PlP
NPPl
Num
D
I will conform here to the view according to which plurals refer to somewhat
special objects, namely plural objects; which is to say, in technically more precise
terms, that each of them introduces a single discourse referent in the clause; this
view has been dubbed by Barry Schein, one of its opponents, the objectual view
about plurals. A position of this kind, which I will set out in a quite simple
way (without implicating, so doing, that this is the most adequate one), is still
probably the most popular in natural language semantics, and it can boast a
long history starting at least as early as Russell (1903). A plural object could
be described as something which is possibly formed by more than one individual
of the same kind. As for the idea that plurals do not denote entities which are
necessarily composed of more than one individual of the same kind (see Krifka
(1986, 1989b,a), among many others; see also, in a partly different connection,
Chomsky (1975: 202)), this is often referred to as the inclusive view on plurals, as
18This should not imply, I believe, that the arguments I am going to develop in the next
part to defend the main claim of this dissertation depend in an essential way on the so-called
“DP hypothesis” (see Szabolcsi (1983), a forerunner of this hypothesis usually ascribed to the
aforementioned Abney (1987)).
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opposed to the exclusive view, claiming, on the contrary, that at least two different
individuals are necessary; the inclusive view is probably the one endorsed by most
semanticists. Well-known supporting evidence displayed in favour of it is given by
examples involving embedding of plurals under negation or in questions, like the
following ones, from Schwarzschild (1996: 5):
(60) No doctors are in the room.
(61) Are there doctors in the room?
Of course, the truth conditions of sentence (60) and of any proper answer to
question (61) (and, hence, a fortiori their meanings) are different, respectively,
from those of the following (62) and of any proper answer to (63):
(62) No more than one doctor is in the room.
(63) Is there more than one doctor in the room?
Introduction of a single referent by plurals (even when they have a numeral
determiner expressing ontological plurality, i.e. any integer from two up) allows for
a much more natural syntax-semantics interface than we would have otherwise.
As it is well-known, plurals appear to share some features with mass nouns,19 to
the point that Bennett (1979: 264) even conjectured that the key to the semantics
of mass nouns was the semantics of plural count nouns. Bunt (1979), for instance,
observed that something similar to the property of cumulative reference that Quine
(1960: 91) noticed about mass nouns, here exemplified by (64), also held for plurals:
19for the distinction between count and mass nouns in English, the earliest reference is Jes-
persen (1909a).
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(64) If the content of this glass is water, and the content of that glass is water,
then the content of the two glasses is water.
(65) If the animals in this camp are horses, and the animals in that camp are
horses, then the animals in the two camps are horses.
I completely set aside any further consideration on this issue here. It is impor-
tant, however, to stress the fact, no matter how obvious it is, that mass nouns lack
a proper plural form, their plurals always having a derived denotation referring to
kinds (see Mourelatos (1978: 424), for this point); hence, of course, they cannot
be associated (unless they are kind-denoting) to determiners which require NPs in
the plural form.20
Once we adopt an objectual standpoint on plurals, we also need to specify a
suitable relation in order to express the fact that a plural object may be formed
by a plurality of entities of a certain kind and that, at some proper level of sub-
division, it must be formed only by entities of that kind: in other words, we want
that, for instance, the plural noun elephants refers to a complex object which is
possibly formed by more than one elephant and, moreover, which is formed only
by elephants (unless we consider a forming relation which can be extended also to
proper subparts of single elephants). Such a relation would be a mereological one
and, hence, we could probably look at one of the many systems of mereology on
the market in order to find useful insights towards a suitable definition in primi-
tive recursive terms. Here I will not provide any such a definition, however, but,
20It has also been noticed, by Baker (1978), that the pronoun one may have as its antecedent
a count noun but not a mass one. This should be taken, I believe, as evidence that one is not
truly a pronoun by itself, but rather the standard numeral determiner which, as all numeral
determiners, when it superficially appears in isolation always associates with a hidden partitive
structure.
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following Link (1983), I will dub it as the individual part relation and denote it
with the symbol ‘Π’, with ‘AΠB’ to be read as ‘A is an individual part of B’.
In any case, I should at least assume that the definition of ‘Π’ is such that the
following theorem holds:
Theorem 6.1 AΠB `RAt A ≤ B.
We can thus specify the semantic contribution of plural morphology in the
following way:21
(66)
uwwwwwwv
PlPi
NPi
NPs
Pl
[−sg]
}~ = (∀x ≤ i)(xΠi→ JNPxK).
6.5.1 Adjectives of quantity and similar modifiers
Once we have defined in this way the semantic contribution of plural morphology, it
becomes almost straightforward to define also that of cardinal numeral adjectives.
I will do it by making use of a relation ‘Card’ (with ‘Card(A,B)’ to be read as
‘the cardinality of A is B’, or, more plainly, ‘the total number of individual parts
of A is B’) whose definition in primitive recursive terms will remain unspecified
here but does not present any difficulty in principle.
The definition is the following one (here, ‘N ’ stands both for a numeral adjective
and for a number; a similar treatment of numerals is given by Scha (1981) and is,
for instance, implicit in Higginbotham (1986)):
21In accordance with the constraints imposed on quantification byRAt, the universal quantifier
is of the bounded sort. In this particular case, however, this seems to be quite an innocent
requirement, since the boundaries of the group denoted by A itself naturally circumscribe the
domain of quantification. For the definition of the bounded universal quantifier, see p. 30 above.
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(67)
uwwwwwv
NumPi
PlPiNum
N
}~ = Card(i, N) ∧ JPlPiK
Many natural language expressions of quantity arguably occupy the same layer
Num within the syntactic structure of the DP; among them, in English, we can
find many, few, most, twice the, the two thirds of the, etc.22 Even if, for the sake
of simplicity, I will avoid expressions of this kind in the following examples, again
there are no principled difficulties in treating them, in the same vein as before, as
denoting properties of a group.
6.5.2 Distributivity
I will assume here, in line with standard assumptions one can find in the literature
and as a consequence of the syntactic structure assumed for DPs and the syntax-
semantics mapping, that singular count DPs are inherently distributive, while no
plural one is.23 As it has been argued by much literature in formal semantics, the
collective reading for plural DPs can be obtained in a natural way by positing a
covert universal quantification over individual parts of the group denoted by the
plural DP; this solution is due to Link (1983). The covert operator which carries
over this universal quantification is sometimes labeled ‘Dist’ and its semantics can
22For a recent account of the semantics of complex numeral adjectives, involving addition
(seventy-four) or multiplication (three thousands), see Ionin & Matushansky (2006).
23As for what Scha (1981) dubbed “cumulative” readings, it seems to me that they would be
better analyzed in connection with the information structure of the sentence. In particular, I
take such cumulative readings to be instances of the phenomenon of discontinuous focus, which
parallels that of multiple wh-s questions (see §6.7.2).
For an interesting correlation between the licensing of sentence-internal different by plural
determiners like English all or both, see Brasoveanu (2011).
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be given in the following way (this is not Link’s (1983) original definition, but it
differs from it under respects which I do not take to be essential here; note that,
in the following definition, the argument i plausibly cannot be the event argument
of the verb):24
(68)
uwv IP1i
IP2iDisti
}~ = (∀x ≤ i)(xΠi→ JIP2iK)
It is not clear to me that genuine collective readings are available even for
adjuncts or arguments other than those bearing the thematic role of agents of
events expressed by transitive verbs.25
6.6 Negation
As is well-known (see in particular Horn (1989: §7.2)), the syntactic distribution
of negation in natural languages does not match that of modern mathematical
logic. In this tradition (and in Goodstein’s formulation of RA too), negation is
represented as a 1-place operator (or even, improperly, “connective”) taking as its
argument a proposition to yield another proposition. Horn (1989) (partly basing
himself on Dahl (1979)) challenged this view by formulating a theory that he
dubbed Extended Term Logic (ETL, for short), which was intended to do justice
24See n. 21 above for the presence of the bounded universal quantifier.
25Even if in general the correlation between thematic roles and Case can only be viewed as a
tendency, while not as a systematic property of the language (at least for languages like English
and Italian), such a correlation exists between the thematic role of Agent and the subject of
transitive verbs in the active voice, as well as the adjunct introduced by by, in English, in the
passive voice.
For the different thematic role of unaccusative verbs, the obvious references are Perlmutter
(1978) and Burzio (1981, 1986).
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to some assumptions of the aristotelian Term Logic, based on the bipartition of
every sentence into a subject and a predicate.
It is true, indeed, for instance, that negation in English (as well as in Italian,
among many other languages) cannot immediately precede a definite subject, at
least unless it gives rise to a marked reading:26
(70) *Not {Gianni / {the / this} farmer} drank the lemonade.
Besides, negation, in natural languages, unlike in CL, cannot take scope over
two coordinated sentences (again, unless it gives rise to a marked reading), a fact
which can be illustrated by the following ungrammatical strings (where the subject
is a quantified DP, thus ruling out the possibility that we are dealing with cases
like those above):
(71) *Not every boy drank lemonade and every girl drank beer.
Intended reading: ‘it is not true that both every boy drank lemonade and
every girl drank beer’
(72) *Not every farmer beat his donkey or every donkey was lame.
Intended reading: ‘it is not true that either every farmer beat his donkey
or every donkey was lame’
26It seems that it cannot immediately precede a definite DP, whatever it is, without giving
rise to such a reading, as the following (69) would show.
(69) *Gianni drank not the lemonade.
However, here my point is only to check if negation can adjoin to a whole sentence (and, thus,
semantically negate a whole proposition) and this point is probably better illustrated, in a
language like English, through sentences where the negation occupies the leftmost position in
the surface.
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As I have just said, negation may in effect immediately precede both definite
subjects (and definite DPs in general) and coordinated sentences without being
embedded in the first one, but only giving rise to a marked reading associated
with the resulting sentence. This reading corresponds to what Horn dubbed met-
alinguistic negation (see Horn (1985) and Horn (1989: Ch.6)). One of Horn’s
assumptions is the following one (from Horn (1989: 472)):
Apparent [. . . ] instances of external negation27 are [. . . ] manifestations
of metalinguistic negation, a means of objecting to an utterance on any
grounds whatever, including its grammatical or phonetic form[.]
The following is a typical case where a metalinguistic negation is used to blame
the fact that our addressee has just said something less informative than what he
could have said or what we know to be the case, while the truth conditions of what
he said are not denied (constituents within square brackets marked by a subscript
‘F’ are focused):
(73) Not [some]F guys love Louise, [every]F guy loves her!
Löbner (2000: 227), however, quoting an example in Horn (1989: 372), reason-
ably conjectures what follows:28
[T]he metalinguistic, or non-propositional, quality of contrast is not
due to some special mechanism of negation, but to a foregoing shift
of focus to which, in a second step, standard negation is applied. All
these metalinguistic effects can as well be achieved without negation
27For “external negation” Horn means here, more or less, negation as conceived in mathemat-
ical logic.
28Emphasis is mine.
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accompanying them. This is obvious from the fact that the same met-
alinguistic quality is to be observed with the non-negative rectification
clauses appropriate after such “metalinguistic negations”.
I will continue to employ, in any case, the widespread label of “metalinguistic
negation”.29
Horn’s claim, however, justifying his ETL, appears to be too strong (and Löbner
(2000: §1.4), at least implicitly, is of the same opinion), as far as we can maintain
that examples like the following ones do not necessarily involve a metalinguistic
use of negation ((74) is Löbner’s (2000: 223) (12c)):
(74) Not every city was destroyed.
(75) Not more than three boys drank lemonade.
As for the impossibility of negation taking scope over two coordinated sen-
tences, instead, this is what Horn (1989: 476) says:
[A]ny negation which takes scope over a conjunction, disjunction, or
conditional must be metalinguistic. This is a result I already argued
for in the case of the negated (i.e., rejected) conditionals [. . . ]. With
the other connectives, there is nowhere for a wide-scope descriptive
negation to surface, given that conjunctive and disjunctive sentence
types have no main verb, VP, or auxiliary as such. The form of wide-
scope negation we do find cross-linguistically (= It’s not ({true / the
case}) that Chris won and Sandy lost) are precisely what we would
29Further, I depart from Löbner when he, following McCawley, states that “there appear to
be good reasons not to consider contrastive focusing as a necessarily metalinguistic operation”.
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identify elsewhere in the same language as reflexes of the metalinguistic
use of the negation operator.30
This is the portion I want to maintain of Horn’s syntactic account of negation
(except for what concerns the conditional, about which I have a slightly different
story to tell: see §7.3). As it should appear clear from below, the ban on negation
taking scope over coordinated sentences plays a crucial role in the explanation I
am trying to offer for some of the fundamental data on which I base the present
proposal. For this reason, even if I take as quite uncontroversial ungrammaticality
judgements like those for (71) and (72), I want to examine this issue a bit further.
First of all, it should be noted that, crosslinguistically, there is another strik-
ing constraint on the syntactic distribution of negation, which again puts natural
languages apart from mathematical logic but which appears to be independent
from the issue of external negation. This is the ban on double negation (recog-
nized, among others, by both Horn and Löbner; see Horn (1989: 470) and Löbner
(2000: §1.8)).31 It is interesting to also draw attention to this ban because it
suggests a possible correlation between pragmatic and syntactic facts related to
negation: given that ¬¬A = 0 a`RA A (as well as, in CL, ¬¬α a`CL α), i.e. a
sentence A and its double negation ¬¬A are logically equivalent, and given addi-
30Immediately afterwards, Horn adds:
[I]t is striking that even these metalinguistic negations are expressed by gathering the
rejected conjunction / disjunction into the predicate expression with a pseudo-logical
predicate (be true, be the case) invoked (and denied) for the occasion. What we do
not find even here is the straightforward not: Chris won and Sandy lost, expressed
in the canonical sentence-negation form dear to the hearts of Stoics, Fregeans, and
transformationalists alike.
In this case, however, I do not share Horn’s judgements: as I have said before, I take sentences
like (71)–(72) to possibly receive a metalinguistic interpretation, and it seems to me that this
state of affairs also extends to Horn’s example in the quotation above.
31For the Law of Double Negation recast in primitive recursive terms, see Goodstein’s (1957: 59)
equation 3.31.
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tionally that the ¬¬A is syntactically more complex than A, it is not surprising
if, in accordance with the general pragmatic Q Principle (see Appendix A for a
brief survey of the relevant pragmatic notions), only A has an unmarked syntactic
realization.32 The link between pragmatic and syntactic facts may also be at work
in the case of negation over coordinate structures.
A curious fact to be noted (even if, taken in isolation, does not provide a
sufficient argument for the existence of the ban under examination) is that n-
connectives (i.e., connectives incorporating a negative morpheme) appear, crosslin-
guistically, to be formed by a negative morpheme plus the morpheme of conjunction
or a morpheme somehow reducible to it.33
The Italian n-connective né can appear in two different constructions, namely
the type non A né B ‘not A nor B’ and the correlative type né A né B ‘neither
A nor B’. As the paraphrases show, the same situation also holds in English, with
the only difference that in the correlative construction two different negative con-
nectives appear. The existence of two types of constructions, however, is common
also to conjunction: in Italian, next to the type A e B ‘A and B’, we also have the
correlative type e A e B ‘both A and B’ (even if it is now more common to say
sia A che B) and, as well as A o B ‘A or B’, we also have o A o B ‘either A or B’.
Given that the two elements of each series share the same meaning, but given
also that the two constructions do not seem freely interchangeable in the discourse,
we should look for some distinction on pragmatic grounds. I cannot address this
issue here, however: what counts for the present discussion is only the semantics,
32Again, however, I assume that cases of double negation in natural languages are available as
marked options.
33As Haspelmath (1997) points out, n-words in general are present in many natural languages,
but not all: several Asian languages, for instance, like Japanese or Hindi, lack them.
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rather than the pragmatics, of n-connectives when compared to their morphology.
The etymology of Italian né, in fact, makes it derive from the Italian conjunction
e ‘and’, as we can see, for instance, looking at the lemma né in Nocentini (2010):
né cong. [fine sec. XII] ∼ e non.
formazione latina di origine indoeuropea: lat. nec, cong. co-
ordinativa con valore negativo I panromanzo: fr. ni, occit. ne, ni,
cat. sp. ni, port. nem, sardo nei, rum. nici (dalla var. neque).
 Il lat. nec è la var. ridotta di neque ricorrente davanti a parola che
inizia per consonante, comp. della neg. ne e della cong. enclitica que
‘e’.
né conj. [end of XIIth cent.] ∼ and not.
Latin formation of Indo-European origin: Lat. nec, coordi-
nating conj. with negative value I panromance: Fr. ni, Occit. ne,
ni, Cat. Sp. ni, Port. nem, Sardinian nei, Rom. nici (from var.
neque).
 Lat. nec is the contracted var. of neque occurring before a word
beginning with a consonant, comp. from neg. ne and the enclitic conj.
que ‘and’.34
It is important to pay attention to the paraphrase e non ‘and not’, where the
conjunction precedes the negation.
The same, mutatis mutandis, holds for English neither and nor, even if an
element of opacity has diachronically intervened in the latter. Here are the ety-
mologies that we can find in Klein (1966-7):
34Translation is mine.
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neither, adj., pron., adv., and conj., not either. — ME. neither,
neyther, nother, nouther, naither, fr. OE. na¯wðer, contraction of na¯hw-
æðer, lit. ‘neither of two’, fr. ne, ‘not’, and a¯hwæðer, ‘either of two’,
which is compounded of a¯-, ‘ever, always’, and hwæðer, ‘which of two’.
See no and whether and cp. either. Cp. also nor.
nor, conj. correlative to neither. — ME., contraction of nother, a var.
of neither ; see neither. The negative conjunction nor was influenced
in form by the affirmative or.
As we can see, the lemma for nor clearly shows that the claim made by some that
nor should be morphologically divided into a negative mark and the disjunction
or is, at best, imprecise. So, let’s also take a look at the etymology for either :
either, adj., pron., conj. and adv. — ME. aither, either, fr. OE.
æ¯ghwæðer, æ¯gðer, ‘each of two, both’, for *a-gi-hwæ¯ðer, which is
formed fr. a¯, ‘ever’, pref. gi- (for ge-) and hwæðer, ‘whether’. See aye,
‘ever’, pref. y- and whether and cp. neither. Cp. also Du. ieder,
OHG. eogiwedar, iowedar, MHG. iegeweder, ieweder, ieder, G. jeder,
‘either, each, every’.
Thus, the original meaning of the root of neither corresponds to that of both and,
hence, can be assimilated to that of the conjunction and rather than that of the
disjunction or (maybe through some intensional construction of the kind of, for
instance, Both the followings hold: A and B).
In other words, the following rough equations in meaning between sentential
schemata seem to be valid:
97
(76) non A né B ≈ né A né B ≈ non A e non B;
(77) neither A nor B ≈ not A nor B ≈ not A and not B.
Summarizing, Italian, Latin and English (as the other languages which have
n-connectives, to the best of my knowledge) have n-connectives whose form is n-&,
where n- is a negative marker and & a connective semantically related, at least
through its etymology, to the conjunction; but the meaning of this n-connective
corresponds to ‘and not’, where the conjunction takes scope over a negation, thus
reversing the surface order of the two morphemes.35 Now, if negation could take
scope over connectives, the fact that so many languages came to have at their
disposal an n-connective where, nevertheless, the scope relation between the cor-
responding positive connective and the negation is reversed with respect to the
superficial order would be quite unexpected and require an explanation: in other
words, we should ask why such n-connectives whose semantic content roughly cor-
responds to ‘and not’ do not take either the form &-n or the form n-OR, with the
negative marker followed by a morpheme related to disjunction. In fact, once we
have assigned a suitable meaning to negation in natural languages (as the one I
am going to assign below in (85)), maintaining for the conjunction and the dis-
junction the semantic characterizations given above and assuming, for the sake of
the argument, that no restriction on the syntactic distribution of negation works
(at least, no restriction involving connectives), we obtain the following well-known
semantic equivalences:36
35The same holds in the case of It. neanche ‘not even’, compound of the negative marker ne-
and anche ‘also’, and Eng. not even. See Lahiri (1998) for related facts in Hindi.
36Known as De Morgan’s Laws, after the name of the logician who rediscovered them in the
Nineteenth century, but actually explicitly formulated by William of Ockham and presupposed
in the work of the Pseudo-Scot. For their proofs in RAt, see Goodstein (1957), where they
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(78) not [A and B] ⇔ not A or not B;
(79) not [A or B] ⇔ not A and not B.
The structures corresponding to &-n and n-OR are the ones in (79), but, even if
they are semantically akin to these structures, the forms we can find in natural
languages for n-connectives all instantiate the first member of (78) (see also Jaspers
(2005), for some particular cases). This would be quite strange if negation could
freely take wide scope over connectives.
Reversing the argument, we can conjecture that in n-connectives the negative
marker has precisely the function of signalling that, at some suitable level of the
syntactic representation of the sentence, we can reconstruct a negation immediately
embedded under a conjunction, in both the conjuncts; the presence of negation
would hence be anticipated in the linear order of the constituents.37 This would
possibly be a consequence of the well-known Neg First principle formulated by
Jespersen (1917: 5) and described there as “the natural tendency, [. . . ] for the
sake of clearness, to place the negative first, or at any rate as soon as possible,
very often immediately before the particular word to be negatived (generally the
verb)”.38
Notice, at least apparently supporting this conjecture, that the simultaneous
occurrence of preverbal n-words and predicate negation with NC reading was pos-
sible in Old Italian, and indeed very common in the case of negative conjunction;
correspond, respectively, to Goodstein’s (1957: 60) equations 3.32 and 3.321.
37Remember that, starting with Kutas & Hillyard (1980), a considerable amount of experi-
mental evidence in favour of the hypothesis that interpretation is an incremental process has
been collected; see also Radó & Bott (2012) for some important refinements of this general idea.
38Note that a similar function is assigned also to negative markers of concord items in the
quite recent analysis of Negative Concord (NC) given by Zeijlstra (2004, 2006); see §7.4 below.
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the following examples are from Zanuttini (2010):39
(80) Epicurio
Epicurio
fue
was
un
a
filosofo
philosopher
che
that
non
not
seppe
knew
lettera
letter
nè
nor
non
not
seppe
knew
disputare
to_dispute
. . .
‘Epicurus was a philosopher who neither knew of letters nor was able to
dispute’
(Fiori e vita di filosafi, Ch. 11, ll. 2–3)
(81) Fue
was
accusato,
accused
ma
but
non
not
si
impers
trova
finds
neuna
no
legge
law
scritta
written
sopra
over
cosìfatto
such
maleficio
made
[reato],
misdeed
né
nor
convenevole
convenient
non
not
era
was
che
that
nne
from_it
39There is, besides, the well-known problem of explaining why natural languages can have
at their disposal only connectives associated with the structures represented in (79) but not to
those in (78). This question is an instance (actually, I believe, the only clear instance; see the
observations on n-indefinites below and on Neg-raising in §7.6) of the so-called puzzle of the O
corner of the aristotelian Square of Oppositions; the puzzle, in its general form, dates back to
Thomas Aquinas, who noticed it in the following passage (the English translation, with slight
modifications, is by J. Oesterle, quoted in Horn (1989: 253)):
In negativis autem non est aliqua dictio posita, sed possumus accipere, non omnis;
ut sicut, nullus, universaliter removet, eo quod significat quasi diceretur, non ul-
lus, idest, non aliquis, ita etiam, non omnis, particulariter removeat, in quantum
excludit universalem affirmationem.
[80398] Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 10 n. 13
There is no designated word, but non omnis [‘not all’] can be used. Just as nullus
[‘no’] removes universally, for it signifies the same thing as if we were to say non
ullus [‘not any’; ‘not some’], so also non omnis removes particularly inasmuch as it
excludes universal affirmation.
The puzzle has been extended to connectives by Horn (1972: §4.23) and Zwicky (1973: 477).
See Horn (1989: §4.5) and, more detailed, Horn (1972: Ch.4) for a famous explanation of the
general case on pragmatic grounds.
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scampasse
escape:sbj;pst:3sg
sanza
without
pena
punishment
. . .
‘he was charged, but nobody was able to find any written law about such
a crime, nor it was right that he escaped the punishment’
(Brunetto Latini, Rettorica, p. 128, ll. 1–3)
(82) De
of
la
the
cosa
thing
del
of_the
prossimo
fellow
tuo
your
non
not
farai
do[imp]:fut:2sg
furto,
theft
né
nor
in
not
tal
in
modo
such
non
manner
gliele
not
torrai,
to_him=it
né
you_will_take
non
nor
l’userai
it=you_will_use
contra
against
sua
his
voluntade.
will
‘you won’t steal your neighbour’s goods, nor will you take them in such a
way, nor will you use them against his will’
(Bono Giamboni, Libro, Ch. 17, §31)
(83) Li
the
veraci
true
amici
friend
nè
neither
per
by
forza
force
d’arme
of-arms
nè
nor
per
by
ricchezza
richness
d’oro
of-gold
non
nor
si
impers
possono
can
avere,
have
ma
but
per
by
servigio
service
e
and
per
by
fede
faith
s’acquistano.
impers-buy
‘true friends can neither be obtained through force of arms, nor thanks
to abundance of gold, but they can be obtained only by devotion and
faithfulness’
(Fiori e vita di filosafi, Ch. 21, ll. 24–25)
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I should point out that, if the story about n-connectives goes the way I have just
described, it could not easily also be extended to the case of n-indefinites, given
that I did not rule out the possibility that negation can take scope over an indef-
inite DP (and the impossibility of negation taking scope over connectives played
a crucial part in that story). However, at a closer inspection, n-indefinites appear
crosslinguistically to be morphologically more complex than one could prima facie
assume, being compound not only by a negative marker and an indefinite mor-
pheme, but also by a third morpheme, usually referred to as an (overt or covert)
“EVEN” element; the overt realizations of this element (like morphemes related
just to even) arguably introduce in the semantic representation of the clause a
connective, i.e. an element belonging to one of those syntactic categories which
must locally precede negation in unmarked structures (see, again, Lahiri (1998)
for scope inversion between negation and such EVEN element in NPIs in Hindi).
Of course, we are still lacking an explanation of why such a ban on negation
over connectives should hold. Here, I will not attempt to address this issue. One
possible answer could be related to the fact that in the right members of (78)
and (79), unlike in the left ones, both clauses bear a syntactic mark that they are
globally in a negative environment (such a line of reasoning would resemble the
one pursued by Dowty (1993, 1994), basing himself on the earlier Sánchez Valencia
(1991), to account for the function of NPIs and negative concord items in human
reasoning; see also Hoeksema (1986)).
Since it will play an important role in the analysis of many of the crucial
empirical data discussed below, it is worth stating the ban on negation taking
scope over coordinate structures in the following more precise way:
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(84) BNCS (Ban on Negated Coordinate Structures)
In the deep syntactic structure, negation is never in a position such that
it is interpreted as having immediate scope over a coordinate structure.
For a coordinate structure I mean here a syntactic constituent which semantically
translates as either a logical conjunction, or a logical disjunction, or a material
implication.
The fact must be stressed that the ban is intended to apply already to the syn-
tactic structure; this is because, among other things, we do not want it to cause
semantic representations containing a material implication whose first argument is
itself a coordinate structure to become illegitimate. The material implication, in
fact, is defined as a disjunction whose first disjunct is a negated term (see definition
(5) at p. 29): we do not want that logical negation, lacking a syntactic counter-
part, to be considered illegitimate, otherwise we would be in trouble defining the
semantic contribution of conditionals, universal quantifiers, generic indefinites and
possibly other linguistic expressions.
Now, we can very simply characterize the meaning of negation in RAt terms
in the following expected way:
(85) Jnot IPK = ¬JIPK.
To conclude this section, I want to stress the fact that the impossibility of
unmarked negation taking scope over a connective may, prima facie, make those
RA systems which are “logic-bearing” appear more natural, i.e. those systems
which extend the classical propositional calculus, like the original Skolem’s (1923)
one or Schwartz’s (1987a), which could easily be modified in order to retain only
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connectives from the propositional language (thus, negation should be defined as
a p.r.u. function and would only have narrow scope with respect to sentential
connectives). However, we should remember that logic-free and logic-bearing sys-
tems of RA are logically equivalent (see Schwartz (1987b)) and, in the light of the
greater conceptual parsimony of logic-free systems, the ban illustrated above is
probably best understood as a merely syntactic constraint. Hence, the choice of
building semantic representations for natural languages through the formalism of
a logic-free system of RA instead of a logic-bearing one is still coherent with the
considerations just developed.
6.7 Dependent clauses
The semantics of dependent clauses will play an important role in the next part
of this dissertation for at least two reasons: first, since all intensional verbs have
a clausal complement, it turns out to be useful to somehow specify the semantic
contribution of complements of that kind before addressing Neg-Raising, one of
the linguistic phenomena which I take to provide support for my claim (in this
regard, however, the particular semantic analysis of dependent clauses which I am
arguing for plays an essential role only in explaining some quite marginal semantic
effects); secondly, and more importantly, the semantic analysis I will give, even
if independently motivated, sheds some light on some apparently strange scope
behaviours of generic indefinites.
The semantics I am going to outline is a unified one for complements of atti-
tude verbs, complements of modal verbs, relative clauses, antecedents of condition-
als, subordinate clauses and clausal complements in topicalizations, focalizations,
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dislocation structures (see Postal (1971), Cinque (1977, 1990), Rizzi (1997) and
Zubizarreta (1998), among others) and wh-questions.40 All these cases arguably
involve a CP projection, since a complementizer is realized in the surface. Thus, at
least prima facie, a unified semantic account of theirs could find a bit of support
from the syntax.41
I think that the discussion should start from the complements of attitude verbs,
since they probably are, among the syntactic structures just listed, those which
posit the hardest challenges to a theory of meaning.
As is well-known, complements of attitude verbs not only do not obey substi-
tution of extensionally equivalent expressions, as in all intensional contexts, but
they seem not to obey substitution of intensionally equivalent expressions either.
The point is illustrated by the following examples:42
(86) a. Gianni knows that any walrus is a mammal. ?⇐
b. ?⇒ Gianni knows that any bachelor is male.
(87) a. Gianni believes that 2+2=4. ?⇐
b. ?⇒ Gianni believes that Poincaré’s conjecture is true.
40This list is by no means exhaustive.
41This observation presupposes that main clauses are not to be conceived as CPs themselves,
at least not in all cases or not in all languages. For positions of this kind held in the syntactic
literature, see, for instance, Travis (1984, 1991), Ottósson (1989), Diesing (1990), Röngvaldsson
& Thráinsson (1990), Zwart (1991, 1993, 1996a,b), Cardinaletti & Starke (1996) and Kiparsky
(1996).
Even if it seems to me that the account I am describing best fits with such a position, it should
not be considered to be incompatible, as far as I can see and when suitably adapted, with the
opposite position where also main clauses are (always) CPs.
42The example is admittedly very involved, but I decided to add it in order to show concretely
that the problem does not affect only analytic statements, like in (86), or mathematical truths,
like in (87), which are by far the most common kind of examples employed in the literature to
illustrate this point.
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(88) a. Gianni wants his zoo to be organized in this way: there are exactly
three walruses, each of them living in a different cage; for each walrus
there is one and only one seal living in the cage where it lives and
in love with it and, for each pair of walruses, there is one and only
one seal living in the cage where the first one lives and in love with
the second one; there are no other seals; besides which, there are also
some baboons, each of them living in a different cage; for each baboon
there is one and only one macaque living in the cage where it lives
and in love with it and, for each pair of baboons, there is one and
only one macaque living in the cage where the first one lives and in
love with the second one; there are no other macaques; there are some
giraffes too, each of them living in a different cage; for each giraffe
there is one and only one zebra living in the cage where it lives and
in love with it and, for each pair of giraffes, there is one and only one
zebra living in the cage where the first one lives and in love with the
second one; there are no other zebras; finally, each zebra likes also
one and only one among seals and macaques and no two zebras like
the same seal or macaque. ?⇐
b. Gianni wants there to be exactly four baboons and exactly five giraffes
in his zoo.
The alleged entailment relations between the two sentences within each couple are
marked with the interrogative dot because they have sometimes been considered as
indeed holding in the literature (usually by appealing to some notion of “implicit”
attitude, namely of “implicit” knowledge, belief, will, etc.), but here I assume
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without further discussion that they simply do not hold at all in any intuitive sense;
however, the following entailment relations, between the clausal complements of
the sentences above, quite uncontroversially do hold:
(89) a. Any walrus is a mammal. ⇐
b. ⇒ Any bachelor is male.
(90) a. 2+2=4. ⇐
b. ⇒ Poincaré’s conjecture is true.
(91) a. Gianni’s zoo is organized in this way: there are exactly three walruses,
each of them living in a different cage; for each walrus there is one and
only one seal living in the cage where it lives and in love with it and,
for each pair of walruses, there is one and only one seal living in the
cage where the first one lives and in love with the second one; there
are no other seals; besides which, there are also some baboons, each
of them living in a different cage; for each baboon there is one and
only one macaque living in the cage where it lives and in love with
it and, for each pair of baboons, there is one and only one macaque
living in the cage where the first one lives and in love with the second
one; there are no other macaques; there are some giraffes too, each of
them living in a different cage; for each giraffe there is one and only
one zebra living in the cage where it lives and in love with it and, for
each pair of giraffes, there is one and only one zebra living in the cage
where the first one lives and in love with the second one; there are
no other zebras; finally, each zebra likes also one and only one among
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seals and macaques and no two zebras like the same seal or macaque.
b. ⇒ In Gianni’s zoo there are exactly four baboons and exactly five
giraffes.
The logical equivalence between (89a) and (89b) holds in virtue of them being
both analytical truths, i.e. statements which are true only in virtue of the relevant
meaning of the words they contain (and in particular of the relevant definitions of
the words walrus and bachelor, respectively).
The logical equivalence between (90a) and (90b) derives from the fact that
they are both true mathematical statements,43 and true mathematical statements
may be viewed as analytic statements too, in that they do not express a contingent
truth, but a necessary one, one which holds independently of any fact in the world.
Finally, as a matter of logic, (91b) is a logical consequence of (91a), since the
cardinalities of the sets of animals in Gianni’s zoo turn out to be related in the
following way, in accordance to what (91a) says:
|{x : x is a walrus}| = 3
|{x : x is a seal}| = |{x : x is a walrus}|2
|{x : x is a seal}| = 9
|{x : x is a macaque}| = |{x : x is a baboon}|2
|{x : x is a zebra}| = |{x : x is a giraffe}|2
|{x : x is a seal}|+ |{x : x is a macaque}| = |{x : x is a zebra}|
9 + |{x : x is a baboon}|2 = |{x : x is a giraffe}|2
It could be proved that the last equation with two variables has only the fol-
lowing solutions:
• |{x : x is a baboon}| = 4;
43Poincaré’s conjecture is a conjecture in geometric topology first formulated by Poincaré’s
in 1904. It was first proved by Grigori Perelman in 2002 as a particular case of Thurston’s
geometrization conjecture.
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• |{x : x is a giraffe}| = 5.
The only solution to the problem of logical omniscience I am aware of is that of
assuming that the objects of attitude reports are actually representations of some
kind.44 This view has been widely explored in the literature and seems to have
a certain affinity with the project of a representationalist theory of meaning (see,
for instance, Field (1978); however, the two are not necessarily tied together).
The view that complements of verbs of attitude report denote representations
can be traced back at least to Carnap (1947) (see also, in part, Quine (1956)),
while the same idea for complements of modal predicates expressing necessity may
be found already in Gödel (1933). Carnap’s (1947) account predicts the following
interpretation for belief reports (Carnap (1947: 61ff.)):
[T]he sentence “John believes that D” in [a semantical system] S can be
interpreted by the following semantical sentence: “There is a sentence
Si in a semantical system S′ such that (a) Si in S′ is intensionally
isomorphic to “D” in S and (b) John is disposed to an affirmative
response to Si as a sentence of S′.”
Carnap’s rather cumbersome paraphrase is intended, of course, to avoid any
sort of commitment of the agent with a specific sentence in the language of the
attitude report, since it may well be the case that the agent does not even know
that language, the attitude report possibly being true all the same. The problem
of the semantic commitment with particular languages, even if in different forms,
44To embrace theories of attitude reports which share such an assumption, the label of “sen-
tentialism” is quite widespread. I prefer, however, the label of “representationalism”, since, in its
common use, the word “sentence” has a narrower meaning (which is arguably properly subsumed
by that of the word “representation”) than the one which is required for more robust theories of
attitude reports.
109
is a problem threatening many representationalist accounts of attitude reports.
Coming back to Carnap’s solution, a similar but more subtle difficulty for it has
been detected by Church in 1950.45 Church considered a couple of sentences like
the following ones, with (92b) being the translation in German of the English
sentence (92a):
(92) a. Seneca believed that man is rational.
b. Seneca glaubte, daß der Mensch vernunftbegabt sei.
As Church observes, when we apply Carnap’s scheme quoted above to (92a) and
(92b), we obtain the following paraphrases (93a) and (93b), respectively:
(93) a. There is a sentence Si in a semantical system L [Latin] such that (a)
Si in L is intensionally isomorphic to “Man is rational” in English and
(b) Seneca is disposed to an affirmative response to Si as a sentence
of L.
b. Es gibt einen Satz Si in einem semantischen System L, so daß gilt: (a)
Si in L ist intensional isomorph zu “Der Mensch ist vernunftbegabt”
im Deutschen und (b) Seneca ist dazu disponiert, auf Si als Satz von
L zustimmend zu reagieren.
Church argues that, although (92b) translates (92a) and even letting aside the
precise properties of Carnap’s crucial notion of “intensional isomorphism”, (93b)
is not a good translation for (93a); a suitable translation would be, instead, the
following one:
45Actually, Church had two different arguments against Carnap, but here I am content to
illustrate only the first one, since I agree with M. Dusche that the second is plainly incorrect.
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(94) Es gibt einen Satz Si in einem semantischen System L, so daß gilt: (a)
Si in L ist intensional isomorph zu “Man is rational” im Englisch und (b)
Seneca ist dazu disponiert, auf Si als Satz von L zustimmend zu reagieren.
Church’s point is indeed quite intuitive and ultimately relies on a concept of
translation in accordance with the requirement expressed in the following passage
by Langford (1937: 53 f.):
There is a simple test which helps us to determine whether a word is
being used or talked about, namely, that of translation. A word that is
being used is to he translated, while a word that is being talked about
must not be (subject matter must remain unchanged under transla-
tion).
Hence, according to this criterion, (93b) cannot be a translation of (93a) be-
cause in it the quoted sentence “Man is rational” does not appear, while in its
place “Der Mensch ist vernunftbegabt” does, and, besides, there is no longer the
reference to English, replaced by reference to German; both these ill correspon-
dences are amended in (94).
Despite an attempt by Burge, followed by Higginbotham and Dusche, to argue
that sentences like (93b) do translate, in fact, a sentence like (93a) (hence relax-
ing Langford’s (1937) claim above), I believe that Church’s argument is on the
right track and should be taken seriously. Of course, Carnap’s theory is only one
early representationalist theory of attitude report: after him, other theories in this
stream have been proposed, and I should mention at least Davidson’s “paratac-
tic account” and Harman’s (1972) “interpreted logical forms” (“ILFs”; especially
developed by Higginbotham, Larson and Ludlow and Dusche). But I think that
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the core ingredient to overcome Church’s argument is offered by those theories
elaborated in the more general framework of LOTH (the Language of Thought
Hypothesis; see the discussion on mentalese in §5.2 above), especially by Field’s
(1978) account, relying on the classical Fodor (1975). After all, once we have at
our disposal a language of thought which can be conceived as a semantic medium
among different natural languages, we could well assume that the representation
we want to commit our agent of the attitude to is built precisely in this language,
and so we could employ it in both the paraphrases for (92a) and (92b), thus over-
coming the translation problem.
In my definition of the semantic contribution of a complementizer phrase, I will
base myself essentially on Montague & Kalish’s (1959) account of complements of
attitude verbs and modal predicates,46 whose main goal was that of combining a
representational treatment of clausal complements with the possibility of estab-
lishing a link between linguistic material within them and variables bound by a
quantifier external to them. As in their case, I will posit no limit to the number
of such variables related to any embedded clause, except of course that it must be
at most equal to the number of overt and covert arguments in that clause (this
is partly related to my theoretical preferences on the issue of islands; see §7.2.3
below).
Hence, if IP~ı is a sentence containing the indices~ı (possibly among others), I will
denote as ‘pJIP~ıKq( ~A)’ the code number that a certain bijective function encoding
semantic representations assigns to the term obtained from JIP~ıK by replacing each
index ij (with 0 ≤ j ≤ n) with the corresponding term Aj in all its occurrences
46The fact that my view on definite descriptions differs sensibly from theirs does not matter
here.
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within JIP~ıK. The possibility of arithmetizing the syntax of a certain formal system
has been famously put to work for the first time in Gödel (1931) for the version of
Peano Arithmetic given in Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. Here,
I omit any precise characterization of such a function for RAt, since it would be
quite tedious while it does not present any difficulty in principle. It is fundamental
to realize that the term JIP~ıK is not itself part of the semantic representation when
appearing in pJIP~ıKq( ~A); hence, rule (S) of substitution can never apply directly
to a term into ‘p q’.47
Now, I assume the following structure for CP~ı :
(95)
uwwwwwv
CP~ı
IP~ıC
that
}~ = pJIP~ıKq(~ı)
Note that it is the syntax that determines which indices within IP~ı must be
replaced in the semantic representation of the embedding CP: this means that
possibly some generic variables contained in IP~ı are not among ~ı and they are, so
to speak, semantically “inactive”, insofar as they cannot provide the input for an
application of rule (P ). If an index i contained within a sentence IP~ı also appears
as an argument of pJIP~ıKq( ~A), I will say that i is transparent to the matrix clause
embedding IP~ı, otherwise I will say that it is opaque to it.
The picture just drawn seems to be reminiscent of some features of the notion
of phase which has entered in recent times in the vocabulary of generative grammar
(see Chomsky (2001)).
47It is precisely for this reason that the semantic theory I am arguing for cannot be composi-
tional, still being, of course, (primitive) recursive.
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The only crucial assumption on which definition (95) relies upon is that a de-
pendent clause ultimately refers to a (semantic) representation; however unortodox
it may be, this assumption, at least in some slightly different fashion, has already
appeared in the literature and misses any special connection with RA.
I will address now the issue of how relative clauses could be handled within a
general theory of dependent clauses along these lines.
6.7.1 Relative clauses
From a semantic point of view, the most important fact about relative clauses is
probably that they behave like adjectives in possibly being intersective modifiers
of the NP, something which can be rendered in logical form through the conjunc-
tion of the property denoted by the modified NP and the property denoted by
its modifier.48 But, assuming this view, a problem arises when trying to extend
the representationalist account of dependent clauses laid out before also to rela-
tive clauses, namely that the semantic representation given above for dependent
clauses does not express a property of any argument. This state of affairs may
of course suggest that, after all, it is not a very good idea to try to extend the
representationalist account also to relative clauses. However, it seems to me that
the risk in not pursuing this strategy is that of underestimating the indication
towards a partially uniform treatment provided by syntax.49
48I am setting aside, here, the issue of non-restrictive (also appositive) relative clauses; see
Ross (1967a, 1986) and Cinque (1978, 1981) on this topic.
49Of course, a solution which would be immune to this objection would be that of abandoning
a representationalist account for all kind of dependent clauses. But this move would be at the
expense of having the problem of logical omniscience come back. Besides, as I will argue in §7.2.8
below, there is also another important reason which points towards a representationalist analysis
of all dependent clauses, but since, unlike the one just mentioned, it is dependent on the main
theoretical claim of this dissertation, I will not consider it here.
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In order to combine the virtues of both the intersective view of nominal modi-
fication and the representationalist view of dependent clauses, I will assume that,
in the case of relative clauses, the operation of merging a relative clause CPi with
a noun phrase NPi not only introduces a conjunction in the associated logical
form, but it also introduces, maybe located in a layer within a (tentative) AdjP
projection, a covert predicate Op. In the semantic representation, ‘Proof(A,B)’
is shorthand for ‘(∃x ≤ ϕ(A))proof ′(x,B)’, which holds for two terms A and B
iff B is the code of a term of RAt such that there is a proof of ‘B = 0’ in RAt
of length at most f(A) (under some suitable measurement of the length of proofs
and with f(A) a specified term containing A).50 Again, Gödel (1931) showed,
for the version of Peano Arithmetic of Principia Mathematica, that the bounded
notion of provability (i.e., the notion of provability through a proof not exceeding
a certain length, possibly determined in functional terms) in that system could
be captured by a primitive recursive function, and again his result extends to our
system without any principled difficulty. Schematically, so, I assume the following
semantic representation of a NP modified by a relative clause:51
50It seems to me that, as for the presence of the unbounded existential quantifier here, consid-
erations analogous to those made relative to the unbounded universal one in nn. 21 and 24 are
valid also in this case.
51Syntactically, I have in mind the quite classical head external analysis of relative clauses,
assumed in Montague (1970a) and which can be drawn back to Quine (1960). However, it seems
to me that also the head raising and the matching analysis are compatible with such a semantic
account.
Note, further, that the binding argument of ‘Proof ’ in the semantic representation could also
have been different from t. From here on, however, I will make this assumption for all extensional
contexts; in the intensional ones, instead, I will take the binding argument to be the situation
(or world) argument introduced by the intensional operator. Simply, it seems to me that these
arguments are particularly salient for that purpose, but admittedly I have no robust evidence
supporting this impression (see also n. 10 below).
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(96)
uwwwwwwwwwwv
NP1i
AdjPi
CPiAdj
Op
NP2i
}~
= JNP2iK ∧ Proof(t, JCPiK)
Informally speaking, this amounts to saying that the NP cat which scratched
Gianni is assumed to be roughly equivalent to the NP cat such that a proof exists
that it scratched Gianni.
Notice that in cognitive sciences and AI it is quite customary to assume that
a cognitive agent whatever always has upper bounds for the computations he
displays; Step Logic (whose first appearance is in Drapkin & Perlis (1986)), for
instance, formally develops the assumption that an agent’s beliefs are indexed by
time points or steps corresponding to stages in the agent’s reasoning, thus allowing
for a definition of a non-omniscient time-bounded reasoner.
6.7.2 Focus and wh-questions
The syntax and semantics of focus is strictly intertwined with those of questions
and wh-items. Fundamental studies on the semantics of questions are Hamblin
(1958, 1973) and Karttunen (1977) (the last one partly relying on Ross (1970));
besides, see also Bolinger (1978) for matching and alternative questions, Groe-
nendijk & Stokhof (1981, 1982, 1983); Groenendijk et al. (1984), Heim (1994),
Rullmann (1995) and Beck & Rullmann (1999), already cited, for strong exhaus-
tivity in embedded questions, Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984b,a) and Krifka (2001)
for coordinated and pair-list questions and Isaacs & Rawlins (2008) for conditional
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questions. The investigation of the semantics and pragmatics of focus ultimately
springs from Paul (1880) and Jackendoff (1972); an influential analysis in terms of
presupposition, based on Hamblin’s alternative semantics, is developed in Rooth
(1985, 1992, 1996) (compare Karttunen & Peters (1979) for differences with clefts,
which are of course related); see also Chomsky (1976), Jacobs (1983), von Ste-
chow (1985, 1991), Rochemont (1986), Krifka (1991), É. Kiss (1998), Zubizarreta
(1998) and Herburger (2000), for different analyses, Szabolcsi (1981) for exhaus-
tivity of focus (at least in Hungarian) and Taglicht (1984) for an early discussion
of discontinuous focus. The syntactic parallelism between wh-items and focused
constituents is explicitly established, for instance, in Chomsky (1977b).
As is well-known, there is a systematic correlation between wh-items in ques-
tions and constituents receiving a marked intonation (i.e., focused constituents) in
answers, which is illustrated by the following examples.
(97) a. Who gave two umbrellas to Luisa?
b. [Gianni]F (gave {two umbrellas / them} to {Luisa / her}).
(98) a. What did Gianni give to Luisa?
b. [Two umbrellas]F ({Gianni / he} gave to {Luisa / her}).
(99) a. Who did Gianni give two umbrellas to?
b. To [Luisa]F ({Gianni / he} gave {two umbrellas / them}).
(100) a. How many umbrellas did Gianni give to Luisa?
b. [Two]F ({umbrellas / of them} ({Gianni / he} gave to {Luisa /
her})).
(101) a. How did Gianni give two umbrellas to Luisa?
117
b. [Roughly]F ({Gianni / he} gave {two umbrellas / them} to {Luisa
/ her}).
(102) a. When did Gianni give two umbrellas to Luisa?
b. [Yesterday]F ({Gianni / he} gave {two umbrellas / them} to {Luisa
/ her}).
(103) a. Where did Gianni give two umbrellas to Luisa?
b. [At the railway station]F ({Gianni / he} gave {two umbrellas / them}
to {Luisa / her}).
(104) a. Why did Gianni give two umbrellas to Luisa?
b. [Because it was raining]F ({Gianni / he} gave {two umbrellas /
them} to {Luisa / her}).
Again in a parallel way, as we may have multiple wh-s within the same sentence,
we also have sentences with a so-called discontinuous focus:52
(105) a. Who did Gianni introduce to whom?
b. [Filippo]F to [Susanna]F ({Gianni / he} introduced).
Finally, we may have embedded wh-questions as well as embedded focus/back-
ground structures, and as a particular case ((108a) and (108b), respectively) even
self-embedded ones (wh- embedded questions are nothing other than free relative
clauses, while focus/background self-embedded structures are the cases usually
referred to in the literature as multiple focus; see Krifka (1991) and n. 52 above):53
52Because of a widespread choice of terms which I consider not entirely felicitous, the existing
label of multiple focus is associated with a phenomenon which is not the parallel of multiple wh-s.
53I should warn the reader that examples (107b) and (108b) with focus display an ambiguity
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(107) a. Luisa told Gianni who was at the party.
b. Luisa told Gianni that [Susanna]F was at the party.
(108) a. Who told Gianni who was at the party?
b. [Luisa]F (told {Gianni / him} {that / that [Susanna]F was at the
party}).
It is widely agreed that both questions and answers project a CP layer in
the syntactic structure: the reason why I included focus and related phenomena
within the present section about dependent clauses is precisely that I share this
rather uncontroversial assumption. Moreover, I believe that this syntactic fact, in
conjunction with the apparently bizarre semantic analysis I suggested for all de-
pendent clauses, may provide the key towards a deeper understanding of Rooth’s
(1985) insight (see also Rooth (1992, 1996)) that focus (and questions) triggers
a presupposition of its correspondent background, despite this not being an exis-
tential presupposition (i.e., the presupposition that at least one true instantiation
of the sentence-schema provided by the background exists). Rooth (1985, 1992,
1996), furthermore, offers an analysis not only of focus, but also of association
with focus, which involves several adverbial modifiers known as focalizing adverbs
like Eng. only, even, also, at most, at least, exactly, etc.
which does not find an analogous one in the corresponding examples (107a) and (108a) with wh-s,
respectively. The ambiguity is between an embedded (the one intended) and an unembedded
reading of the rightmost focused element (with the unembedded reading making (108b) turn
into a case of discontinuous focus). As for (107b), for instance, the two readings may find the
following corresponding rough paraphrases with cleft structures:
(106) a. Luisa told Gianni that it was Susanna who was at the party.
b. It was Susanna who Luisa told Gianni was at the party.
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Chapter 7
Challenging semantic
representations
7.1 Bounded quantifiers
In this part, I will restrict my attention only to universal and existential (covert or
overt) quantifiers in natural languages. This may be viewed as a strong limitation,
given the apparent wide range of determiners with different meanings which natural
languages have at their disposal. I have already said, however, that here, following
the tradition of dynamic semantics, I am treating definite DPs as mere anaphoric
elements (see §6.3). Besides, as I said in §6.5.1, many other determiners are treated
here as adjectives of groups, following, for instance, Verkuyl (1981). Once we
decide to treat words like these as adjectives, it is even more difficult to treat them
as determiners, in line with the tradition of generalized quantifiers theory (Barwise
& Cooper (1981)), some complex expressions like Eng. more than n, less than n,
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at most n, at least n, only n, even n, compound by a focalizing adverb 1 and a
numeral n (see Krifka (1999)). Finally, so-called negative quantifiers have received
sound analyses treating them as syntactically complex elements, in particular as
elements introducing or relating to a negation in the syntactic structure (as an
early reference, see Jacobs (1980), who analyzed German negative quantifiers as
existential quantifiers within the immediate scope of a negation; but see §7.4).
As for conjunction, disjunction and negation, I already said that they behave in
the same way in RA and in classical first order logic, provided that we accept the
formal translations I gave before. What is, instead, intrinsically beyond the limits
of any version of RA are quantifiers conceived in the customary way. Notice that,
actually, under consistent finitist assumptions, we had better say, with Goodstein
(1951) (see the quotation at p. 17 above), that standard logic fails to provide the
right interpretation to natural language quantifiers.
The way quantifiers are defined in RA is based on the notion of bounded quan-
tification. The idea lying behind it is the one, common also to standard logic
and famously expressed in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, that universal and existential
quantifiers correspond respectively to plural conjunction and disjunction. The dif-
ference between standard logic and RA consists in the cardinality which is assigned
to these pluralities: in standard logic it is an infinite one (at least the infinite of
natural numbers, ℵ0), i.e. universal and existential quantifiers are conceived respec-
tively as an infinitary conjunction and disjunction;2 while in RA there is an upper
bound to the number of conjuncts and disjuncts, respectively. In other words, and
1Early analyses of some of these modifiers, offering seminal insights for further developments,
are Fillmore (1965) on even (see also Fillmore et al. (1988)) and, moreover, Horn (1969, 1972)
on both only and even and Horn (1996) and Geurts & van der Sandt (2004) on only.
2Remember, however, that, as I said in §2, later Wittgenstein abandoned this view to embrace
a full-fledged finitism. See the discussion on p. 18 and in particular n. 16.
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remembering that our domain of quantification is the set N of natural numbers, a
quantifier which is conceived classically is unbounded, in that it is assumed that
it can range over all natural numbers, while a quantifier defined as a primitive
recursive function must be bounded, i.e. it can only range over natural numbers
up to a certain one.
As I have said before (p. 36), what behaves like unbounded universal quantifiers
in RAt, under certain circumstances, are generic variables, but they are crucially
not functions (hence, not binding terms) and thus they cannot be embedded in
the scope of any operator, something which natural language quantifiers, instead,
appear able to do.
Of course, since all constraints on the domain of quantification can be put ex-
plicitly in the scope of the quantifier (quite naturally, when considering restricted
quantifiers, within the restrictor itself), technically we can express primitive recur-
sive quantifiers in terms of the standard ones. The converse is obviously impossible,
but we can still maintain (and this is what I am actually doing) that the infinitary
interpretation of quantifiers simply does not make sense at all.
7.1.1 Existential import
Before coming to semantic representations of natural language quantifiers, there is
one important issue I should address, even if only briefly: the problem of so-called
existential import of quantifiers. An example of existential import is given by the
following sentence (109), which seems to presuppose the information in (109a):
(109) Every mouse in this room is grey.
a. There is at least one mouse in this room.
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That the content of (109a) is not actually asserted by (109) is proven, in the usual
manner (see Strawson (1950)), by considering its negative counterpart (110) and
realizing that it seems too to presuppose (109a):
(110) Not every mouse in this room is grey.
Notice that the label of “existential import”, even if it is probably the most
widespread in the literature, may be somewhat misleading, since the phenomenon
does not necessarily imply the existence of an individual of a certain kind in the
real world. This is well illustrated by the following example:
(111) If there are mice in this room, then every mouse in this room is grey.
In this case, the existence of at least one individual of the relevant kind (i.e., of at
least one mouse in the room) holds only at a local level, not necessarily at a global
one. If we assume that existential import is a genuine case of presupposition, this
fact is, of course, not surprising at all, since consequents of conditionals are a typi-
cal case of filters, in Karttunen’s (1973) terminology, i.e. of linguistic environments
which do not always allow presuppositions to project in larger environments they
are embedded within.
In the literature, it is sometimes said that determiners having existential import
are partitive, in a technical sense which is of course related, but still different from,
the sense in which we speak of true partitive constructions (i.e., complex DPs which
in English appear in the form DP of Detdef NPs). However, since it seems to me
that nothing really forces a global interpretation of the label “existential import”,
since it is probably the most common means used to refer to the phenomenon and
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since its most accredited competitor, namely the adjective “partitive”, is itself not
completely immune to risks of misunderstandings, I will maintain the standard
label without further hesitations.
There has been a lot of discussion, among linguists and philosophers, whether
this phenomenon is better understood as a genuine case of presupposition or rather
as an implicature, i.e. arising as a by-product of independent pragmatic principles,
maybe ultimately grounded on processing strategies.3 It seems to me that it would
be hard to reconcile this latter position with data like, for instance, the following,
where the oddness of both the question and the answer appears to be independent
from any property of the context other than the one specified:
(112) (Scenario: There is no mouse in the room.)
A: # Is every mouse in this room grey?
B: # Yes.
Furthermore, notice that, under the assumption that the existential import of the
universal quantifier every arises only as a by-product of some pragmatic principles,
the answer in (112) would be true!
The standard gricean pragmatic account of the existential import of the uni-
versal quantifier is a typical case of a quantity implicature (see Geurts (2010)
and Appendix A). However, Geurts (2007: 256 f.) shows, contra Abusch & Rooth
(2004), that the implicature story simply does not work. In a non-presuppositional
account, a sentence like the following (113) (Geurts’s (2007: 257) (8)) would uni-
laterally entail both, say, (114) and (115) (Geurts’s (2007: 256) (6a)); hence, (113)
3Some historical remarks on the existential import of universal quantifiers can be found in
Kneale & Kneale (1962) and, moreover, Horn (1989: §1.1.3).
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is a stronger statement of both (114) and (115), and thus, having uttered either
(114) or (115), the speaker conveys the information that he was not in a position
to utter the more informative (113), i.e. he conveys the information in (116).
(113) There are no Swiss matadors.
(114) No Swiss matador adores Dolores del Rio.
(115) Every Swiss matador adores Dolores del Rio.
(116) It is possible that there are Swiss matadors.
However, as Geurts notices, a genuine conversational implicature should be can-
cellable by suitable prosecutions in the discourse: this is actually the case with
(114), as the following (117a) and (117b) show, but it it is not the case with (115),
as shown by the corresponding (118a) and (118b) (Geurts’s (2007: 257) (10a) and
(10b), respectively):
(117) a. No Swiss matador adores Dolores del Rio — in fact, there are no
Swiss matadors (at all).
b. No Swiss matador adores Dolores del Rio, and maybe there are no
Swiss matadors (at all).
(118) a. #Every Swiss matador adores Dolores del Rio — in fact, there are no
Swiss matadors.
b. #Every Swiss matador adores Dolores del Rio, and maybe there are
no Swiss matadors.
126
In other words, Abusch & Rooth’s (2004) pragmatic story seems to work for no,
but should face serious problems with determiners like every.
Here, I will simply assume that several determiners in English (and in many
other languages as well) do have an existential import, quoting some studies in the
relevant literature where the reader can find more in-depth observations support-
ing this point of view. In particular, the first scholar who argued that universal
quantifiers have existential import conceived as a presupposition was Hart (1951),4
who claimed the following (Hart (1951: 207)):
[A]ny one who in normal discourse asserts such a sentence as, e.g., ‘All
taxi drivers are well-read’, and appears to be making on this occasion
a serious assertion will be properly taken to believe the corresponding
existential sentence to be true. For otherwise he could have no reasons
for asserting it. [. . . ] If we want a word we can say that the [universal]
form in the absence of a special indication ‘presupposes’ or ‘strongly
suggests’ the truth of the existential form. But these psychological
terms ill convey the conventional character of the connection.
The same view was expressed in Strawson (1952), even if relative to a list
of different English determiners (see Heim & Kratzer (1998: 160 f.)). This work
has been the source for the strongest hypothesis on existential import formulated
in the literature, due to McCawley (1972), according to which all determiners
would have existential import. This hypothesis has proved barely tenable: in
particular, de Jong & Verkuyl (1985) (followed by Diesing (1992), among others)
4see the discussion in Horn (1989: §1.1.3) and in particular the views expressed by Apuleius
and reported by Sullivan (1967).
For experimental evidence supporting the existential import of every, see Rips (1994)
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showed that there seems to be a clear correlation between strong determiners and
presuppositional determiners, on one side, and weak determiners and determiners
which are not necessarily presuppositional, on the other side, where the opposition
between strong and weak determiners is to be understood in Milsark’s (1974) terms
(see also Milsark (1977)). In Milsark’s terminology, strong determiners are those
which are bad in there be sentences (like every, most, both, each), while weak ones
are those which are fine in such a linguistic environment (like numerals, no, few,
many):5
(120) a. There is {a / no} unicorn.
b. There are {two / few / many} unicorns.
(121) a. #There is {every / each / neither} unicorn.
b. #There are {all / most / both} unicorns.
5Here, I am simply using the terminology used by Milsark himself: following on from the
previous discussion in 6.5.1 and at the beginning of this section, it should be evident that I am
implicitly assuming that some of these words are not true determiners.
It is quite customary, in the literature, to find sentences like those which are marked here as
simply odd marked as plainly ungrammatical. I think that such sentences are not, in fact, really
ungrammatical. Consider, for instance, one of the variants of (121a) in the specified scenario:
(119) (Scenario: B read to A the descriptions, made by a certain explorer who many take
to be mad, of three unicorns, each one with its own distinguishing features, living in a
remote island in the Eastern portion of the Pacific Ocean. Both A and B are in doubt
whether to trust the story or not. A decides to reach that island himself and, after
coming back, runs breathless to B and tells him what follows.)
A: There is every unicorn!
Of course, this is not a scenario which appears to be relevant when a sentence like (119) is
uttered out of the blue. Out of the blue, the locative argument in there be sentences is normally
understood as covering the whole universe of discourse and, under this assumption, (119) turns
to be a tautology (this is the same explanation given by Barwise & Cooper (1981: §4.3); see
Portner & Partee (2002: 96)).
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Note that in all the Italian counterparts of (121b) complex determiners incorporat-
ing the definite article are involved (this is of course connected to the fact, repeated
below in §7.2.2, that English bare nouns may be definite DPs, while Romance ones
cannot; see Heim & Kratzer (1998: 161) on the hidden partitive structure asso-
ciated with Eng. all: for this reason, hereafter, when speaking of the universal
quantifier I will only refer to singular determiners like every or its counterparts in
other languages):
(122) #Ci
there
sono
are
{tutti
all
gli
the
/ la
the
maggior
greater
parte
part
degli
of_the
/ entrambi
both
gli}
the
unicorni.
unicorns
‘there are {all / most / both} unicorns’ It.
It is often assumed that strong determiners are all presuppositional (see de Jong
& Verkuyl (1985) and Diesing (1992), among others), and here I align myself with
this view. It is more controversial, instead, the treatment of weak determiners,
as far as existential import is concerned (see Heim & Kratzer (1998: §6.8) and
in particular Heim & Kratzer (1998: §6.8.4)). It seems reasonable to assume at
least that they do not mandatorily have existential import. From this point of
departure, we have two alternatives: stating that they are ambiguous between
presuppositional and non-presuppositional interpretations (as, again, in de Jong
& Verkuyl (1985) or Diesing (1992), the latter arguing for a structural rather than a
lexical ambiguity), or maintaining that they are never presuppositional and trying
to explain presuppositional effects in terms of the intervention of independent
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factors.6 Here, I will endorse the last position, directing the reader to the indicated
references for arguments supporting it.
One needs to carefully distinguish between weak determiners and persistent
determiners, in Barwise & Cooper’s (1981) sense. Here is a formulation of the
relevant definition of persistence for determiners:
Definition 7.1 A determiner Det is persistent iff, for any noun phrases NP1x and
NP2x and any verb phrase VPx, if NP1x is a hyponym of NP2x (in symbols, NP1x ⊆
NP2x), then [Det NP1x]VPx entails [Det NP1x]VPx (in symbols, [Det NP1x]VPx ⇒
[Det NP1x]VPx).
Given this definition, both Eng. some and a turn out to be persistent deter-
miners,7 as the following example may serve to illustrate:
(123) a. black cat ⊆ cat
b. (i) {A / Some} black cat loves beer.
(ii) ⇒ {A / Some} cat loves beer.
Here, I want to argue that not all persistent determiners are also weak. In
particular, one counterexample is represented by determiners like It. qualche ‘some
(sg.)’ and alcuni ‘some (pl.)’, as opposed, respectively, to the indefinite article
un(o) / una / un’ ‘a(n)’ and to the so-called partitive article dei / degli / delle
6Among others, topicality and focalization; but simply consider also the widely independently
attested possibility of implicit content associated with the restrictor discussed, for instance, in
Kuroda (1982) and Sperber & Wilson (1986)).
7Actually, I would be inclined to say that none of them occupy the head position in a DP
(see the beginning of this section and n. 11 below), but, given that they are very commonly
treated as such, at least in the semantic literature, and that it seems to me that trying to be
more precise would result in increased complexity of exposition, for now and henceforth I will
quite freely speak about elements like that as “determiners”.
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‘sm’ (see Chierchia (1997) and Zamparelli (2002b) on the morphological structure
and the semantics of the Romance partitive article).8 All three determiners are
persistent, as illustrated by the following examples:
(124) a. pugile
boxer
miope
short-sighted
⊆ pugile
boxer
‘short-sighted boxer’ ⊆ ‘boxer’
b. (i) {Un
a
/ Qualche}
some
pugile
boxer
miope
short-sighted
studia
studies
linguistica.
linguistics
‘{a / some} short-sighted boxer studies linguistics’
(ii) ⇒ {Un
a
/ Qualche}
some
pugile
boxer
studia
studies
linguistica.
linguistics
‘{a / some} boxer studies linguistics’
c. (i) {Dei
sm
/ Alcuni}
some
pugili
boxers
miopi
short-sighted
studiano
study
linguistica.
linguistics
‘{sm / some} short-sighted boxers study linguistics’
(ii) ⇒ {Dei
sm
/ Alcuni}
some
pugili
boxers
studiano
study
linguistica.
linguistics
‘{sm / some} boxers study linguistics’
8sm is here, in accordance with the standard usage in the literature, the written form corre-
sponding to the unstressed variant of some; see the discussion on p. 147 below.
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However, un and qualche, on one side, and dei and alcuni, on the other side, are not
freely interchangeable in there-sentences and, in general, in existential assertions:
(125) a. In
in
questo
this
villaggio,
town
{c’è
there_is
/ esiste}
exists
un
a
unicorno.
unicorn
‘in this town, there {is / exists} a unicorn’
b. #In
in
questo
this
villaggio,
town
{c’è
there_is
/ esiste}
some
qualche
unicorn
unicorno.
‘in this town there {is / exists} some unicorn’
(126) a. In
in
questo
this
villaggio,
town
{ci
there
sono
are
/ esistono}
exist
degli
sm
unicorni.
unicorns
‘in this town, there {are / exist} sm unicorns’
b. #In
in
questo
this
villaggio,
town
{ci
there
sono
are
/ esistono}
exist
alcuni
some
unicorni.
unicorns
‘in this town, there {are / exist} some unicorns’
I believe that Italian illustrates this point better than English would do, since
in Italian the opposition between un and qualche, on one side, and dei and alcuni,
on the other, seems indeed to correspond to minimal couples whose members only
differ, in synchrony, for the determiner having existential import or not. In En-
glish, on the contrary, the difference between sm and some may not be entirely
clear.9 Besides, despite the glosses and paraphrases given above, Eng. sg. some
is far from being an exact equivalent of It. qualche (the point is illustrated in
9Note, as well, that some overlap between the partitive article and some (arguably, sm) should
be however reasonably assumed, given that Romance mass NPs, if not used as kind-referring,
cannot restrict the existential presuppositional determiner, still possibly being the restrictor of
the partitive article, while in English they can appear introduced by some:
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Zamparelli (2007)) and is, instead, closer to It. un qualche ‘a some’ (usually, It.
qualche is translated by pl. some, instead of singular one, but still this would be the
same translation of It. pl. alcuni, while there are undoubtedly both semantic and
pragmatic differences between qualche and alcuni; see Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-
Benito (2008, 2010) on Spanish sg. algún and Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito
(2011, 2013) on its plural counterpart algunos, at least partly paralleling the dis-
tinction between qualche and alcuni).
Nevertheless, I will assume, following Strawson (1952), that Eng. some, in its
stressed variant (probably not the same thing as the focused variant of some which
Büring (1996) takes to be the exclusive source of its partitive readings), do have
existential import.
Now, the time has come to give the semantic representations for some English
syntactic structures whose outermost operator is a quantifier (here, in line with
all syntactic theories I am aware of, I am implicitly assuming a ban on vacuous
quantification, as the one proposed by Chomsky (1982)):10
(127) *Dammi
give_me
qualche
some
vino,
wine
per favore.
please
(128) Dammi
give_me
del
sm
vino,
wine
per favore.
please
‘give me some wine, please’ It.
(129) Give me some wine, please.
10For the sake of simplicity, from here on, I will take t itself to be the binding argument of
each bounded quantifier whenever the quantifier is not embedded in an intensional context; in
this last case, instead, I will take the binding argument to be the world (or situation) argument
introduced by the intensional operator. I am not entirely sure that this is always a viable option
(even if I am inclined to think so), but, in any case, it makes things simpler and, moreover, does
not affect the arguments I am trying to develop (see n. 51 above).
As one can see, with the following semantic representations I do not want to commit myself
to the view that all the layers within DP must always project.
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(130)
uwwwwwwwwwwv
IP1i
IP2xDPi,x
NPi,xD
every
}~
= (∀x ≤ t)(xΠi→ JIP2xK);
(131)
uwwwwwwwwwwv
IP1i
IP2xDPi,x
PlPi,x
some NPs
D
∃
}~
= (∃x ≤ t)(xΠi ∧ JIP2xK);
(132)
uwwwwwwwwwwwwwwv
IP1
IP2xDPx
NumPx
NPxNum
a
D
∃
}~
= (∃x ≤ t)(JNPxK ∧ JIP2xK).11
The semantic representations above reflect the fact that, in the case of DPs
having existential import, I take the restrictor to be only a tool to recover the
proper antecedent for the anaphoric link. However, since logical forms where the
property conveyed by the restrictor is supplied also at the local level (i.e., in the
case of universal quantification, within the antecedent of a material implication;
11This semantic representation reflects the fact that I take the English indefinite article to
simply be the unstressed non-pronominal variant of the numeral one; there are, of course, mor-
phological facts possibly justifying this assumption (the same considerations also apply to the
indefinite article in Italian, where the morphologic link is even more evident).
On generic one, see Moltmann (2006).
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while in the case of existential quantification, within the first conjunct of a con-
junction) rather than only at the global level where the antecedent is merged into
the structure which is input to interpretation are logically equivalent, hereafter I
will conform to the standard practice of making these properties appear (also) at
the local level in the semantic representations. This should avoid useless compli-
cations when comparing universal quantifiers and generic indefinites in the next
sections.
Of course, when dealing with quantifiers in natural language semantics, of par-
ticular importance is the problem of how they can take scope, especially given the
availability of so-called inverse scope readings, where two operators are interpreted
with a reciprocal scope which does not reflect their order in the surface.12 One
of the earliest solutions to the problem of quantifier scope in natural languages
proposed in the literature has been the so-called Quantifying-in, first formulated
in Montague (1970a) (see Montague (1974: 204–5)). Essentially, Quantifying-in is
a syntactic approach to quantifier scope, in that it establishes a connection be-
tween different scope configurations in the semantic representation of a sentence
and different syntactic representations corresponding to it. Its main difference
with the other major syntactic approach to quantifier scope, namely the one based
on Quantifier Raising (QR; see Chomsky (1976) and May (1977, 1985)), is that,
since it does not assume, unlike the QR approach, that quantifiers take scope only
after they have obeyed some movement rule at a certain level of the syntactic rep-
12At least starting with Ioup (1975), it has often been argued that the information structure
of inverse scope readings is marked. I believe that this may be indeed a reasonable conclusion
in some cases of inverse scope readings. However, there is evidence enough from experimental
studies (see references at p. 155) that inverse scope is more difficult to process than direct one;
hence, several judgements of markedness may be ascribed to a hard processing rather than to a
complex information structure.
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resentation, the Quantifying-in approach does not predict that quantifier scope is
constrained by the same kind of limitations which constrain overt movement (on
this issue, see already Chomsky (1975)); as I will go into further in §7.2.3, the
empirical tenability of many, if not most, of such constraints has been challenged
from several sides.13 However, I follow Hofmeister & Sag (2010) in maintaining
that at least the Coordinate Structure Constraint (CSC; see Ross (1967a, 1986)
and Schmerling (1972)) holds as a genuine syntactic constraint.
It is worth remembering here what the CSC amounts to, since it will play an
important role in the analysis of some crucial examples in the next section. Here
I will formulate it in the following manner:
(133) Coordinate Structure Constraint (CSC)
An element may be extracted from a coordinate structure only if it is
extracted from both the coordinated clauses and it is either an adjunct
or it receives the same case in both of them.14
It is plausible that the CSC, as well as the BNCS stated above, can find a
pragmatic motivation to the extent of making inferences simpler; in this way,
there would also be a uniform principle of economy applied to reasoning justifying
both these syntactic restrictions.
13Quantifier Raising is often advocated to explain phenomena such as Antecedent Contained
Deletion (ACD); but see already Cormack (1984) for an account of ACD as simple V-ellipsis
instead of VP-ellipsis, compatible with other syntactic assumptions.
14For the theory of Case, the obvious references are Chomsky & Lasnik (1977) and Rouveret
& Vergnaud (1980).
This formulation is intended to cover also the well-known case of so-called “across-the-board”
(ATB) extraction (see already Ross (1967a, 1986) himself).
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The need for implicit arguments, such as the one introduced as the boundary
argument in the definition of bounded quantifiers, is supported by massive inde-
pendent evidence collected in the semantic literature: I have already cited Kuroda
(1982) and Sperber & Wilson (1986) among the earliest studies addressing this
topic. The first indirect argument at supporting that, however, has probably been
put forward already by Aristotle, when he defends, by introducing his notion of
the distinction of respects, the possibility of consistently asserting a superficial con-
tradiction in natural language. Aristotle makes this point in the celebrated and
ad nauseam discussed passage from Metaphysics (1005b 19–23) (Aristotle (1984);
italics in the English translation mine):
τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑpiάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑpiάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ
τὸ αὐτό (καὶ ὅσα ἅλλα piροσδιορισαίμεθ᾿ ἄν, ἔστω piροσδιωρισμένα piρὸς
τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας) [. . . ].
It is impossible that the same thing can at the same time both
belong and not belong to the same object and in the same respect (and
all other specifications that might be made, let them be added to meet
local objections) [. . . ].
Finally, I want to also outline here a semantic analysis for the English univer-
sal quantifier each, in order to give some clarifications about an alleged contrast
between it and every in terms of distributivity.
The etymology for the Italian counterpart of each, {ciascun(o) / ciascuna},
seems to be particularly telling; the following lemmas are from Devoto (1968):15
ciascuno, lat. volg. *cisque (class. quisque) unus; cfr. ciascheduno,
15Translations are mine.
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incr. con catuno [. . . ].
ciascuno, Vulgar Lat. *cisque (Classical Lat. quisque) unus; cf. cia-
scheduno, crossed with catuno [. . . ].
ciascheduno, lat. volg. *cisque (class. quisque) et unus, it. *cischeduno,
incr. con cata unum, it. arc. catuno e cadauno [. . . ].
ciascheduno, Vulgar Lat. *cisque (Classical Lat. quisque) et unus, It.
*cischeduno, crossed with cata unum, Old It. catuno and cadauno [. . . ].
catuno ‘cadauno’ (arc.), lat. volg. *cata-; [. . . ] cfr. cadauno.
catuno ‘cadauno’ (archaic), Vulgar Lat. *cata-; [. . . ] cf. cadauno.
cadauno, dallo sp. cadauno e questo dal lat. cata- distributivo (preso
dal gr. katá) e unus [. . . ].
cadauno, from Spanish cadauno and this from Lat. cata- distributive
(taken from Greek katá) and unus [. . . ].
The diachronic data (see in particular the lemma for cadauno) suggest a way to
give substance to the commonplace, quite ubiquitous in the literature (see Beghelli
& Stowell (1997: §5.1), for instance) according to which it is each, not every,
which is the true English distributive universal quantifier. Such a claim needs, I
believe, to be better specified, since there is a technical meaning of the adjective
“distributive”, that opposes it to the adjective “collective” and that is presupposed
by default here, according to which it can hardly be denied that every is also
distributive. Sentence (134) below is not compatible with a scenario where the
students painted the room together, each one painting only a limited portion of it.
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(134) Every student completely painted the room.
But the etymology of each and, moreover, that of some of its counterparts in other
languages (like It. ciascuno or French chaque) seem compatible with the idea that
each is a universal quantifier that needs to have an existential quantifier in its
immediate scope and that receives the following semantic representation:
(135)
uwwwwwwwwwwwwwwv
IP1i
IP2x
IP3x,yDP2y
NP2yD
∃
DP1i,x
NP1i,xD
each
}~
=
= (∀x ≤ t)(xΠi→ (∃y ≤ t)(JNP2yK ∧ JIP3x,yK ∧ (∀z ≤ t)(JIP3z,xK→
→ z = y))).
Note that the existential quantifier required to satisfy such a semantic representa-
tion does not need to be provided by a DP; it may well be triggered in the logical
form by, for instance, the inflection, i.e. it may be an existential quantifier over
time intervals. This can be seen, I believe, by comparing the following sentences:
(136) a. Every boy ran down the hill.
b. Each boy ran down the hill.
As far as I can see, (136b), while not (136a), entails that no two relevant runnings
took place simultaneously.
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7.2 Generic indefinites
7.2.1 First caveat: epistemic indefinites
It is sometimes claimed in the literature (and Hornstein (1984) is one example)
that certain prenominal adjectival modifiers, like English certain, can force wide
scope readings of indefinites.
However, already Fodor & Sag’s (1982: 362 f.) (see also Hintikka (1986)) saw
that, even if it is undoubtable that such modifiers can favour wide scope, nev-
ertheless they are compatible also with different readings. Unfortunately, in my
opinion, they failed to provide a clear example supporting their claim, because
they discussed only one single sentence where the indefinite modified by certain
is embedded within a CP (see the considerations at p. 104 above). This is the
relevant passage:
The modifiers certain and particular [. . . ] favor a referential under-
standing of an indefinite. [. . . ] The stronger claim is sometimes made
that certain and particular force maximally wide scope interpretations
of a quantifier with respect to higher predicates, negation, and so forth.
[. . . ] However, it seems clear to us that sentence [(137)] can have an
interpretation which implies that Sandy, but not Tom, has a boy in
mind.
(137) Tom said that Sandy believes that a certain boy has been
cheating.
[. . . ] The semantics of modifiers like certain is completely obscure, and
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our impression is that these modifiers correlate with scope in only a
very rough way. [. . . ] It looks to us as if certain is used in discourse
as a loose cue to the fact that an identification of a relevant individual
could be given by someone, either by the speaker or by one of the
people whose propositional attitudes are being reported.
Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2003, 2011) refer to determiners modified
by adjectives of this kind as “epistemic indefinites” (Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-
Benito (2010) speak instead of “modal indefinites”). The literature on these mod-
ifiers has become quite huge in recent years: one can see, for instance, Zamparelli
(2000, 2007) and Chierchia (2006) on It. un {qualsiasi / qualunque} ‘a whatever’
and Zamparelli (2007) on It. (un) qualche ‘(a) sm’; Krifka (1991) and Kratzer
& Shimoyama (2002) on German irgendein ‘a whatever’; Jayez & Tovena (2002,
2006) on French un quelconque ‘a whatever’, quelque ‘sm’ and un certain ‘a cer-
tain’; already cited Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2008, 2010) on Spanish
algún ‘sm’ and Gutiérrez-Rexach (2001) and Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito
(2011, 2013) on Spanish algunos ‘some’. The adjectives of the whatever-type are
often analyzed in terms of some notion of “non-individuation” or “indifference”,
while those of the certain-type in terms of “individuation” or “referentiality”. Ad-
jectives of the first type present some interesting and well-known correlations with
so-called Free Choice Items (FCIs) as Eng. any (in positive environments).16
16For some deep analyses of FCIs, see Kadmon & Landman (1993), Eisner (1994), Dayal
(1995, 1997, 1998), Tovena & Jayez (1997, 1999) and Giannakidou (1997b,a, 1998). This issue
interrelates in a non-trivial manner with the problem of the ambiguous or univocal status of any,
between its free choice and its negative polarity readings; the ambiguity theory follows quite
straightforwardly from the arguments provided in the literature supporting the claim that NPI
any is an existential quantifier: see Ladusaw (1979a), Carlson (1980a), Linebarger (1980, 1987)
and Jackson (1995).
Besides, there seem to be expected correlations, in Romance languages, between the differences
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All this recent literature agrees on not recognizing any special connection be-
tween these epistemic modifiers and scope, if not as a side-effect of pragmatic
nature arising in certain circumstances. Hence, in trying to show the existence,
in natural language, of wide scope DPs, I will not look at such modifiers, unlike
Hornstein (1984).
7.2.2 Second caveat: bare nouns
Genericity is a pervasive phenomenon of natural language and, prima facie, it can
be described as a way to say something about any individual whatever belonging
to a certain kind, instead of about a particular individual of that kind. Put it this
way, we could also say that genericity is a way to refer to individuals of a spe-
cial, abstract sort, namely “kinds”. This was the notion of genericity proposed by
Carlson (1973, 1977a,b, 1980b) (see also Carlson (1979)), for instance. However,
expressions that may be argued to be generic in this sense semantically differ very
much from one another. In particular, we shall distinguish here, slightly modifying
a terminology introduced by Longobardi (2001), between generic indefinites (here-
after, GIs) and kind-referring definites.17 As for kind-referring definites, I consider
them to belong to a subclass of anaphoric expressions, as any other definite noun
in meaning of the two types exemplified by It. un {qualunque / qualsiasi} NP and un NP
{qualunque / qualsiasi} and the differences in meaning between prenominal and postnominal
adjectives. On this last issue, the seminal work is Bolinger (1967a); see also Cinque (1990)
and, for some more recent references, Knittel (2005) on French, Demonte (2008) on Spanish and
Alexiadou et al. (2007).
17Longobardi (2001) actually speaks, in a more symmetric way, of “generic indefinites” and
“generic definites”. Given that, according to the analysis I want to defend, the latter are distin-
guishable from other definites not because of their semantic representation but rather because
of the ontological properties attributed to their antecedent, while the former are distinguishable
from other indefinites on a purely semantic ground, and given that “generic” is probably never-
theless the most widespread label in treating the kind of phenomena I am interested in, I will
use this label for indefinites only, while making overtly clear what I assume to be the peculiarity
of the subclass of definites which I am comparing them with.
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phrase.
The difference between these two kinds of DPs is quite sharp in languages
like Italian, where they are always differently marked on the surface (needless to
say, the following English translations are highly inaccurate in several respects;
however, they seem to me to be a good compromise to convey in plain language
the relevant aspects of the meaning of the corresponding original sentences):
(138) a. Le
the
patate
potatoes
verdi
green
sono
are
state
been
trovate
found
per
for
la
the
prima
first
volta
time
in
in
America
America
del
of
Sud.
South
3 ‘the first group of green potatoes to be found was found in South
America’
b. Patate
the:f;pl
verdi
potatoes
sono
green:pl
state
be;ind;3pl
trovate
stay:ptcp;pst:f;pl
per
find:ptcp;pst:f;pl
la
for
prima
the:f;sg
volta
first:f;sg
in
time:sg
America
in
del
America
Sud.
of:the;m;sg South
3 ∃: ‘a certain group of green potatoes was first found in South
America’
3 Gen: ‘a group whatever of green potatoes was first found in South
America’
7 Kind: ‘the first group of green potatoes to be found was found in
South America’
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(139) a. Il
the;m;sg
vino
wine
in
in
cartone
carton
è
is
stato
stay:ptcp;pst:m;sg
immesso
introduce:ptcp;pst:m;sg
nel
in:the;m;sg
mercato
market
negli
in:the:m;pl
anni
years
Ottanta.
Eighties
3 ‘the first quantity of wine in cartons to have been introduced to
the market was introduced in the Eighties’
b. Vino
wine
in
in
cartone
carton
è
is
stato
stay:ptcp;pst:m;sg
immesso
introduce:ptcp;pst:m;sg
nel
in:the;m;sg
mercato
market
negli
in:the:m;pl
anni
years
Ottanta.
Fifty
3 ∃: ‘a certain quantity of wine in cartons was introduced to the
market in the Eighties’
3 Gen: ‘a quantity whatever of wine in cartons was introduced to
the market in the Eighties’
7 Kind: ‘the first quantity of wine in cartons to have been introduced
to the market was introduced in the Eighties’
As the contrasts between (138a) and (139a), on one side, and, respectively, (138b)
and (139b), on the other side, show, Italian bare nouns cannot have a kind-denoting
reading, which, instead, is available with definite DPs like the subjects of (138a)
and (139a).
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The pattern of Italian is also shared by the other Romance languages (see Lon-
gobardi (2001));18 English bare plurals, however, as it is well-known, are equally
fine as existential indefinites, as GIs and as kind-referring definites. The following
examples illustrate the English case:
(140) Green potatoes were first found in South America.
3 ∃: ‘a certain group of green potatoes was first found in South America’
3 Gen: ‘a group whatever of green potatoes was first found in South
America’
3 Kind: ‘the first group of green potatoes to be found was found in South
America’
(141) Wine in cartons was introduced to the market in the Eighties.
3 ∃: ‘a certain quantity of wine in cartons was introduced to the market
in the Eighties’
3 Gen: ‘a quantity whatever of wine in cartons was introduced to the
market in the Eighties’
7 Kind: ‘the first quantity of wine in cartons to have been introduced to
the market was introduced in the Eighties’
The semantic parallel between bare plural count nouns and bare singular mass
nouns in English was noticed a long time ago, at least by Cartwright (1975) and
Carlson (1980b: §7.6.0) (see also Benincà (1980) and Gillon (1992), for some syn-
tactic remarks).19
18For the peculiar syntactic constraints on Romance bare nouns, see Contreras (1986) and
Delfitto & Schroten (1991).
19There is, in addition, the symmetric circumstance that both Romance and Germanic lan-
guages lack bare plural mass nouns (they lack in general plural mass nouns) and also bare singular
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Carlson’s (1977a) is a non-quantificational approach to bare plurals, where
they are treated as proper names, in particular as proper names of kinds, and
their ambiguity between a generic and an existential reading is derived from the
presence or absence of an operator possibly encoded in the lexical meaning of the
predicate (see 7.2.4 below; some analogies between bare plurals and proper names
had already been noticed by Postal (1969)).
The fact that English bare nouns cover semantic functions which in Romance
languages are played by two distinct constructions is one of several arguments
which led many scholars to reject Carlson’s unified account of English bare plurals
and to argue in favour of the hypothesis of a genuine ambiguity of English bare
nouns. Among the advocates of this position, see Krifka (1987), Gerstner-Link &
Krifka (1993), Schubert & Pelletier (1987), Wilkinson (1988, 1989, 1991, 1995)and
Longobardi (1991, 1994, 2001).20
One could ask why languages like Italian, where an indefinite non-presupposi-
tional overt determiner is available (the so-called partitive article) also have bare
plurals. This question may find an answer through another central question. Let’s
assume that bare plural count nouns have a hidden determiner, say ϕ, as it is
sometimes labeled in the literature. The question, then, is the following: can ϕ be
viewed as the plural counterpart of the indefinite article in English, in the cases
where the bare noun cannot be analyzed as a kind-denoting definite? The viability
count ones (this very well-known feature is stressed, for instance, in Chierchia (1998: 341)). Of
course, bare singular count nouns may be easily found, with both definite and indefinite inter-
pretations, in articleless languages like Russian and the other Slavic languages (see Chierchia
(1997)).
20For differences in the syntactic encoding of the two sorts of genericity in French see Car-
lier (1989). The distinction has superficial manifestations also in some African languages: see
Welmers (1974) for the relevant data and Greenberg (2003) and Greenberg (2002: 121) (n. 5) for
an analysis along these lines.
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of this option was, for instance, the motivation underlying a specific transformation
rule in Chomsky (1965). Others, like Sweet (1898), instead, identified the indefinite
plural of a with the unstressed variant of some, (sometimes written ‘sm’; see
Carlson (1977a) (Portner & Partee (2002: 37)) and n. 8 above).
The problem is widely discussed in Carlson (1977a, 1980b), who came to a
negative answer. First of all, Carlson (1977a) (Portner & Partee (2002: 38 f.))
observes that bare plurals, unlike DPs introduced by the indefinite article a, cannot
give rise to transparent readings; the examples he considers are the following ones
(Carlson’s (1977a) (8) and (10), respectively):
(142) a. Minnie wishes to talk with a young psychiatrist.
b. Minnie wishes to talk with young psychiatrists.
(143) a. Minnie wishes [(a young psychiatrist: x) [Minnie talks with x]]
b. (a young psychiatrist: x) [Minnie wishes [Minnie talks with x]]
While (142a) can receive both the interpretations represented in (143), the reading
(143b) is unavailable for (142b). In other words, (142b) rules out a de re read-
ing compatible with the possibility that Minnie wishes to talk with one or more
psychiatrists even ignoring the fact that they are psychiatrists (the interpretation
corresponding to (143b)).
Further, Carlson noticed that English bare nouns, unlike DPs introduced by
the indefinite article a, cannot take wide scope over universal quantifiers (Portner
& Partee (2002: 40 f.); the following examples are Carlson’s (1977a) (22) and (23)):
(144) a. Everyone read a book on caterpillars.
147
b. Everyone read books on caterpillars.
(144a) can receive, in fact, both the interpretations represented in (145), while
only (145a) is available for (144b), according to him.21
(145) a. (everyone: x) [(a book on caterpillars: y) [x read y]]
b. (a book on caterpillars: y) [(everyone: x) [x read y]]
(144b) cannot receive an interpretation necessarily requiring that there is one and
the same book on caterpillars read by everybody. It is easy to see that this state
of affairs also holds for Italian:
(146) a. Ogni
every
musicista
musician
di
of
questo
this
conservatorio
conservatoire
ha
has
suonato
played
uno
an
strumento
instrument
conservato
stored
in
in
questa
this
stanza.
room
‘every musician of this conservatoire has played an instrument stored
in this room’
b. Ogni
every
musicista
musician
di
of
questo
this
conservatorio
conservatoire
ha
has
suonato
played
strumenti
instruments
conservati
stored
in
in
questa
this
stanza.
room
‘every musician of this conservatoire has played instruments stored
in this room’
21I ignore here the fact that Carlson assumes plural morphology to entail the cardinality of the
relevant set to be at least 2; see §6.5 above for classical counterarguments to this claim already
made available in the literature.
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(147) a. (every musician: x) [(an instrument stored in this room: y) [x has
played y]]
b. (an instrument stored in this room: y) [(every musician: x) [x has
played y]]
Again, while both interpretations in (147) are accessible to (146a), only (147a) is
available for (146b).
Note that the plural variants of (144a) and (146a) obtained by using the deter-
miners some and degli, respectively, share with the correspondent sentences con-
taining the singular indefinite article the same interpretative ambiguity between a
narrow scope reading of the indefinite and a wide scope one:
(148) Everyone read some books on caterpillars.
(149) Ogni
every
musicista
musician
di
of
questo
this
conservatorio
conservatoire
ha
has
suonato
played
degli
of:the
strumenti
instruments
conservati
stored
in
in
questa
this
stanza.
room
‘every musician of this conservatoire has played some instruments stored
in this room’
Another argument against the analysis of bare plurals as the plural form of the
singular indefinite article is the one I illustrated in §6.1.2, based on the contrast
between telicity induced by overt determiners and atelicity induced by the null
one.
Finally, look at the following contrast in Italian, which, as far as I know, has
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remained unnoticed in the literature up to now:
(150) a. Abbiamo
have;1pl
fatto
made
una
a
scoperta
discovery
sensazionale:
sensational
una
a
foresta
forest
tropicale
tropical
produce
produces
ossigeno!
oxygen
‘we made a sensational discovery: a tropical forest produces oxygen!’
b. #Abbiamo
have;1pl
fatto
made
una
a
scoperta
discovery
sensazionale:
sensational
foreste
forests
tropicali
tropical
producono
produce
ossigeno!
oxygen
‘we made a sensational discovery: tropical forests produce oxygen!’
As a native speaker, if I was asked to judge the acceptability of sentences (150a)
and (150b) taken out of the blue, I would be strongly inclined to consider (150a)
fine but (150b) quite odd. Note that such a judgement would not depend on
the role of singular morphology, since the previous contrast replicates with the
following sentences, where all relevant DPs are plural:22
(151) a. Abbiamo
have;1pl
fatto
made
una
a
scoperta
discovery
sensazionale:
sensational
dei
part:the
gemelli
twins
omozigoti
homozygous
talvolta
sometimes
si
recp
odiano!
hate
22Apparently, the generic use of plural indefinites with numeral adjectives is much more con-
strained than that of indefinites with the singular article. However, this can quite easily be
explained in purely pragmatic terms, such as those provided by Corblin (1987: 57 f.) (see also
Dobrovie-Sorin (2004: 58) for a brief English description of Corblin’s analysis and for some crit-
icism).
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‘we made a sensational discovery: homozygous twins sometimes hate
each other!’
b. #Abbiamo
have;1pl
fatto
made
una
a
scoperta
discovery
sensazionale:
sensational
gemelli
twins
omozigoti
homozygous
talvolta
sometimes
si
recp
odiano!
hate
‘we made a sensational discovery: homozygous twins sometimes hate
each other!’
As far as I can see, the problem seems to be that, when they are capable of a
generic reading, Italian bare plurals, unlike indefinite correspondents with numeral
modifiers, seem to be topics. I do not want to go into this pretty informal intuition
further, here; however, it is worth noting that all the examples of generically
interpreted Italian bare noun phrases quoted in Longobardi (1994) (a paper which
is quite open, even if not as much as Longobardi (2001), to the possibility that
Italian bare nouns can receive a generic interpretation) contain a demonstrative in
the bare noun phrase, which necessarily refers to some contextually salient entity.
See below:23
(152) a. Foreste
forests
di
of
tali
such
dimensioni
dimensions
sono
are
ormai
by_now
difficili
difficult
da
to
23Note, further, that the structure with the frequency adverb preceding the modal verb is
marked in Italian, and that this marked structure makes the presence of the generic bare noun
far more acceptable, thus indirectly confirming that a complex information structure plays a role
in licensing generic bare nouns in Italian. For the unmarked structure of Italian sentences, see
Benincà et al. (1988).
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trovare.
find
‘forests of that size are now hard to find’
b. Castori
beavers
di
of
questo
this
tipo
sort
non
not
costruiscono
build
mai
ever
dighe.
dams
‘beavers of this sort never build dams’
c. Acqua
water
di
of
quel
that
colore
color
raramente
rarely
può
can
essere
be
bevuta.
drunk
‘water of that color can rarely be drunk’
Note that it is hard to see how one could directly check in English as well the
presence of such a constraint on generically interpreted bare nouns, given that
English bare nouns, unlike Romance ones, can be kind-referring definites and kind-
referring definites allow for perfectly acceptable sentences in Italian too, whether
uttered out of the blue or not, as the following examples derived from (150b) and
(151b), respectively, show:
(153) a. Abbiamo
have
fatto
made
una
a
scoperta
discovery
sensazionale:
sensational
le
the
foreste
forest
tropicali
tropical
producono
produce
ossigeno!
oxygen
‘we made a sensational discovery: tropical forests produce oxygen!’
b. Abbiamo
have
fatto
made
una
a
scoperta
discovery
sensazionale:
sensational
i
the
gemelli
twins
omozigoti
homozygous
talvolta
sometimes
si
recp
odiano!
hate
152
‘we made a sensational discovery: homozygous twins sometimes hate
each other!’
Let’s conclude this brief overview on bare nouns by giving a look at, following Lon-
gobardi (2001: 339), to the four major semantic proposals formulated to account
for the behaviour Romance bare nouns:
a) Casalegno (1987) (followed by Zamparelli (2002a)): Romance bare nouns,
unlike in English, are only existential;
b) Longobardi (1991, 1994): Romance bare nouns can be existential, but some-
times also GIs, even if in this case their distribution is more restricted than
in English; they can never be kind-referring definites;
c) Chierchia (1998): Romance and English bare nouns have essentially the same
distribution;
d) Longobardi (2001) (see also Delfitto (2002) and Dobrovie-Sorin (2004)): Ro-
mance bare nouns can be existential or GIs, with the same distribution of
GIs with an overt Num head and without any difference, as for both uses,
between Romance and English; they can never be kind-referring, however.
The few phenomena I illustrated above point towards an explanation akin to
Longobardi’s (1994), even if, unlike him, I would take the difference illustrated
by examples (150a)–(151b) as the core feature semantically distinguishing bare
GIs (both in Italian and English) from overt generic ones and constraining the
distribution of the formers with respect to the latters.
This picture about bare nouns, even as incomplete as it is, still suffices, I believe,
to convince one that bare nouns, even when they appear to share some properties
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with GIs with an overt Num head, at best can only be seen as an atypical case
of GIs. Thus, we can set them aside in the next part of this dissertation, without
worrying too much that the analysis of GIs we are going to outline below may turn
out too incomplete.
7.2.3 Third caveat: leaving islands aside and movement in
peace
In the following sections, I am going to examine some data illustrating the different
scope behaviour of GIs with respect to quantified DPs relative to some other
operators: that will be the core data hopefully providing support for my main
claim. At least some of this data have already been discussed in the literature.
However, these differences in scope behaviour has often been argued for on the
basis of a different kind of evidence, ultimately reducible to two partly related
phenomena:
a) scope inversion of operators within the same clause;
b) wide scope reading of operators across (scope) islands.
Actually, what I am going to suggest is that none of these phenomena can
provide clearcut evidence that some expressions of natural language should trans-
late in logical form as free (generic) variables. Arguments based on these kinds of
phenomena are the chief ones in Fodor & Sag’s (1982) classic paper about specific
indefinites and the only ones for some of the issues addressed in Hornstein (1984),
which is one source of inspiration for this dissertation.
The arguments based on scope reversing are essentially intended to show that
scope reversing is at least easier when the element embedded under the operator on
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which it should be interpreted as having wide scope is a free DP (see p. 165 below)
rather than a quantified one. Since the possibility of quantified DPs (paradigmat-
ically, universals) taking wide scope through scope reversing has been known for
a long time (see, for instance, Montague (1970a, 1973) for an early treatment of
the problem), the sloppy and barely definitive character of such arguments is usu-
ally acknowledged. There are, however, several experimental studies proving that
scope reversing has an impact in terms of increased processing costs with respect
to linear scope (see, among others, Ioup (1975), Fodor (1982), Crain & Steedman
(1985), Altmann & Steedman (1988), Kurtzman & McDonald (1993), Tunstall
(1998), Anderson (2004), Filik et al. (2004), O’Grady (2006), Pylkkänen & McEl-
ree (2006), Reinhart (2006), AnderBois et al. (2012) and Dotlačil & Brasoveanu
(2012)).
Usually, evidence from scope islands violation is taken to be much more robust;
however, almost all proposed scope islands have been challenged in the literature
by providing convincing counterexamples, and the intervention of semantic and
pragmatic factors has been shown to be often decisive.
Further, under many accounts of the ambiguity between opaque and transpar-
ent readings (de dicto vs. de re) of DPs embedded under intensional predicates, the
ambiguity is attributed to the relative scope of the DP and the intensional pred-
icate, which can come in two distinct possible combinations. This analysis was
first advocated in Russell (1905) (see Zamparelli (2000: §6.1.1)) and illustrated
here with the following example:
(154) Gianni thinks that every British detective is after him.
a. Gianni thinks that [(every x: x is a British detective) [x is after
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Gianni]]
b. (every x: x is a British detective) [Gianni thinks that [x is after
Gianni]]
One way to account for data of this kind would be of course that of relaxing the
close parallel which has been assumed to hold between extraction islands and scope
islands (at least since Lakoff (1970); for some earlier relevant literature see Fodor
& Sag (1982: 369)).24 However, it is a remarkable fact that, in a parallel way, also
extraction islands have come under intensive attack in the last few decades. More
or less as in the case of scope islands, the main strategy to cast doubts on the ex-
istence of (some) extraction islands has been that of ascribing them not to syntax
but rather to processing limitations; this idea is, at least prima facie, promising in
order to explain the widely attested grey zones in grammaticality judgements, the
interference of molecular factors in increasing or decreasing the degree of accept-
ability and the important oscillations of judgements between different speakers of
the same language.
As is well-known, the starting point for the syntactic studies of islands, where
the term itself made its first appearance in the linguistic literature, was Ross
(1967a, 1986), basing himself on the previous Chomsky (1964), while Chomsky
himself, in turn, made further notable developments in Chomsky (1973) (see
Boeckx (2012) for a recent overview on the topic of syntactic islands). But in
recent years, a new approach to syntactic islands has gained respectability, one
which looks at them (or at least at part of them) not as constraints on the syntac-
24Note, however, that this parallel is predicted in a principled way once we assume that
quantifiers take scope through movement at LF. Historically, in fact, such a parallel had been
the primary motivation underlying the QR account.
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tic structure, but rather as a by-product of syntactic constructions which are too
difficult to process (with different degrees of difficulty depending on several fac-
tors, corresponding to the different degrees of acceptability of the island violation;
see Boeckx (2012: §2.3) for a critical opinion). The most prominent recent study
developing an analysis like that is probably Hofmeister & Sag (2010),25 based on,
among others, Deane (1991), Pritchett (1991), Kluender (1991, 1992, 1998, 2004)
and Kluender & Kutas (1993); but see already Givon (1979) for an early statement
of the core idea.26
Even if I feel sympathetic with both processing-oriented reductionist attempts,
the semantic one of deriving scope island effects through processing considerations
and the syntactic one of deriving extraction island effects in these terms too,27 the
only point here is that of stressing the fact that possibly any argument based on
a greater or smaller predisposition of some classes of DPs to violate scope islands
may fall under attack on the basis of some counterexample. For this reason, I will
try to develop some arguments relying on different bases.
7.2.4 Standard accounts of generic indefinites
There are two main families of approaches to genericity in natural language on
the market and both have also been put to work for the particular case of the
analysis of generic indefinites. Here, I will briefly comment on some fundamental
ideas underlying each one.
25As I said before (p. 136), Hofmeister and Sag concede that at least the Coordination Structure
Constraint (CSC) is an irreducibly syntactic island effect.
26As Boeckx (2012: 33) remarks, one main source of inspiration for all these reductionist
accounts has been Chomsky & Miller (1963); see also Chomsky (1961).
27And, moreover, I think that the we should maintain that the two kinds of phenomena proceed
on a par.
157
The first approach is rooted in Carlson (1977a, 1980b) and was primarily de-
signed to address the issue of the semantics of bare plural noun phrases. As I said
before, Carlson analyzed bare plural NPs as definite descriptions of kinds. The
most interesting feature of this approach, in the light of the empirical data I am go-
ing to discuss in the following sections, is that it treats BPs as non-quantificational,
a feature that will prove crucial, in my analysis, to account for that data.
However, there are at least two problems for also extending such an approach
to GIs. First of all, if GIs were anaphoric elements, I cannot see how one could
find, in whatever context, any proper overt antecedent for them without falling
into a regressus ad infinitum. Hence, it seems that an analysis of GIs in terms of
kind-referring definite descriptions requires abandoning the idea that definites are
always anaphoric elements.
The second problem of a carlsonian approach extended to GIs would be that
of how to obtain particularization in a non-stipulative way. GIs, in fact, always
allow us to derive, as a logical consequence of the sentence they are embedded
in, a corresponding sentence obtained from that sentence by replacing the GIs
themselves with a referential item. This is not always the case, however, with
BPs. The following examples illustrate this contrast (of course, the indefinite
article is to be interpreted generically in (155a)):
(155) a. A dodo is funny.
b. ⇒ That dodo is funny.
(156) a. Dodos are extinct.
b. *That dodo is extinct.
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Thus, we would have the remarkable problem of distinguishing between the two
types of kind-reference, something which is enough to make the original project
appear no longer feasible. Sentences containing GIs (or habituals) are usually
referred to as characterizing sentences, to distinguish them from sentences whose
generic character entirely relies on the presence of kind-denoting elements.
Approaches belonging to the second family attempt to model genericity by
assimilating it to some (modal) quantificational structure. This is, for instance,
the analysis offered by Heim (1982: §II-4.3). Heim took inspiration from works
such as Katz (1972), where it is said that GIs are akin to if -clauses, structures
which are usually analyzed in modal terms in formal semantics. In the same vein,
she also cites Nunberg & Pan (1975: 415), who say that a generic statement of
the form An F is G means that G is a property that holds of Fs “in virtue of
[their] classmembership”. The main technical tool employed by Heim to articulate
her proposal, however, is the notion of an unselective quantifier famously put to
work in Lewis (1975) to account for the semantic behaviour of what he called
“adverbs of quantification” and, following him, by Kratzer (1979) for her account
of conditionals (see §7.3 below).
Lewis (1975) explicitly considered the following “adverbs” (see Portner & Par-
tee (2002: 178)):28
a) always, invariably, universally, without exception;
b) sometimes, occasionally;
c) never ;
28Actually, some of them are not morphologically adverbs, but this has no relevance for the
present discussion.
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d) usually, mostly, generally, almost always, with few exceptions;
e) often, frequently, commonly;
f) seldom, infrequently, rarely, almost never.
He noticed that, despite them being temporal adverbs, in certain sentences
these modifiers behave as if they were quantifiers binding variables provided by in-
definite DPs within the same clause. The following examples are slightly modified
versions of Heim’s (1982: §II-4.3) ones (precisely, of Heim’s (1982: 126) original
examples (16) and (17), respectively):
(157) If a cat has been exposed to 2,4-D, it {(a) never / (b) seldom / (c)
sometimes / (d) often / (e) usually / (f) always} goes blind.
(158) A cat that has been exposed to 2,4-D {(a) never / (b) seldom / (c)
sometimes / (d) often / (e) usually / (f) always} goes blind.
Heim assumes, extending the analysis of cases like (157) already offered in Lewis
(1975) to the case of GIs, that both (157) and (158) can be paraphrased in the
following way:
(159) {(a) No / (b) Few / (c) Some / (d) Many / (e) Most / (f) All} cats that
have been exposed to 2,4-D go blind.
In other words, in Heim’s account (which can be seen more or less as the
starting point of all other quantificational accounts of GIs), a GI works like the
restrictor of a possibly covert universal-alike quantifier which I will refer to as the
generic operator (usually represented as “Gen” or “GEN”, in the literature), whose
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meaning is closely related, if not identical, to that of Eng. always in its use as an
adverb of quantification just illustrated above.
Adverbs of quantification (as well as the generic operator in Heim’s original
proposal) are unselective quantifiers, insofar as they do not necessarily bind one
single variable, as ordinary quantifiers of first order logic, but they bind all free
variables in their domain:
(160) a. A cat which finds a mouse {(a) never / (b) seldom / (c) sometimes
/ (d) often / (e) usually / (f) always} runs after it.
b. ({(a) No / (b) Few / (c) Some / (d) Many / (e) Most / (f) All}
〈x, y〉: x is a cat and y is a mouse) [x runs after y]
Note that, in Lewis’s (1975) original theory, there is no need to stipulate a
(suspect) ambiguity, inherent to adverbs belonging to the category under exam-
ination, between their reading as temporal adverbs and the one as restrictors of
participants in a certain event: the temporal reading, in fact, may well arise as
the only available reading when there are no other free variables except from the
temporal one in the clause.
The unselective binding hypothesis, however, has to face several empirical and
conceptual problems, which led most linguists to embrace the view that adverbs
of quantification are better uniformly analyzed as standard selective quantifiers
ranging over events or situations (see, among others, Rooth (1985, 1995), Schubert
& Pelletier (1987) and Krifka et al. (1995)). In §7.2.7, however, I will discuss some
problems which affect any quantificational account of GIs.29
29Another one, which I cannot discuss here, is presented in Hintikka & Carlson (1979), where
GIs are treated as wide scope universal quantifiers.
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7.2.5 Goodstein (1951)
There was, however, another approach to GIs that needs to be discussed. This
approach dates back at least to the work of Goodstein himself. Unfortunately,
Goodstein, as a mathematician, was not primarily interested in problems about
natural language and his deep linguistic insights were not properly developed to
show the full range of empirical consequences they could lead to. On the linguistic
side, instead, a strikingly similar analysis was proposed by Hornstein (1984) for
GIs. Hornstein, on the contrary, seemed to be unaware of the possibility of con-
necting the analysis he was advocating to the formalism of recursive arithmetic;
moreover, the linguistic community apparently paid less attention than deserved
to his analysis.
The chief aim of this dissertation can be viewed as the attempt to establish a
connection between these two analyses, Goodstein’s and Hornstein’s, and to show
that they may find an application for a solution to some apparently unrelated
well-known linguistic puzzles.
The examples of genericity in natural language discussed by Goodstein are
centred on English bare nouns. Because of what I said above in §7.2.2, this has
not really been a felicitous choice. However, the relevance of his considerations
for the semantic analysis of natural language emerges all the same through the
following passage from Goodstein (1951: 21 f.):
The numeral variable is an instance of a general noun, and as such
its use is akin to that of a blank space which may be filled by certain
signs. The college rules forbidding students to leave their place of res-
idence after a certain hour is expressed by means of the variable sign
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“student”. If the rule reads “students in residence from January 1944
to January 1945”, the variable term “student” could be replaced in the
formulation of the rule, by a list of names, the names of the students
in residence 1944–45, and it is this fact which has tempted mathemat-
ical philosophers to believe that a variable is a class of objects, but if
the rule is intended to apply not only to present, but also to future
students, the replacement of the variable sign by a list of names is no
longer possible and we are obliged to find an interpretation of variable
signs which does not identify a variable with a class of names given in
extension. The truth value of a sentence containing a variable sign is
unchanged if the variable sign is replaced by some certain other sign,
for instance, in the sentence “metal is found in the earth”, the vari-
able “metal” may be replaced by names of particular metals, such as
“iron” or “gold”, so that the term “metal” may be regarded as a space
to be filled in by the name of a metal. What is unsatisfactory about
this analysis of the variable is that we require a knowledge of all the
particulars which come under the variable sign before the variable it-
self is defined; that is to say we are no better able to define a variable
sign as a blank space to be filled by certain signs than to identify the
variable with a class of objects, for just as we cannot enumerate an
infinite class we cannot say just which are the signs that may fill a
certain variable-sign space.
The definition of a variable is not given in terms of the objects
whose signs may take the place of the variable sign but by the rules for
the use of the variable sign itself.
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7.2.6 Hornstein (1984)
Hornstein (1984) is a monograph which deals with the general issue of elaborating
a theory of meaning in natural languages which is shaped on the syntactic structure
of languages as predicted by generative grammar on the basis of a sound analysis
of the logical problem of language acquisition, in contrast with approaches to
semantics making essential use of notions like “truth” or “reference”. This project
is by itself, I believe, of considerable interest; however, there is a more specific
reason why Hornstein (1984) deserves special attention here. An important part
of that book, in fact, investigates a distinction first introduced by Hornstein in
1981 between two types of “quantifiers” that matches quite well the one between
free (generic) variables and quantifiers in RAt.
Essentially, I could say that the crucial linguistic notions investigated in this
dissertation were already correctly identified in Hornstein (1984). What was still
missing was: (a) the description of a formal system making the different inferen-
tial behaviour of the linguistic elements involved (and, thus, providing a further
confirmation for their relevant properties through a functional justification for
them) predictable in a precise way; (b) a discussion of their interaction with clause
boundaries; (c) the consideration of adequate empirical data neatly supporting the
distinction under examination.
In Hornstein (1984), especially in Ch. 2, it is argued that natural languages
have essentially three different types of quantified NPs, which Hornstein simply
dubs type I, type II and type III quantifiers. As for type III quantifiers, mostly
discussed in Hornstein (1984: 67–8), I think that Hornstein’s analysis appears to be
particularly controversial; hence, I will focus only on the opposition between type
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I and type II quantifiers, which Hornstein himself seems to consider more basic
and to which he devoted the entire Ch. 2 (entitled Two Types of Quantifiers). The
two types are defined, in Hornstein (1984: 17), respectively in the following ways:
I. a set of NP expressions whose interpretive scope domain is always
wide;
II. a set whose interpretive scope domain is restricted to the clause
in which the quantified NP is situated [. . . ].
Since linguistics derived the word quantifier from logic, where of course it is
still part of the basic vocabulary of the discipline, and since my point (as well
as Hornstein’s) is that of trying to show that certain DPs, among which those
that Hornstein dubbed “type I quantifiers”, should not be conceived as translating
in logical form as logical quantifiers, I think that Hornstein’s choice of terms here
turns out to be quite infelicitous. Hence, hereafter I will speak, when not explicitly
stated otherwise, of free determiners, meaning Hornstein’s “type I quantifiers”, and
of quantifiers, meaning his “type II quantifiers”; in a parallel fashion, I will speak
of a free DP, meaning a DP whose head is a free determiner, and of a quantified
DP, meaning a DP whose head is a quantifier.
What is of considerable importance, here, is especially the content of Hornstein
(1984: Ch.5), where the author argues that GIs are to be viewed among free de-
terminers. To make this point, Hornstein employs the same diagnostics he put to
work in Ch. 2, mainly based on examples of scope inversion or coindexing across
clause boundaries; as I have said, however, arguments built upon this sort of em-
pirical data cannot easily be employed to account for the differences between the
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determiners under examination. In the case of GIs, however, Hornstein added one
notable new kind of example supporting, according to him, the hypothesis that
GIs are free determiners: they are instances of donkey sentences. These sentences
should be analyzed, according to Hornstein’s account, as essentially involving a
GI which is syntactically embedded in the scope of another operator; in the pro-
totypical case reported here as (161), Hornstein’s analysis could be represented as
in (161a):
(161) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
a. (a∃ x: x is a donkey) [(every y: y is a farmer who owns x) [y beats
x]]
Notice that this is indeed a new kind of argument with respect to those dis-
played in Hornstein (1984: Ch.2), because, as is well-known, donkey sentences
represent a puzzle not only for the apparently unusual scope properties displayed
by the embedded indefinite, but further and foremost for its unexpected universal-
alike interpretation. Of course, once we analyze it as a GI, this interpretation is
instead the expected one.
The analysis of donkey sentences in terms of GIs, however, was already taken
into account and criticized by Heim in her dissertation (Heim (1982: 36–37)). In
Heim (1982: 36), in fact, we can read what follows:30
it will be important to realize that the indefinites in donkey sentences
are not instances of “generic” indefinites [. . . ]. I am not denying, of
course, that our understanding of indefinites in the context of donkey
30Emphasis is in the original.
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sentences [. . . ] in effect amounts to a “generic” understanding [. . . ].
What I am denying is that the observed truth conditions are a result of
disambiguating the relevant indefinites in favor of their generic readings
[. . . ].
There are, according to Heim, two obstacles against an analysis of donkey
sentences involving generic reading of the embedded indefinite. The first is the
following one (Heim (1982: 37); examples renumbered):
[N]ot all indefinites have generic readings. “Someone,” for instance,
does not (unless it is part of a larger NP, e.g., modified by a relative
clause), as the impossibility of a generic reading for (162) shows:
(162) Someone is grey.
However, “someone” can act just like “a donkey” in donkey sentences,
as (163) shows.31
It seems to me that this argument is quite weak: a DP whose head is some has,
in accordance with the semantic representation I gave above in (131), existential
import, a feature which involves greater semantic complexity (and maybe also
syntactic) with respect to the indefinite article, which in turn lacks it. Hence,
if existential import does not turn out to be relevant, it seems quite reasonable
that pragmatic principles should make one use the indefinite article instead of
some. Now, this circumstance is probably quite common with generic statements,
31This is the example Heim is making reference to (Heim’s (1982: 35) (1)):
(163) If
{
someone
anyone
}
is in Athens, he is not in Rhodes.
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i.e., when speaking generically, we are more inclined, I believe, to say something
about a generic individual of some sort than of a generic member of some set of
individuals which is salient in the discourse. In other words, I think that a sort
of pragmatic story along the lines of that formulated in Corblin (1987) would also
work in the case of someone, as used in examples like Heim’s ones.
The second argument by Heim is, in my view, plainly ill-formed. In Heim
(1982: 37), she says (examples renumbered):
[T]here are certain linguistic environments that, for whatever reason,
preclude a generic reading for indefinites, most notably the subject-
position of “there”-insertion sentences, and also the object position of
the verb ‘[‘]have.” Neither of the following sentences can be read as a
generic statement about donkeys:
(164) John has a donkey.
(165) There is a donkey in the yard.
However, indefinites in these environments do serve as antecedents for
donkey anaphora:
(166) If John has a donkey he beats it.
(167) If there is a donkey in the yard John will chase it away[.]
A generic interpretation of the indefinite in (164) and (165) results in oddness,
rather than in ungrammaticality, especially in the case of (164) (for (165), we
need to share the spirit of Barwise & Cooper’s (1981: §4.3) analysis of the bad-
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ness of universal quantifiers in existential statements; see again Portner & Partee
(2002: 96)): John could not plausibly own any donkey in the universe, nor any
conceivable donkey could be in the yard now. But similar odd interpretations
would not arise if we interpret (166) and (167) as if the indefinite was generic, in
accordance with Hornstein’s analysis, since we would obtain the following logical
representations, which are perfectly consistent with the facts in the actual world:
(168) (a∃ x: x is a donkey) [[if John has x] John beats x];
(169) (a∃ x: x is a donkey) [[if there is x in the yard] John will chase x away].
However, even if I am not persuaded by Heim’s arguments, I am still persuaded
by her conclusion. It seems to me, in fact, that quite a strong argument against a
GI account of donkey sentences comes from considering the embedding DP, instead
of the embedded one.
There is nothing strange, from a pragmatic point of view, in a sentence like
(161), while the following (170) is, instead, pretty odd:
(170) #Three farmers own Ih-Oh.
It is not a common state of affairs, in fact, that donkeys have more than one single
owner. However, it is well-known that the universal quantifier triggers a scalar
implicature to the extent that it ranges over a domain with possibly more than
one single individual; otherwise, a fully cooperative speaker should use the definite
article in its place:
(171) a. Every farmer is rough.
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b. ; It is possible that there is more than one farmer.
(172) a. The farmer is rough.
b. ⇒ There is one and only farmer.
But then a correspondent implicature should arise from (161), here repeated
as (173a), while the following (174a) implies the information in (174b) (where we
assume for both (173a) and (174a) that the embedded indefinite is interpreted
generically):
(173) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
b. ?; # It is possible that there is a donkey who is owned by more
than one farmer.
(174) a. The farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
b. ⇒ For any donkey, there is one and only farmer who owns it.
And if we map the intended scope hierarchy of the elements of (173a) on the
surface, we come up with the following rough paraphrase, which in fact has the
same implicature in (173b):
(175) a. #For any donkey, every farmer who owns it beats it.
b. ; # It is possible that there is a donkey who is owned by more than
one farmer.
But (175a) is far from being a good paraphrase for the donkey reading of (173a),
since the former, but not the latter, turns into pragmatic oddness in virtue of
the odd implicature it triggers. If the embedded indefinite in (173a) was indeed
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a GI, under normal circumstances we would have used (174a) instead of (173a).
It seems to me that this strongly suggests that, in donkey sentences, we are not
dealing with GIs, as Heim correctly maintains.
There is, however, at least one example which Hornstein quotes to argue for
GIs being free determiners and which is worth repeating here, compared with its
corresponding sentence containing a universal quantifier in the place of the GI
(Hornstein’s (1984: 82) (19a)):
(176) Itsi family is important to a raccooni.
(177) *Itsi family is important to every raccooni.
In (176), the GI is able to coindex a pronoun to its left, something which the
universal quantifier cannot do. As far as I can see, this is the pattern of grammati-
cality judgements which arises when the antecedent DP is interpreted as the topic
of the sentence, while the rest is the focus. Under the assumption that topicaliza-
tion may only involve free DPs, this would become the expected result; I will not
explore this idea here, however.
Now, I move to what I take to be the crucial empirical data showing that GIs
are indeed free determiners, as argued by Hornstein (1984).
7.2.7 Generic indefinites as free determiners
The literature, especially the more philosophically oriented, contains plenty of
passages where GIs are semantically assimilated to universal quantifiers. And,
prima facie, there seem to be good reasons for such an assimilation, as the following
examples show:
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(178) a. Every cat scratches Gianni.
b. A cat scratches Gianni.
(179) a. Gianni beats every cat.
b. Gianni beats a cat.
(180) a. Some dog-sitters beat every cat.
b. Some dog-sitters beat a cat.
(181) a. Every dog-sitter beats every cat.
b. Every dog-sitter beats a cat.
If the indefinite article is interpreted in a generic way, the (a)-sentences above
have more or less the same meaning of the corresponding (b)-sentences. However,
things change dramatically if we are in a negative environment:
(182) a. Not every cat scratches Gianni.
b. Not a cat scratches Gianni.
(183) a. Gianni does not beat every cat.
b. Gianni does not beat a cat.
In this case, no matter how we try to interpret the indefinite: the (a)-sentences
systematically have a weaker interpretation than the corresponding (b)-sentences.
(182a), in fact, is consistent with a situation where the following (184) is true,
while (182b) is not; and the same pattern holds between (183a), (185) and (183b):
(184) There is some cat who scratches Gianni.
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(185) There is some cat who Gianni beats.
The stronger reading conveyed by sentence (183b) with the GI can be roughly
paraphrased by the following sentence displaying a universal quantifier in its place:
(186) For every cat, Gianni does not beat it.
This effect is discussed in Löbner (2000: §4.2) (see also Löbner (2013)), who
noticed that “[t]his question is, apparently, neglected in almost all the literature
on generics. It is not, for example, discussed throughout the whole Generic Book
[Carlson & Pelletier (1995)]. The only work I know of which addresses the question
is Fodor (1970). She arrives at the same result as I will below”. Further, Löbner
(2000: 282) rightly argues what follows:
The fact that negation of a simple CS [characterizing sentence] yields an
all-or-nothing contrast provides an argument against analyses in terms
of universal quantification that is much stronger than the exceptions
argument.32
Now, the following appears to be a reasonable semantic representation in RAt
for (183a):
(188) ¬(∀x ≤ t)(xΠi ∧ cat′(x)→ beat′(Gianni, x))
32Note, however, that Löbner, again correctly, would take the following (187), instead of (182b),
as the true negation of (178b); additionally, he does not explicitly consider GIs other than those
in subject position. However, there are no appreciable differences in truth conditions between
(187) in its generic reading and (182b).
(187) A cat does not scratch Gianni.
173
Given the difference just observed in interpretation between the universal quan-
tifier and the GI, we should strongly doubt that (188) can be a good semantic rep-
resentation also for (183b), since a purely pragmatic explanation of that difference
is hard to imagine. But let’s look now at the following two terms of RAt:
(189) (∀x ≤ t)(xΠi ∧ cat′(x)→ scratch′(x,Gianni))
(190) vΠi ∧ cat′(v)→ scratch′(v,Gianni)
Given theorems 4.1 and 6.1, it can be easily proved that (189) and (190) are
logically equivalent in RAt.33 Hence, we could easily hypothesize that, if (189)
is the semantic representation associated with (178a), then (190) could be the
semantic representation associated with (178b). If things are so, let’s see what
kind of semantic representation we would get for (183b) in accordance with this
hypothesis:
(191) ¬(vΠi ∧ cat′(v)→ beat′(Gianni, v))
With such a representation, we immediately obtain a welcome result: through
the rule of inference (P ), in fact, we may substitute the generic variable v in (191)
with whatever term even if the outmost operator is the negation, something which
is however impossible in the case of the universal quantifier. If we replace the
variable with a term which denotes an individual which belongs to the relevant
set of cats, in particular, we get the semantic representation of a right logical
33This equivalence is obtained by assuming that the restrictor of the GI provides a covert
argument in order to obtain the same partitive interpretation which, under our assumptions, is
mandatory in the case of the universal quantifier (see §7.1.1).
For the view that nothing prevents GIs from being contextually restricted, see Greenberg
(1998) (anticipated in part by Condoravdi (1997)).
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consequence of the corresponding sentence. In fact, after substituting v in (191)
with whatever number n denoting a cat in the relevant set, the resulting logical
form entails that, since the antecedent of the conditional is true but the whole
conditional needs to be false (given that it is in the scope of the negation), the
consequent must be false too; hence, for any number denoting a cat in the relevant
set, we obtain that Gianni does not beat it, i.e. we obtain precisely the stronger
reading conveyed by (186).
However, the semantic representation (191) has at least two main (related)
problems. The first one is syntactic: under reasonable assumptions about the
mapping between syntax and semantics, this logical form implies that the negation
takes direct scope over a connective, something which would violate the BNCS.
Moreover, I have previously only considered substitution of v by a number
denoting a cat in the relevant set, arguing that, in this case, the resulting se-
mantic representation correctly reflects the intuitive truth conditions, unlike what
we would have through (188). But once we come to consider numbers denoting
individuals which are not cats in the relevant set, things completely change. If
we particularize the generic variable v in (191) with a number n which does not
denote a cat in the relevant set, then the antecedent of the conditional would turn
out to be false and hence the whole conditional would automatically be true and
its negation false: by reductio ad absurdum, we could conclude that all individuals
must be cats in the relevant set! Of course, such an odd conclusion is not entailed
by (183b). This is an instance of what has been known, after Reinhart (1997), as
the Donald Duck problem.34
34This name is due to the way the following example is commented by Reinhart:
(192) If we invite a certain philosopher to the party, Max will be annoyed.
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A better candidate as a semantic representation for sentence (183b) may be
the following:35
(193) cat′(v)→ ¬beat′(Gianni, v)
(193) no longer violates the BNCS and it seems to carry the right truth conditions.
Note that, under this semantic analysis and assuming the BNCS, we are forced
to analyze (182b) as not containing a GI but the standard existential quantifier;
this analysis is also semantically unproblematic, since it leads to the right truth
conditions as well.
As I have said, Löbner (2000: §4) comes very close to these same conclusions
about the interaction between negation and GIs. He scrutinizes and rules out both
the carlsonian and the quantificational accounts of CSs. It is especially interest-
ing what he has to say about the second one (Löbner (2000: 282–3); examples
renumbered):
Many present analyses of CSs agree in assuming a genericity operator in
the semantic representations of CSs. The genericity operator, written
as “GEN” in Carlson and Pelletier (1995)[,] is unanimously given a
a. 7 (a certain x) [[if [x is a philosopher] and [we invite x to the party]] Max will be
annoyed]
b. 3 (a certain x: x is a philosopher) [[if we invite x to the party] Max will be
annoyed]
The fact that Donald Duck is not a philosopher, under the reading represented by (192a), would
make (192) true as about him. However, a much more reasonable reading for (192) is the one
represented by (192b).
35Here, I omitted that part of the semantic representation which corresponds to the partitive
interpretation. First, in fact, under many natural readings of the sentences involved such covert
information is not conveyed; secondly, I think it should now be clear enough that it is not the
presence or absence of existential import which is the main source of the semantic differences
between universal quantifiers and GIs.
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semantics in terms of some variants of universal quantification.
The inadequacy of any account of genericity in terms of universal
quantification shows up in the following problem, which is immediately
related to the problem of intrasentential negation. Consider a question-
answer pair such as
(194) Is sushi delicious? — No.
We would certainly want to be able to analyze sentential no in general
as the negation of the proposition of the question, i.e., as an equivalent
of the negation of the corresponding declarative sentence. ‘No’, in (194)
must be equivalent to
(195) Sushi is not delicious.
Thus, the only plausible semantic representation of sentential no in this
function appears to be something like “¬p”, where p is a free variable
for a proposition provided by the context. Now, if we represent the
meaning of sushi is delicious roughly (omitting all variables) by
(196) GEN(sushi; is delicious)
we would have to represent the meaning of sentential no in (194) ad
hoc by (197) – in disagreement with the general interpretation ‘¬p’,
which would result in (198):
(197) GEN(sushi; ¬ is delicious)
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(198) ¬GEN(sushi; is delicious)
This is certainly an unwelcome consequence. Independently of the
question whether a hidden genericity operator is admissible or not, the
negation argument developed here is an argument against the kind of
operator used in the analyses mentioned.
I think that Löbner’s (2000) criticism of quantificational accounts of charac-
terizing sentences is indeed on the right track. Note, further, that there is little
probability that theories advocating a treatment of genericity along the lines of
Lewis (1975) can fall outside the quantificational family, since the generic operator
is usually assumed to have the adverb always as its almost exact overt counterpart,
and always is without a doubt a quantificational adverb, as its interaction with
negation shows; the following sentence (199), which is logically compatible with
(200), illustrates this latter claim:
(199) Gianni is not always sick.
(200) Gianni is sick most times.
As for Löbner’s positive alternative proposal (which I cannot examine in depth
here, since Löbner, in that paper, has many other fishes to fry), it rests on a
broad conception of genericity along the lines of the following quotation (Löbner
(2000: 290–2); emphasis is in the original; examples are renumbered):
Common to the generic constructions discussed here [. . . ] is [. . . ] a
certain mode of language use. This mode is characterized as a predica-
tion about hypothetical cases involving at least one parameter that is
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not referentially anchored in the situation of utterance. Generic talk is
talk on the level of categories rather than individuals referred to [. . . ].
However, it is not explicit talk about categories, as no categories are
mentioned as such (and therefore I do not agree with Carlson’s refer-
ence-to-kinds analysis). Let me illustrate what I mean by referential
anchoring with a simple example.
(201) a. dogs bark
b. dogs are chasing Joan
(201b) is a sentence about Joan, a report about some event taking
place during the present time. Both tense (plus the progressive form)
and the reference to Joan anchor the event to particular components of
the world. Since the event itself is anchored, its agent is part of reality
as well: the referent of the indefinite NP can be anchored. No such pos-
sibility exists in the case of (201a). The sentence is somehow anchored
by tense, but the non-progressive form of the event verb bark in its
present tense does not allow its referential anchoring to any particular
event. Hence, its agent role cannot be anchored either.
Thus, the category level quality of such statements is brought about
by the fact that the generic NP, generic conditional or generic relative
provides no more information than just an explicit categorization of
an unanchorable parameter. Being left with this information alone,
without the possibility of connecting any other information that we
might have about any real, i.e., particular, values of parameters in case
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they were anchored, we have to take the predication as relevant on the
basis of the explicit categorization alone. It is the lack of anchoring
that makes these statements general.
[. . . ] I assume that the availability of an unanchored reading of the
indefinite is crucial.
(S) Hypothesis
Generic predication is predication about referentially unanchored
cases.
[. . . ] If this line of analysis is correct, we obtain at the same time
an explanation of the truth-value gaps resulting from simple generic
predication. [. . . ] [T]he truth-value gaps of generic quantification are
due to a predication in terms of abstract cases. If I state a predication
in terms of an abstract case specified by the generic NP or clause,
I attribute the truth of the predication to the sort of case specified.
Hence it carries over to the whole category. It is important to note in
this regard that indefinites inevitably provide sortal information about
possible referents as objects with certain characteristics they exhibit
for themselves.
The claim that generic predication essentially involves “referentially unan-
chored cases” can be interesting, in the present framework, at least insofar as
it can be matched with the fact that, under present assumptions, natural lan-
guage quantifiers logically translate as bounded quantifiers, which, as their name
reveals, have an argument “anchoring” them to an upper boundary of their domain
of quantification, while logical translations of GIs lack such a boundary. However,
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as I said, this boundary may be “simulated” even for GIs, by simply imposing, ex-
plicitly or with the essential contribution of the context of utterance, some suitable
specifications on their restrictor.
Moreover, Löbner’s claim seems to parallel the one, which is quite ubiquitous
in the literature, that there are no “episodic” generics, as his speculations about
tense suggest. However, Greenberg (1998) already showed that this claim is simply
false, providing the following examples:
(202) a. A Jew is in synagogue tonight.
b. A faithful Catholic is in Church today.
Further, he observes that there are factors which seem to considerably improve
the degree of acceptability of such temporally restricted GIs, like the presence of
modal expressions would or should ((203)), the addition of what he calls “modifying
“normative” adjectives” ((204)) and, finally and more expected, context ((205)):
(203) a. An Italian restaurant would be closed today.
b. A lion would be very aggressive today.
c. A Catholic should be nervous today.
d. A child should be especially polite today.
(204) a. A decent Italian restaurant is closed today.
b. A true Clinton supporter is happy tonight.
c. A decent accountant is busy this week.
d. A well-behaved child is especially polite today.
(205) (Scenario: Me and my friend decide to eat tonight in an Italian restau-
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rant, but an hour later my friend calls me and says “We better go eat
in an Indian restaurant tonight. I just remembered that it’s Italy’s inde-
pendence day”)36
An Italian restaurant is closed tonight.
Besides, even if he rightly argues against quantificational approaches to GIs, Löb-
ner concretely strives to account for their interaction with negation by appealing
to a presupposition of Excluded Middle, along the lines of Fodor (1979) (acknowl-
edged by Löbner himself, as we saw before) mentioned above (p. 80). This is
precisely his formulation (Löbner’s (2000: 294) condition (120a), where D is “the
domain of cases the predication is about”):
(206) ∀x(x ∈ D→ P(x)) ∨ ∀x(x ∈ D→ ¬P(x)).
All the objections raised to a solution of this kind for the case of plural definite
DPs also extend to the present case of GIs.
As regards GIs, Löbner only addresses their interaction with negation. It may
seem, until now, that the different behaviour between GIs and universal quantifiers
is limited to cases involving negation and could, thus, be related to some features
of negation rather than to features of those determiners. Things are different,
however. Consider the following examples:37
36Sic!
37Here, I needed a verb with three DP arguments in order to have one which both precedes the
GI in the linear order and is postverbal: in this case, its interpretation as a topicalised DP is ruled
out, or, at least, strongly disfavoured. Topicalization can, in fact, interfere with the phenomena
I am addressing, since it involves a CP projection and, hence, can give rise to those apparent
counterexamples I am going to discuss in §7.2.8. Further, I chose a quantified subject in order
to avoid any possible interference of a referential interpretation of the non-generic indefinite by
embedding this latter in its scope.
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(207) Every sailor shows some shell to every blonde girl.
a. 3 ‘For every sailor, there is at least one shell such that, for every
blonde girl, he shows it to her.’
b. 3 ‘For every sailor and for every blonde girl, there is at least one
shell such that he shows it to her.’
(208) Every sailor shows some shell to a blonde girl.
a. 7 ‘For every sailor, there is at least one shell such that, for any
blonde girl, he shows it to her.’
b. 3 ‘For every sailor and for any blonde girl, there is at least one shell
such that he shows it to her.’
The (a)-readings are the readings where the determiners, provided that they all
translate in logical form into scope-bearing logical operators, take scope parallel
to their surface order; in the (b)-readings, instead, the last determiner in the
surface appears to have outscoped the existential quantifier in the logical form;
other readings are of course available for both sentences, but are not relevant for
the present purposes and do not need to be taken into account.
Now, the unexpected fact for a theory of GIs as universal-alike quantifiers
is that the (a)-reading is only possible for sentence (207) containing as its last
determiner a universal quantifier, while it is not available for sentence (208) with
the GI in its place. Again, thus, there is an unexpected mismatch between the
universal quantifier and the GI, even if in this case it goes in the opposite direction
with respect to the couple of examples (183a) and (183b),38 because it is now the
38Here I do not consider (182a) and (182b), since, as I argued above, in the case of (182b), it
is likely that the only possible interpretation for the indefinite is the existential one.
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sentence without the GI, (207), which possibly expresses the strongest reading,
while the weakest one is the only one available for (208); this is easily seen by
realizing that, if (207) is interpreted in the reading represented by (207a), then
only (208) is compatible with the following scenario:
(209) There is no shell such that at least one sailor showed it to every blonde
girl.
If we consider, then, the two following logical forms, corresponding to readings
(207a) and (207b) respectively, this means that (207a) cannot be the semantic
representation of (208).
(210) a. (∀x ≤ t)(xΠi ∧ sailor′(x)→ (∃y ≤ t)(yΠj ∧ shell′(y) ∧
∧ (∀z ≤ t)(zΠh ∧ girl′(z) ∧ blonde′(z)→ show′(x, y, z))))
b. (∀x ≤ t)(xΠi∧ sailor′(x)→ (∀z ≤ t)(zΠh∧ girl′(z)∧ blonde′(z)→
→ (∃y ≤ t)(yΠj ∧ shell′(y) ∧ show′(x, y, z))))
Again, we can try, as a first approximation, to translate (208) by using a generic
variable for the GI; the result is arguably the following:
(211) (∀x ≤ t)(xΠi ∧ sailor′(x)→ (∃y ≤ t)(yΠj ∧ shell′(y) ∧
∧ (vΠh ∧ girl′(v) ∧ blonde′(v)→ show′(x, y, v))))
(211) immediately does the job: from it, applying rule (P ) to any n, we can derive
that, if n denotes something which is a blonde girl, then every sailor shows a
shell to her (with nothing forcing the interpretation that there must be one and
the same shell shown to each girl by each sailor): this corresponds exactly to the
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expected interpretation of (208) paraphrased in (208b).
Notice that, in this case, no Donald Duck problem arises, since we could for-
mally prove that this problem is limited to environments which are not upward
entailing (henceforth, also simply ‘UE’),39 while the nuclear scope of any deter-
miner within (211) is. However, (211) would be the translation of an alleged deep
syntactic structure where the existential quantifier takes immediate scope over a
material implication, i.e. a coordinate structure, without possibly receiving case
from the antecedent; hence, it would violate the CSC. This fact suggests the fol-
lowing logically equivalent semantic representation for (208) (again, I set aside the
possible partitive interpretation of the generic):
(212) girl′(v) ∧ blonde′(v)→ (∀x ≤ t)(xΠi ∧ sailor′(x)→
→ (∃y ≤ t)(yΠj ∧ shell′(y) ∧ show′(x, y, v)))
In order not to reproduce, relative to the universal quantifier, the problem of the
violation of the CSC, in (212) the antecedent of the conditional introduced by
the restrictor of the GI also outscopes the universal quantifier: the interpretation,
however, matches the one represented by (208b). Both the following theorems,
in fact, hold, with the first one corresponding to a familiar result of CL and the
second, only minimally differing from the previous one for the substitution of a
universal quantifier with a generic variable, showing once more the universal-alike
character of generics:
Theorem 7.1 (∀x ≤ A)(ϕ(x)→ (∀y ≤ B)(ψ(y)→ χ(x, y))) = 0 a`RAt
a`RAt (∀y ≤ B)(ψ(y)→ (∀x ≤ A)(ϕ(x)→ χ(x, y))) = 0
39See Fauconnier (1975b,a), Ladusaw (1979b, 1980) and Barwise & Cooper (1981), for instance,
for the relevant definition of “upward entailment”.
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In both senses, the derivation follows from Goodstein’s (1957: 84) theorem 3.834,
Goodstein’s (1957: 85) 3.982 and Goodstein’s (1957: 82) 3.06, given also the De-
duction Theorem (Goodstein (1954: 255) and Goodstein (1957: 114)). 2
Theorem 7.2 (∀x ≤ A)(ϕ(x)→ (ψ(v)→ χ(x, v))) = 0 a`RAt
a`RAt ψ(v)→ (∀x ≤ A)(ϕ(x)→ χ(x, v)) = 0
In both senses, the derivation follows from Goodstein’s (1957) theorems 3.06 and
3.834 alone, again via the Deduction Theorem. 2
Note that the same contrast observed between (207) and (208) is also replicated
in the case of the following two slightly more complex sentences,40 where pragmatic
factors should favour a reading of the direct object as taking scope over the indirect
object; notwithstanding these factors, such a reading is still absent with the GI.41
(214) Every sailor showed with pride some of his shells to every girl passing
there.
a. 3 ‘For every sailor, there is at least one shell such that, for every
girl passing there, he showed it to her with pride.’
40The reason why I developed the argument above starting from (207) and (208) instead of
from (214) and (215) is precisely that the formalization of the latter would have resulted in even
more complicated logical forms.
41It seems to me, as well as to my English informants, that the judgement of impossibility
for the reading correspondent to (215b) becomes more fuzzy when we replace some with, for
instance, a numeral:
(213) Every sailor showed with pride two of his shells to a girl passing there.
But this may well be a pragmatic effect due to a functional interpretation of the existential
indefinite (i.e., two of his shells which are such and such: for instance, the two biggest shells
he had), while such an interpretation is semantically blocked in the case of some (again, see
Zamparelli (2007) and Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2008, 2010, 2011) for the counterparts
of some in other languages). The important fact is, in my view, that despite the non-functional
preferences of some, its wide scope reading over a universal quantifier, as exemplified by (214a),
is perfectly accessible, while it is not in the case of a GI.
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b. 3 ‘For every sailor and for every girl passing there, there is at least
one shell such that he showed it to her with pride.’
(215) Every sailor showed with pride some of his shells to a girl passing there.
a. 7 ‘For every sailor, there is at least one shell such that, for any girl
passing there, he showed it to her with pride.’
b. 3 ‘For every sailor and for any girl passing there, there is at least
one shell such that he showed it to her with pride.’
One natural way to definitively check if, even in UE-environments, we should
assume that the restrictor of a GI, translating in logical form as the antecedent of
a material implication, takes wide scope over quantifiers, is by looking at sentences
where the indefinite is anaphorically linked to a quantified DP: we should expect, in
these cases, that if the restrictor cannot be interpreted in situ, then the indefinite
cannot be interpreted generically. This prediction is actually borne out when
looking, for instance, at the following sharp contrast (where one should try to
interpret the last indefinite in (216a) generically):42
(216) a. *Gianni shows some shellsi he found to a blonde girl who likes themi.
b. Gianni shows some shellsi he found to every blonde girl who likes
themi.
(217) a. *Gianni shows every shelli he found to a blonde girl who likes iti.
42See also n. 37 above about the need for three DP arguments.
Note, as well, that, under the controversial assumption that specific indefinites conceived as
scopeless elements exist (like, classically, in Fodor & Sag (1982)), (216a) should be able to receive
such an interpretation where the second indefinite is a GI. Since this is not the case, (216a) seems
to provide an argument against an account of specific indefinites as scopeless elements and thus,
plausibly, also in general against specificity as a distinguished semantic feature in its own right.
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b. Gianni shows every shelli he found to every blonde girl who likes iti.
The pattern differentiating the universal quantifier from the GI can be detected
also in connection with other, semantically more complex, environments:
(218) a. No dog-sitter beats every cat.
b. No dog-sitter beats a cat.
(219) a. Exactly two dog-sitters beat every cat.
b. Exactly two dog-sitters beat a cat.
Again, (218a) but not (218b) is compatible with (220), and, again, (219a) but not
(219b) (in one of its readings) is compatible with (221):
(220) There is a dog-sitter such that there is a cat that he beats.
(221) There is no dog-sitter who beats every cat.
The readings conveyed by sentences (218b) and (219b) with GIs can be roughly
paraphrased, respectively, by the following sentences displaying widest scope uni-
versal quantifiers in their place:
(222) For every cat, no dog-sitter beats it.
(223) For every cat, there are exactly two dog-sitters who beat it.
Now, the following ones appear to be reasonable semantic representations for
(218a) and (219a), respectively:
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(224) ¬(∃x ≤ t)(dog_sitter′(x) ∧ (∀y ≤ t)(yΠj ∧ cat′(y)→ beat′(x, y)))
(225) (∃x ≤ t)(Card(x, 2) ∧ (∀y ≤ t)(yΠx→ dog_sitter′(y)) ∧
∧ (∀y ≤ t)(yΠx→ (∀z ≤ t)(zΠj ∧ cat′(z)→ beat′(y, z)))) ∧
∧ ¬(∃x ≤ t)(Card(x, 3) ∧ (∀y ≤ t)(yΠx→ dog_sitter′(y)) ∧
∧ (∀y ≤ t)(yΠx→ (∀z ≤ t)(zΠj ∧ cat′(z)→ beat′(y, z))))
In accordance with what I argued before for (183b) and (208), the following
terms are instead good candidates to be the semantic representations of (218b)
and (219b), respectively:
(226) cat′(v)→ ¬(∃x ≤ t)(dog_sitter′(x) ∧ beat′(x, v))
(227) cat′(v)→ (∃x ≤ t)(Card(x, 2) ∧ (∀y ≤ t)(yΠx→ dog_sitter′(y)) ∧
∧ (∀y ≤ t)(yΠx→ beat′(y, v))) ∧ ¬(∃x ≤ t)(Card(x, 3) ∧
∧ (∀y ≤ t)(yΠx→ dog_sitter′(y)) ∧ (∀y ≤ t)(yΠx→ beat′(y, v)))
I believe that, conjunctively, examples (183b), (208), (218b) and (219b) provide
strong empirical evidence supporting the claim that GIs provide generic variables
to the logical form of the sentence (plus the structure of a material implication).
This is, hence, the semantic representation that I am suggesting for them:
(228)
uwwwwwwwwwwv
IP1v
IP2vDPv
NumPvD
Gen
}~
= JNumPvK→ JIP2vK.
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Now, I move to an apparent counterexample which seems to threaten this
relatively simple picture.
7.2.8 Generic indefinites in dependent clauses
There is, indeed, a simple way to obtain sentences whose meaning resembles very
much that of (182a) or (183a) but where, instead of the universal quantifier, a GI
appears: it is by embedding the GI within a CP. Look at the following examples:
(229) It is not true that a cat scratches Gianni.
a. 3 it is not true that [(aGen v: v is a cat) [v scratches Gianni]]
b. 3 (aGen v: v is a cat) [it is not true that [v scratches Gianni]]
(230) It is not true that Gianni beats a cat.
a. 3 it is not true that [(aGen v: v is a cat) [Gianni beats v]]
b. 3 (aGen v: v is a cat) [it is not true that [Gianni beats v]]
We can easily see that the readings represented by (229a) and (230a) roughly
correspond to the weak interpretation of (182a) and (183a), respectively, and are
compatible, thus, with the scenarios in (184) and (185), unlike (182b) and (183b).
Actually, there is nothing really surprising in this phenomenon: as I argued
in §6.7 above, dependent clauses provide a number to the semantic representa-
tion of their matrix clause, namely the number of the semantic representation of
a sentence; variables within that sentence may well be accessible from outside,
as implied by the semantic representation I gave, but crucially they do not need
to. In the (a)-readings, the variables provided by the GIs are opaque, to use the
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terminology introduced in §6.7, while in the (b)-readings they are still transpar-
ent. The distinction is formally represented through the following logical forms,
corresponding to (229a)–(230b):
(231) a. ¬true′(pcat′(v)→ scratch′(v,Gianni)q(Gianni))
b. cat′(v)→ ¬true′(pscratch′(v,Gianni)q(v,Gianni))
(232) a. ¬true′(pcat′(v)→ beat′(Gianni, v)q(Gianni))
b. cat′(v)→ ¬true′(pbeat′(Gianni, v)q(Gianni, v))
This is instead an example designed to obtain an interpretation similar to that
of (208a) by using a GI within a relative clause:
(233) Every sailor owns some shell that he shows to a blonde girl.
a. 3 (every x: x is a sailor) [(some y: y is a shell such that [(aGen v: v
is a blonde girl) [x shows y to v]]) [x owns y]]
b. 3 (aGen v: v is a blonde girl) [(every x: x is a sailor) [(some y: y is
a shell such that [x shows y to v]) [x owns y]]]
Again, we can see that a reading like (233a), which was impossible for (208), is
now available for (233): this is, of course, the opaque reading of the GI, while the
transparent one, represented by (233b), is close to the only one which was possible
for (208), namely the one represented by (208b). Formally, the contrast between
the two readings reveals itself through the following logical forms:
(234) a. (∀x ≤ t)(xΠi ∧ sailor′(x)→ (∃y ≤ t)(yΠj ∧ shell′(y) ∧
∧ Proof(t, pgirl′(v) ∧ blonde′(v)→ show′(x, y, v)q(x, y))))
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b. girl′(v) ∧ blonde′(v)→ (∀x ≤ t)(xΠi ∧ sailor′(x)→
→ (∃y ≤ t)(yΠj ∧ shell′(y) ∧ Proof(t, pshow′(x, y, v)q(x, y, v))))
Given that the semantic representation suggested here for dependent clauses is
independently motivated (on the basis of the problem of logical omniscience plus
considerations of parallelism between syntax and semantics) and that it suffices to
explain the different behaviour of GIs when they are embedded within them with
respect to their behaviour when they are not, I conclude that dependent clauses
do not constitute a real counterexample to my claim that GIs translate in logical
form as generic variables. On the contrary, once we had independently proved this
claim, the asymmetry between dependent and independent clauses seems to add
further evidence supporting sententialism.
As far as I can see, GIs which are complements of deverbal nouns can receive an
interpretation with narrow scope with respect to quantifiers in the same sentence:
this would be coherent with the analysis of nominalizations as relative clauses in
disguise which I suggested in §6.1.3.
(235) Gianni knows some ridiculous admirer of an artwork made by him.
a. 3 (some x: (aGen v: v is an artwork made by x) [x is a ridiculous
admirer of v]) [Gianni knows x]
(236) Every novelist introduced some of his poet friends to some admirer of a
work of his written in hendecasyllabic verses.
a. 3 (every x: x is a novelist) [(some y: y is a poet friend of x) [(some
z: (aGen v: v is a work of y written in hendecasyllabic verses) [z is
an admirer of v]) x introduced y to z]]
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7.3 Conditionals
In §6.6, I discussed the BNCS deliberately avoiding making reference to the case
of conditional sentences, in this way departing from Horn’s (1989) treatment. The
reason why Horn (1989), instead, also took into account conditional sentences is
that he presupposed an account of conditionals like the one in standard logic,
i.e. as coordinated structures triggered by an operator whose English counterpart
would be the “connective” if (. . . then); the semantic treatment of this connective,
besides, is given in terms of what is known as “material implication” (starting with
Russell, who borrowed its logical definition from Frege (1879)), corresponding to
the definition of the standard symbol ‘→’ given above in (5) (which does not show
any difference between CL and RA).
Even if the structure defined in (5) may of course be relevant (and I assume that,
in fact, it is) for the semantic characterization of natural language conditionals (and
for that of universal quantifiers and GIs as well, along the lines we saw above),
Kratzer (1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1986, 1991) provided a much sounder semantic
analysis for these constructions than the one based on pure material implication.
First of all, Kratzer pays serious attention to the syntactic circumstance that the
antecedent of the conditional is introduced by a complementizer, i.e. an element
that has the same syntactic category as the head of standard relative clauses.
Additionally, following previous analyses by Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1975)
(ultimately affording in Ramsey (1931a)), she strives to build an account covering
as uniformly as possible both indicative and subjunctive conditionals (for some
irreducible differences, on the semantic side, see already Adams (1970)).43
43There is an enormous literature on the semantic properties of the conditional and its sub-
species. I can mention here only some studies I am aware of and consider particularly original:
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In a nutshell, Kratzer, developing the insight in Lewis (1975) which I already
mentioned above (see §7.2.4 above), analyzes a conditional as a tripartite struc-
ture where the antecedent provides the restriction for a (possibly) covert modal
operator, and the consequent is its nuclear scope. Her proposal is actually more
articulate, but this is what I consider its most important and solid portion. The
following is a famous quotation from Kratzer (1991: 656):
The history of the conditional is the story of a syntactic mistake. There
is no two-place if . . . then connective in natural language. If -clauses
are devices for restricting the domains of various operators.
Now, the problem is the same as above: such a modal operator is again con-
ceived as some variant of the (unbounded) universal quantifier, possibly GEN itself,
ranging over possible worlds or possible situations or possible states of affairs or
possible whatever else.44 But a quantifier of whatever kind must face the same
sort of objections raised for GEN by Löbner (2000) and quoted above. In particu-
Jespersen (1909b) and Bolinger (1967b) on conditional conjunction and disjunction and Keshet
(2013) on conditional conjunction; Palmer (1974), Thomason (1984), Iatridou (2000), Ogihara
(2000) and Ippolito (2003) (the latter formulates a theory of the interaction between modality and
temporality analogous to that in Condoravdi (2002)) on the role of past tense in counterfactuals;
McCawley (1988) and Beck (1997) deal with the problem of comparative conditionals, i.e. con-
structions which in English follow the schema The X-er A, the X-er B; Biezma (2011) (partly
based on Iatridou & Embick (1994) and Schwarzschild (1999)) on subject-auxiliary inversion
in the antecedent of conditionals; Schwarz (1998) and Romero (2000) on reduced conditionals;
Schwager (2005, 2006) on conditionalized imperatives; Schwager (2005) and von Fintel & Iatridou
(2007) on sufficiency modal constructions.
44Even if here I am trying to set aside as much as possible ontological questions, I feel that
speaking of possible worlds in connection with indicative conditionals is particularly problematic,
since it seems to me that what we are considering when evaluating an indicative conditional is
not possible worlds different from the actual one (as we may be obliged to consider, instead, when
evaluating a subjunctive conditional), but rather situations of the actual world which possibly
we have not directly experienced.
For the semantics of mood see especially Farkas (1985, 1992b,a) and, for some comparisons
between English and Italian, Portner (1992, 1997), but already Quine (1956) and, in connection
with conditionals, Anderson (1951).
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lar, it would not be easy to explain, under the assumption that a covert operator
GEN is restricted by the antecedent of a conditional, why the logical negation of
a conditional is impossible to obtain in natural language, if not negating an in-
tensional predicate (possibly covert) whose complement contains the conditional,
while the logical negation of a universal quantifier is always fine. The point is
illustrated, for both indicative and subjunctive conditionals, by the following ex-
amples (grammaticality judgements, again, do not extend to marked information
structures):45
(237) a. *Not if Gianni is at home, every sandwich is on the table.
b. *Not if Gianni was at home, every sandwich would be on the table.
(238) a. Not every sandwich is on the table, if Gianni is at home.
(i) 3 ‘if Gianni is at home, not every sandwich is on the table’
(ii) 7 ‘it is not the case that every sandwich is on the table if Gianni
is at home’
b. Not every sandwich would be on the table, if Gianni was at home.
(i) 3 ‘if Gianni was at home, not every sandwich would be on the
table’
(ii) 7 ‘it is not the case that every sandwich would be on the table
if Gianni was at home’
(239) a. The sandwich is not on the table, if Gianni is at home.
45I am leaving aside here from the semantic or pragmatic differences induced by the reciprocal
order of antecedent and consequent. I chose a quantificational subject in order not to have the
ban of negation over definites interfere; however, with sentences in (239), I also checked the case
where the negation is attached to the main verb and tries to take scope over the alleged covert
operator from that position.
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(i) 3 ‘if Gianni is at home, the sandwich is not on the table’
(ii) 7 ‘it is not the case that the sandwich is on the table if Gianni
is at home’
b. The sandwich would not be on the table, if Gianni was at home.
(i) 3 ‘if Gianni was at home, the sandwich would not be on the
table’
(ii) 7 ‘it is not the case that the sandwich would be on the table if
Gianni was at home’
(240) a. It is not the case that, if Gianni is at home, every sandwich is on
the table.
b. It is not the case that, if Gianni was at home, every sandwich would
be on the table.
(241) a. It is not the case that every sandwich is on the table if Gianni is at
home.
b. It is not the case that every sandwich would be on the table if Gianni
was at home.
The contrast between possible and impossible interpretations of sentences in
(238) and (239) is made more apparent by the fact that both (238a) and (238b),
on one side, and (239a) and (239b), on the other, are inconsistent with the fol-
lowing scenarios (242) and (243), respectively, while they should not be if the
negation behaved like a logical negation with wide scope over the covert head of
the antecedent:
(242) It is possible that every sandwich is on the table and Gianni is at home.
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(243) It is possible that the sandwich is on the table and Gianni is at home.
The point was already made by Dummett (1973) and Grice (1975). Dummett
(1973: 330) (as quoted in Horn (1989: §6.2.2)) pushed himself to conclude that
“we have no negation of the conditional of natural language, that is, no negation
of its sense: we have only a form for expressing refusal to assent to its assertion”
(the context from which this passage has been extracted makes it clear that, when
speaking of the refusal to assent to an assertion, Dummett here has in mind the
utterance of a negative statement where negation attaches to a verum predicate
or similar).
Now, if, repeating the same argument developed above for GIs, we assume that
the antecedent of the conditional does not restrict a variable bound by a generic
operator, but instead, simply, a generic variable, i.e. a scopeless element, we may
analyze the pattern of the interaction between negation and conditionals as a mere
instantiation of the BNCS again. Thus, we get the same ban on negation taking
immediate scope over a conditional as Horn’s, but without committing ourselves
to the material implication account of conditionals, while endorsing, instead, the
more widely accepted account based on genericity and tripartite structure.
Further evidence that the antecedent of the conditional is to be interpreted as
having wide scope within the clause on which it depends comes, again, from obser-
vations on anaphora (note that, in (244), the pronoun should not be interpreted
as generically referring to the kind of shells; besides, once more, topicalizations
should be avoided):
(244) *Gianni shows some shellsi to Luisa if she likes themi.
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(245) *Gianni shows every shelli to Luisa if she likes iti.
I assume, for concreteness, that the generic variable introduced in indicative
conditionals ranges over situations accessible from t (see n. 45 above); the case
of subjunctive conditionals is notoriously more complicated. It seems to me that,
in subjunctive conditionals, the generic variable ranges over situations which are
accessible to the perceptual experience of the speaker up to a certain point in time
(possibly also the present instant).46
As for the relevant notion of accessibility, here it is impossible to give any precise
characterization of it, assuming that a suitable one can even be found somewhere
in the literature. However, at least concerning the particular case of epistemic
accessibility, it is worth signalling the growing amount of studies on inductive
inference taking as their starting point the rigorous formalization of the principle
of Ockham’s Razor developed in Solomonoff (1960, 1964) and Kolmogorov (1998)
(see also Odifreddi (1999: §VII.5)): inductive inference is of course at the core of
epistemic modality, which is, I believe, the most difficult subspecies of modality
to constrain.47
The semantic representation of a conditional sentence, thus, turns out to be the
following one (where ‘Acc’ is the relation of accessibility between situations and
t′ = t in the particular case of the indicative conditional; as before, the syntactic
46The possibility of the relevant point in time being the present is related to the reason why
I prefer to use the label of “subjunctive conditionals” instead of that of “counterfactuals”. If
conditionals of this kind are in fact needed when we want to speak of scenarios which are contrary
to facts, the converse does not hold: i.e., we are not forced to use them only in that case. This
assumption is in agreement with most literature on the topic.
47When dealing with, say, deontic modality, we could just concentrate on a given set of relevant
conventional laws and derive logical consequences from them by deductive inferences, while no
such conventional character can be found in natural laws, since we derive them from sensorial
experience through that peculiar kind of inferential process, neatly distinct from deduction, which
is induction.
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structure is simplified):
(246)
uwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwv
IP1v,t′
IP3vDPv,t′
AdjPv
CPv
IP2vC
if
Adj
Op
D
Gen
}~
=
= Acc(v, t′) ∧ Proof(v, pJIP2vKq(v))→ JIP3vK
Now that we have sketched such a semantic analysis of conditionals, we can
address a puzzle raised by Winter (2001) relative to the following sentence:
(247) If three workers in our staff have a baby soon we will have to face some
hard organisational problems.
Winter noticed that (247) cannot have the reading in (248):
(248) There are three workers such that for each x of them, if x has a baby,
there will be problems. 3 > Dist > if > 1
In the present account, the unavailability of (248) as a reading for (247) is not
surprising, since the covert argument restricted by the if -clause is a generic vari-
able and, hence, cannot be interpreted as if it had narrow scope under a genuine
universal quantifier like Dist.
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Lewis (1975) also dealt with when-clauses, in the margin of his influential
theory about adverbs of quantification, viewing them as “stylistic variations” of
if -clauses restricting an adverb of quantification, in a paragraph titled just in
this way (Portner & Partee (2002: 185–6)): in Lewis’s (1975) own words (Portner
& Partee (2002: 185)), “canonical restrictive if-clauses may, in suitable contexts,
be replaced by when-clauses” (see the discussion on Lewis’s (1975) proposal in
§7.2.4 above). In other words, when-clauses would play the function of restricting
the variable bound by the quantifier introduced by a (possibly covert) adverb of
quantification. Letting aside problems of syntactic nature (partly acknowledged
by Lewis himself), Löbner’s (2000) criticism, reported above in §7.2.7, to proposals
inspired by Lewis (1975) employing (unselective) generic quantifiers extends also
to this particular application. Löbner (2000: 285 f.) too, however, treats when-
clauses, as well as other adverbial clauses and headless relatives, as instances of
those linguistic structures whose negation “is formed by VP negation in the main
clause”. Even if I completely agree with this claim, I strongly believe that, in
accordance with what I said in §6.3 above, free relatives are anaphoric elements,
unlike what I argued the head of an if -clause to be. Hence, the behaviour of free
relatives with respect to negation should not have the same source of that of if -
clauses, and in particular it should probably be put in relation to the constraint
on binding of wh-pronouns via accommodation (see again §6.3).
Besides the morphological differences between the two types of clauses, I also
take the contrast in interpretation between (244) above, repeated here as (249),
and (250) to be significant:
(249) *Gianni shows some shellsi to Luisa if she likes themi.
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(250) Gianni shows some shellsi to Luisa when she likes themi.
7.4 Negative indefinites
I want now to briefly address the complex issue of negative indefinites (hereafter,
also simply ‘NIs’), i.e. indefinite determiners which morphologically incorporate a
negative mark, like Eng. no or It. {nessun / nessuna / nessuno}, because certain
puzzling properties of theirs may receive some clarity once we put generic variables
into the semantic toolbox.
First of all, consider the following well-known laws of CL:
(251) a. ¬∀xϕ(x)⇔ ∃x¬ϕ(x)
b. ¬∃xϕ(x)⇔ ∀x¬ϕ(x)
These laws already appeared in the writings of William of Shyreswood48 and have
the following corresponding versions with bounded quantifiers ((252a) corresponds
to Goodstein’s (1957: 71) 3.964 or Goodstein’s (1957: 83) 3.222, while (252b) can
be derived from it through Goodstein’s (1957: 59) 3.31 and Goodstein’s (1957: 60)
3.34):
(252) a. ¬(∀x ≤ A)ϕ(x)⇔ (∃x ≤ A)¬ϕ(x)
b. ¬(∃x ≤ A)ϕ(x)⇔ (∀x ≤ A)¬ϕ(x)
Generalizations of these are the following (where ‘Q~x’, with Q an unbounded or
48Parallel laws also hold for the classical modal operators of necessity and possibility and they
are essentially due to Peter of Spain. In the light of the modern interpretation of necessity in
terms of universal quantification and possibility in terms of existential quantification (see p. 225
below), they simply arise as a special case of (251a) and (251b).
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bounded quantifier of whatever force, is a shorthand for ‘Qx1 . . . Qxn’), which
should be of interest once we are dealing with NIs which are also NPIs:
(253) a. ¬∀~xϕ(~x)⇔ ∃~x¬ϕ(~x)
b. ¬∃~xϕ(~x)⇔ ∀~x¬ϕ(~x)
(254) a. ¬(∀~x ≤ A)ϕ(~x)⇔ (∃~x ≤ A)¬ϕ(~x)
b. ¬(∃~x ≤ A)ϕ(~x)⇔ (∀~x ≤ A)¬ϕ(~x)
Developing the parallel between logical quantifiers and connectives I already
mentioned above (see p. 122), these laws correspond to standard De Morgan laws
(see p. 98):
(255) a. ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇔ ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ
b. ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)⇔ ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
Here are some instantiations of the laws given above in English (notice that
those in (256) are not precise instantiations of the laws in (255), since such precise
instantiations would violate the BNCS and thus are not available; besides, the
indefinites in the examples of (257) are of course to be interpreted as existential
quantifiers):
(256) a. It is not the case that both John is bald and Harry is hairy. ⇐
⇒ John is not bald or Harry is not hairy.
b. It is not the case that either John is bald or Harry is hairy. ⇐
⇒ John is not bald and Harry is not hairy.
(257) a. Not every man is bald. ⇐
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⇒ A man is not bald.
b. Not a man is bald. ⇐
⇒ Every man is not bald.
Now, because of the logical equivalences in (253)–(254), when dealing with NIs
and with negative polarity determiners (henceforth, ‘NPDs’),49 it is impossible to
decide on purely truth-conditional grounds if they were to be analyzed as exis-
tential quantifiers within the scope of a negation or, on the contrary, as universal
quantifiers taking scope over a negation. This fact has led, in many cases, to dif-
ferent analyses of different NIs (and sometimes even to different analyses of the
same one) coexisting in the literature.
While NPDs in English have most frequently been analyzed as existential
quantifiers in the (immediate) scope of a negation (see Ladusaw (1979a, 1980),
Linebarger (1980, 1987)), several other analyses dealing with different languages,
in particular recent ones, have taken the opposite path: starting with Szabolcsi
(1981) on Hungarian n-words, through Giannakidou (2000) on emphatic n-words in
Greek, ending up with Sells (2001), Sells & Kim (2006) and Kim & Sells (2007) on
Korean NPDs and Kataoka (2006b,a), and Shimoyama (2008, 2011) on Japanese
NPDs,50 all these studies analyzed some items as universal-alike quantifiers taking
49For the licensing conditions of NPDs, the standard analysis is the one based on the notion
of downward entailment, due to Fauconnier (1975b,a) and Ladusaw (1979b, 1980). See also
Klima (1964), Linebarger (1980, 1987), Zwarts (1981, 1986, 1995, 1996a,b, 1998), Hoeksema
(1983a, 1986), Heim (1984) (following Schmerling (1971)), Kadmon & Landman (1990, 1993),
Giannakidou (1998) and Lahiri (1998) for problems, refinements and extensions.
Regarding the complex issue of the licensing of NPDs in questions, see in particular Hig-
ginbotham (1993) (partly relying on Higginbotham (1991)), relating the issue to downward-
entailingness; see also Guerzoni & Sharvit (2007) for some criticisms.
50Remember that Asian languages in general lack n-words, as reported by Haspelmath (1997);
see n. 33 at p. 95 above.
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(immediate) scope over a negation.51
Here it is impossible to carry out any serious discussion on the quantificational
force of NIs and NPDs even in one single language. However, I believe that it
is worth stressing the role that the analysis outlined above for GIs may play in
suggesting a solution to a puzzle about NIs and the conditional.
First of all, we should emphasize the trivial fact that, if one wants to pursue
an analysis of certain NIs in terms of something semantically close to universal
quantification, then genericity seems to be the best candidate, since indefinites,
in positive environments, are never standard universal quantifiers, while they can
be generic. Taking this simple fact as our starting point, a reasonable taxonomy
for NIs and NPDs on the basis of their quantificational force may a priori be the
following one:
I) NIs or NPDs that are always existential quantifiers within the (immediate)
scope of a negation;
II) NIs or NPDs that are always GIs taking (immediate) scope over a negation;
III) NIs or NPDs that are ambiguous between existential quantifiers within the
(immediate) scope of a negation and GIs taking (immediate) scope over a
negation.
I will call these possible items “type-I”, “type-II” and “type-III” NIs or NPDs,
respectively.
It is interesting to consider, I believe, the case of Italian. Italian has a series
51See also the logical forms employed by Zanuttini (1991, 1997) and Haegeman & Zanuttini
(1996), with universal quantifiers taking scope over negation, but apparently only committing
themselves to the resulting truth conditions of the sentence.
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of NIs and a series of NPDs which are not also NIs: they are summarised in the
following table:
Determiner form Null-nominal form
NIs
nessun(o) nessuna
no:m;sg no:f;sg
‘no’ ‘no’
nessuno niente
none nothing
‘{nobody / ‘{nothing /
anybody}’ anything}’
NPDs
alcun(o) alcuna
any:m;sg any:f;sg
‘any’ ‘any’
∅ alcunché
anything
‘anything’
Table 7.1: NPDs in Italian.
The items in the NIs series, when more than one appears in the same local
domain, give rise to the phenomenon of Negative Concord, as the following exam-
ples illustrate (in order to be consistent with the hypothesis that the NIs appear
in the same local domain, marked information structures must not be taken into
account; it is well-known that, in that case, double negation readings may arise):
(258) Gianni
Gianni
non
not
ha
has
regalato
gifted
niente
nothing
a
to
nessuno.
nobody
‘Gianni did not gift anybody anything’
(259) Nessuno
nobody
ha
has
regalato
gifted
niente
nothing
a
to
nessuno.
nobody
‘nobody gifted anybody anything’
Further, contrary to what happens in non-NC languages like English, in Ital-
ian there cannot be a postverbal NI which has not been licensed by a preverbal
negation:
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(260) John ate nothing.
(261) *Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
mangiato
eaten
niente.52
nothing
I assume, following Laka Mugarza (1990) and Ladusaw (1992), that data like
this is to be taken as evidence that postverbal NIs in NC languages like Italian
are NPIs. As is well-known, furthermore, Italian is a Non-Strict NC language,
differing from Strict NC languages like, for instance, Czech in that the former
does not allow surface sentential negation with a NI subject, while the latter, on
the contrary, require it. The pattern is illustrated below:
(263) a. Nessuno
nobody
ha
has
mangiato
eaten
{la
the
torta
cake
/ niente}.
nothing
‘nobody ate {the cake / anything}’ It.
b. *Nessuno
nobody
non
not
ha
has
mangiato
eaten
{la
the
torta
cake
/ niente}.
nothing
52Sentences like the following (262) are indeed possible in Italian, and they were even more
frequent in Old Italian. However, a suitable paraphrase of it easily shows that the meaning of
the n-word has somehow shifted:
(262) Questo
this
è
is
niente.
nothing
‘this is a thing of very small value’
At first glance, cases like this one seem to be relicts specular to the so-called Emphatic Negation
(see van der Wouden (1994)). This expression refers to a phenomenon attested in some non-NC
languages and consists of two words, which must appear strictly adjacent in the sentence, both
containing one negative morpheme but conveying a single negative meaning; examples are Dutch
nooit niet ‘never not’ or niets geen ‘nothing no’. For an analysis of Emphatic Negation as a
by-product of loss of Negative Concord, see Zeijlstra (2010).
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(264) a. *Nikdo
nobody
{snědl
ate
dort
cake
/ nic
nothing
snědl}.
ate
b. Nikdo
nobody
{nejedl
not_ate
dort
cake
/ nic
nothing
nejedl}.
not_ate
‘nobody ate {the cake / anything}’ Czech
Following Zeijlstra (2004, 2006), I further assume that the only difference be-
tween Italian and Czech is that Italian has, besides an overt negation, also a covert
negation at its disposal: in both languages, thus, the negative marker of NIs would
be an abstract, uninterpretable negative feature, while the interpretable negation
(whether covert or overt) occupies its standard position in the clause: hence, in
both Strict and Non-Strict NC languages, all concord items would be NPIs.53
Note, as well, that the simultaneous occurrence of preverbal NIs and sentential
negation with NC reading was possible in Old Italian, even if less frequent than
the case, mentioned above in §6.6, of the negative conjunction cooccurring with
standard negation. The following examples are again from Zanuttini (2010):
53Note that, on the basis of the examples above alone, one could argue, in an equally plausible
way, that the Italian preverbal NI contains a negative morpheme with a truly negative semantic
value (and this is, in fact, Ladusaw’s (1992) idea); however, we may have as well more than one
preverbal NI argument in the same clause, as in the following example:
(265) A
to
nessuna
no
ragazza
girl
nessun
no
marinaio
sailor
ha
has
mostrato
showed
{una
a
/ nessuna}
no
conchiglia.
shell
‘to no girl any sailor showed {a / any} shell’
In this case, we have two preverbal NIs, with the sentence obligatorily lacking an overt standard
negation; but the meaning of the sentence requires that at most one of the two contains a negative
morpheme which is also semantically negative. Given this state of affairs, it seems to me that
Zeijlstra’s account explains the empirical facts in a more parsimonious way.
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(266) . . . e
and
comandò
he_ordered
a’
to
baroni
barons
che
that
neuno
no_one
non
not
li
him
insegnasse
teach:sbj;pst:3sg
spendere
to_spend
questo
this
oro
gold
. . .
‘. . . and he told his barons not to instruct him how to spend that gold. . . ’
(Novellino, 7, ll. 8–10)
(267) . . . sicché
so_that
si
mid
spegnesse
fade_away:sbj;pst:3sg
l’umana
the-human
generazione
generation
e
and
neuno
no_one
non
not
andasse
go:sbj;pst:3sg
poscia
then
in
in
paradiso
heaven
. . .
‘. . . so that the human generation faded away and then no one went to
heaven. . . ’
(Bono Giamboni, Libro, Ch. 44, §4)
(268) . . . e
and
che
that
neuno
none
uomo
man
non
not
sapea
knew
che
what
ne
of_him
fosse
be:sbj;pst:3sg
adivenuto.
become:ptcp:pst
‘. . . and no one knew what had become of him’
(Novellino, 64, ll. 54–55)
Now, if we are to classify the Italian items under examination according to
the taxonomy just given, I consider the following example rules out for both the
determiners the hypothesis that they can belong to type II NPDs:
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(269) Ogni
every
marinaio
sailor
non
not
ha
has
mostrato
shown
a
to
qualche
some
ragazza
girl
{alcuna
any
/
nessuna}
no
conchiglia.
shell
‘every sailor did not show to some girl any shell’
According to one of the readings for (269), there is at least one girl for each sailor
such that the sailor did not show to her any shell.54 This reading is available
with items of both series and is possible only if these items are interpreted as
existential quantifiers under negation, otherwise negation would be interpreted as
having wide scope over the other arguments and over qualche ragazza in particular,
which would plainly lead to wrong truth conditions.
Additionally, the items in the NPDs series which are not NIs cannot appear
in the preverbal position, independently of the fact that a preverbal negation is
present or not:
(270) *Alcun
any
ragazzo
boy
(non)
not
ha
has
mangiato
eaten
la
the
torta.
cake
In other words, even if it has an element corresponding to Eng. NPI any,
modern Italian lacks something formally corresponding to Eng. FC any, thus it is
reasonable to assume that It. {alcun(o) / alcuna} is a type I NPD. However, this
state of affairs only represents the actual endpoint of a diachronic process, since
in Old Italian, {alcun(o) / alcuna} were not (exclusively) NPIs, but could also
appear in positive environments and, among other uses, as FC determiners as well
54The complication of the existential quantifier in the scope of a universal one is again intended,
as in p. 182 before, to avoid a referential reading of the indefinite.
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(see (274) below), as the following examples from Zanuttini (2010) show:
(271) Pubbliche
public
questioni
questions
son
are
quelle
those
nelle
in-the
quali
which
si
impers
tratta
treats
il
the
convenentre
utility
d’alcuna
of-any
cittade
city
o
or
comunanza
community
di
of
genti.
people
‘public questions are those in which the utility of whatever city or com-
munity of people is dealt with’
(Brunetto Latini, Rettorica, p. 5, ll. 8–10)
(272) Compagno
comrade
è
is
quelli
the_one
che
that
per
for
alcuno
any
patto
pact
si
himself
congiunge
conjoins
con
with
un
an
altro
other
ad
to
alcuna
any
cosa
thing
fare.
do
‘a comrade is one who, through whatever pact, joins another one to do
something’
(Brunetto Latini, Rettorica, p. 13, ll. 13–14)
(273) Dimmi
tell=me
alcuna
any
cosa
thing
de
of
la
the
natura
nature
de’
of
Vizî
vices
che
that
nascono
originate
di
from
lei.
her
‘tell me something about the nature of vices which originate from it’
(Bono Giamboni, Libro, Ch. 30, §7)
(274) . . . in
in
Campo
Campo
Marzio,
Marzio
nel
in-the
quale
which
s’asemblava
impersgot_together
la
the
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comunanza
community
a
to
llodare
praise
alcuna
any
persona
person
ch’era
that-was
degna
worthy
d’avere
of-getting
dignitade
dignity
e
and
signoria
lordship
. . .
‘. . . in Campo Marzio, where people got together to praise one who was
worthy of getting dignity and lordship’
(Brunetto Latini, Rettorica, p. 59, ll. 12–14)
Finally, notice that the determiner forms of both the series are strong NPIs (for
the notion of strength relevant in this case, see, for instance, Hoeksema (1983b,
1986) or Zwarts (1998)), since they are bad, for instance, in questions, as exam-
ples in (275) show, while their pronominal forms, which instead are fine in such
environments, seem to be weak NPIs for this reason:
(275) a. %Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
incontrato
met
nessuna
no
ragazza?
girl
b. *Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
incontrato
met
alcuna
any
ragazza?
girl
(276) a. Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
incontrato
met
nessuno?
nobody
‘did Gianni meet anybody?’
b. Gianni
Gianni
ha
has
mangiato
eaten
{niente
nothing
/ alcunché}?
anything
‘did Gianni eat anything?’
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It still has to be decided if the nessuno series groups type I or type III items.
Reasoning by uniformity with alcuno, we should expect that the former is the right
answer. However, there is a puzzle also involving the conditional which suggests
that things could be different.
The puzzle was first formulated by Higginbotham (1986) (and further dis-
cussed especially in Dekker (2001)) and illustrated through the following English
sentences:
(277) a. Every student will succeed if he works hard.
b. No student will succeed if he goofs off.
As Dekker (2001: 118) puts it (examples are renumbered),
[e]xample (277a) can be given an intuitively correct interpretation, if it
is taken to state that for every student the following holds: if he works
hard he will succeed. However, a similar analysis of example (277b)
would give rather disastrous results. For suppose example (277b) is
rendered as stating that for no student this holds: if he goofs off he
will succeed. If we read the latter implication as a material one, then
the sentence would turn out to state that every student goofs off and
no student succeeds, which is way too strong. Alternatively, if the
sentence is taken to state that for no student there is a rule-governed
connection between goofing off and success, then this is way too weak.
Rather, example (277b) seems to state that no student who goofs off
will succeed, that is, that goofing off implies failure.
The first case taken into account by Dekker, namely that of material impli-
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cation, requires, I believe, no further discussion: it parallels the instances of the
Donald Duck problem already encountered above. As for the second case, it may
formally arise, under the standard assumptions implicit in the quotation above, in
two ways: either we have a Kratzer-style modal operator embedded under the NI,
or we have, in the same position, an embedded verum predicate or similar, leading
to a reading of sentence (277b) which could be paraphrased more or less as For
no student it is the case that, if he goofs off, he will succeed or No student is such
that, if he goofs off, he will succeed. Readings like that are actually available, I
believe, as marked options for sentence (277b), but, nevertheless, as Dekker rightly
maintains, they are by no means its most natural readings.
Now, let’s see which readings should be expected in the present framework
which would not be expected, however, unless without ad hoc stipulations, under
standard semantic assumptions. As for the semantic representation of the condi-
tional, we have only one possibility; the choice only weighs upon the NI, which
we may analyze as an existential quantifier under a negation or as a GI over it.
It should be remarked that the former choice encounters an obstacle of syntactic
nature, because it configures itself as a violation of the CSC, given that the an-
tecedent must remain within the scope of the negative quantifier, since its subject
is anaphorically linked to it, and in this position the material implication (i.e., a
connective) would be in the immediate scope of the quantified main subject with-
out the latter having been extracted from the antecedent. However, even setting
aside this problem, such an analysis also leads to wrong semantic results. The two
semantic representations corresponding to the two different analyses are thus the
following ones:55
55Actually, we would need to formulate a suitable adaptation of Linebarger’s (1980) Immediate
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(278) ¬(∃x ≤ t)(student′(x) ∧ (Acc(w, t) ∧
∧ Proof(t, pgoof_off ′(x,w)q(x,w))→ will_succeed′(x)))
(279) student′(v)→ (Acc(w, t) ∧ Proof(t, pgoof_off ′(v, w)q(v, w))→
→ ¬will_succeed′(v))
Now, (278) differentiates from the too strong reading with the conditional inter-
preted in terms of material implication Dekker alluded to for only one aspect:
that now the sentence is no longer simply stating that every student goofs off,
but rather that every student in any accessible situation does; but this is a com-
pletely negligible difference, and the reading remains far too strong with respect
to the actual meaning of the sentence. No such an objection, however, can be
raised against (279), which seems to correspond correctly to the intuitive truth
conditions of (277b).
Italian may provide even more suggestive evidence in favour of a solution to
Higginbotham’s puzzle along these lines. Consider the following Italian version
of the puzzle where direct objects, instead of subjects, are coindexed with the
anaphoric pronoun in the antecedent of the conditional and remember that the
items in the alcuno series, in modern Italian, are all NPIs and are not homophonic
with any other item, unlike English any:
Scope Constraint (ISC) in order to allow the antecedent of the conditional to intervene between
the NI and the negation licensing it. However, such an adaptation would probably not cause
big theoretical discomforts, since the logical form of the antecedent has the same structure of
that of the DP whose head is the NI, and hence a certain uniformity, at least at the semantic
level, is guaranteed. Besides, we could also push ourselves to hypothesize that the covert head
restricted by the antecedent can come also in an NPI variant; such an assumption may not be
so inventive as it may appear at first glance, considering for instance that the complementizer if
also introduces embedded yes/no questions, which can license weak NPIs.
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(280) Gianni
Gianni
non
not
promuoverà
will_pass
nessuno
no
studentei
student
se
if
proi sarà
will_be
stato
been
pigro.
lazy
‘Gianni will pass no student if he goofed off’
(281) *Gianni
Gianni
non
not
promuoverà
will_pass
alcuno
any
studentei
student
se
if
proi sarà
will_be
stato
been
pigro.
lazy
(282) Gianni
Gianni
non
not
promuoverà
will_pass
alcuno
any
studente
student
se
if
Mario
Mario
sarà
will_be
stato
been
pigro.
lazy
‘Gianni will pass no student if Mario goofed off’
Now, the impossibility of (281) clearly depends on the indicated coindexing pat-
tern, as the comparison with (282) immediately shows. This impossibility is par-
ticularly telling, since I have already argued that, for independent reasons, alcuno
is a type I NPI, i.e. it always introduces in the logical form an existential quantifier;
hence, it is not surprising if that coindexing pattern results in ungrammaticality,
since it has the same syntactic problems of the syntactic representation that we
needed in order to get the (also semantically untenable) semantic representation
(278) above. This seems to confirm that our syntactic worries were indeed jus-
tified. But, moreover, it seems to suggest that items in the nessuno series are
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best understood as type II NPIs, i.e. NPIs which are ambiguous between exis-
tential quantifiers under negation and GIs over it. Remember, in fact, that we
were wondering if these items are type I, like alcuno, or type II NPIs. Now, the
grammaticality of (280) with the indicated coindexing pattern rules out an inter-
pretation of nessuno as an existential quantifier, for both the syntactic and the
semantic reasons just seen, and strongly suggests the viability of a reading where
nessuno is interpreted as a GI, like no in the reading represented by (279).
Note that such a solution to Higginbotham’s puzzle and its Italian version
would have not been available if, instead of a GI, we had had whatever quantifier
(not necessarily an existential one, but also a universal or universal-alike one, i.e.
even one semantically closer to GIs): in this case, in fact, the same syntactic
problem of (281) and of the alleged syntactic representation leading to logical
form (278) would have been reproduced; additionally, there would have been an
unpleasant semantic mismatch between the indefinite morpheme in NIs and that
in standard indefinites.56
7.5 Habituals
A sentence like the following one may be of course understood as expressing a
general trend:
(283) Gianni jokes with Luisa.
56The idea that NIs bear some kind of reference to a set of possibly abstract, or generic, objects
is not new in the literature, since it has been advocated in Geurts (1996). However, Geurts there
did not characterize generics as I did, nor even as universal-alike elements.
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This is what is also known as an habitual reading of (283). Note that (283) has only
proper names as DPs: hence, if we want to try to formalize its generic character
by means of a generic variable, the only possible candidate to trigger one in the
logical form is the temporal argument. This is in accordance (apart, of course,
from the issue of quantification) with two related positions usually held in the
literature about habitual sentences, namely that they arise as a consequence of
generic quantification over time intervals (see Fox (1995: 316) and Giannakidou
(1995: 104); but, before them, also McCawley (1981) and Farkas (1992b) for the
related view that habituals are intensional operators) and that there is a close
correlation between habituality and imperfective aspect (see Bonomi (1995)).57
Further, a sentence like (283) can hardly be interpreted as saying that in any
interval of time Gianni is actually joking with Luisa. Most likely, it will express the
fact that in any relevant interval of time he is so doing: (pragmatic) restriction on
the domain of the generic variable is of course in order. Besides, this restriction may
be made explicit by employing a when-clause, something which strongly confirms
that what we are dealing with is a generic temporal argument (remember that,
under present assumptions, I take such clauses to be anaphoric elements, looking
at a bound or generic variable already present in the discourse to be coindexed
with):
(284) Gianni jokes with Luisa {when / whenever} a funny situation creates.
57In this regard, it should be pointed out that languages like French (Kleiber (1987)), Czech
and Polish (Filip & Carlson (1997)) do also appear to have perfective habituals; however, Klimek-
Jankowska (2012) analyzes these cases as instances of kind-reference, thus extending the oppo-
sition between two different sorts of genericity already detected within the nominal domain to
the verbal one as well.
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Without any pretence of accuracy and departing completely from the issue of
domain restriction, hence, the semantic representation for (283) may be something
along the following simple lines (where the generic variable v in the first argumental
place of the predicate joke′ is a variable over time intervals):
(285) joke′(v,Gianni, Luisa)
Hence, it comes as no surprise that the negation of (283), translated in logical form
as (286a), produces a stronger statement than the one that would result from the
negation of a universal quantifier:
(286) Gianni does not joke with Luisa.
a. ¬joke′(v,Gianni, Luisa)
Informally, (286) means that in any relevant interval of time it is not the case that
Gianni jokes with Luisa, not merely that there are some relevant intervals of time
in which he does not.
There would be, of course, much more to say on the issue of habituality, but
I prefer to move on to an arguably more puzzling issue, namely Neg-Raising, to
conclude this overview on the possible applications of RA to natural language
semantics.
7.6 Neg-Raising
Neg-Raising is a well-known puzzling linguistic phenomenon involving negation
and some verbs selecting a sentential complement (i.e., some intensional verbs): it
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amounts to the possibility, with such verbs, that preverbal negation is interpreted
as if it was embedded within the sentential complement, i.e. as if it had raised from
a position within the embedded clause, which it occupied in the deep structure,
to gain the position in the matrix where it appears on the surface.
One of the puzzling facts about Neg-Raising is that this phenomenon regards
some but not all intensional verbs. This fact is illustrated by the following two
series of examples: in (287) we have verbs which do not show Neg-Raising effects,
while in (288) there are verbs that do; the list is by no means exhaustive (the
exclamative dot in the paraphrases of sentences in the second series signals that a
non-Neg-Raising reading is also available for them, but, out of the blue, it seems
to be a marked reading):58
(287) a. Gianni {can / could / may} not watch the match.
3 ¬3: ‘it is not the case that Gianni {can / could / may} watch
the match’
7 3¬: ‘it is possible that Gianni does not watch the match’
b. Luisa does not {hope / dream} {to watch / that Gianni watches}
the match.
3 ¬Hop: ‘it is not the case that Luisa {hopes / dreams} {to watch
/ that Gianni watches} the match’
7 Hop¬: ‘Luisa {hopes / dreams} {not to / that Gianni does not}
watch the match’
c. Luisa does not {say / affirm / assert / declare / guess / maintain /
tell} {to have watched / that Gianni watched} the match.
58This feature, namely the possibility of having also a non-Neg-Raising reading but associated
with some markedness, seems to accomunate all Neg-Raising verbs; see Gajewski (2005: 16).
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3 ¬Say: ‘it is not the case that Luisa {says / affirms / asserts /
declares / guesses / maintains / tells} {not to have watched / that
Gianni did not watch} the match’
7 Say¬: ‘Luisa {says / affirms / asserts / declares / guesses / main-
tains / tells} {not to have watched / that Gianni did not watch} the
match’
d. Luisa does not {know / realize / understand} {to have watched /
that Gianni watched} the match.
3 ¬Know: ‘it is not the case that Luisa {knows / realizes / un-
derstands} {not to have watched / that Gianni did not watch} the
match’
7 Know¬: ‘Luisa {knows / realizes / understands} {not to have
watched / that Gianni did not watch} the match’
e. Luisa does not love {to watch / that Gianni watches} the match.
3 ¬Lov: ‘it is not the case that Luisa loves {to watch / that Gianni
watches} the match’
7 Lov¬: ‘Luisa loves {not to / that Gianni does not} watch the
match’
(288) a. Gianni {must / should} not watch the match.
! ¬2: ‘it is not the case that Gianni {must / should} watch the
match’
3 2¬: ‘it is necessary that Gianni does not watch the match’
b. Gianni does not {seem / appear} to watch the match.
! ¬Seem: ‘it is not the case that Gianni {seems / appears} to watch
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the match’
3 Seem¬: ‘Gianni {seems / appears} not to watch the match’
c. Luisa does not {want / desire / wish} {to watch / that Gianni
watches} the match.
! ¬Want: ‘it is not the case that Luisa {wants / desires / wishes}
{to watch / that Gianni watches} the match’
3 Want¬: ‘Luisa {wants / desires / wishes} {not to / that Gianni
does not} watch the match’
d. Luisa does not {believe / expect / suppose / think} {to watch / that
Gianni watches} the match.
! ¬Bel: ‘it is not the case that Luisa {believes / expects / supposes
/ thinks} {not to / that Gianni does not} watch the match’
3 Bel¬: ‘Luisa {believes / expects / supposes / thinks} {not to /
that Gianni does not} watch the match’
e. Luisa does not like {to watch / that Gianni watches} the match.
3 ¬Lik: ‘it is not the case that Luisa likes {to watch / that Gianni
watches} the match’
7 Lik¬: ‘Luisa likes {not to / that Gianni does not} watch the
match’
The contrast between non-Neg-Raising and Neg-Raising readings also appears
with modal adjectives in predicative position:
(289) a. It is not possible that Gianni watches the match.
3 ¬3: ‘it is not the case that Gianni can watch the match’
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7 3¬: ‘it is possible that Gianni does not watch the match’
b. It is not X -ble that Gianni watches the match.59
3 ¬3: ‘it is not the case that one can X that Gianni watches the
match’
7 3¬: ‘it is X -ble that Gianni does not watch the match’
c. It is not necessary that Gianni watches the match.
3 ¬2: ‘it is not the case that Gianni must watch the match’
7 2¬: ‘it is necessary that Gianni does not watch the match’
(290) It is not convenient that Gianni watches the match.
! ¬2: ‘it is not the case that it is convenient that Gianni watches the
match’
3 2¬: ‘it is convenient that Gianni does not watch the match’
Theories attempting to explain the phenomenon of Neg-Raising essentially fall
into three major groups: syntactic, semantic and pragmatic theories. Syntactic
theories have been the first ones to be proposed: Fillmore, in particular, argued
that Neg-Raising is a movement rule, since it has the appearance of being cyclic;
Fillmore’s proposal, however, has been strongly criticized on empirical grounds,
especially by Horn (1972); see also Gajewski (2005: §2.1.6).
Another interesting insight about Neg-Raising comes from Kiparsky & Kiparsky
(1970), who argued that factive verbs never obey Neg-Raising effects, and further
offer a syntactic explanation for this fact by postulating that factive complements
are embedded under a (possibly silent) nominal fact.
59X stands for a propositional attitude verb like think, desire, conceive, etc., provided, of
course, the necessary phonological adaptations.
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Semantic accounts of Neg-Raising stem from Bartsch (1973) and probably find
their most representative recent advocate in Gajewski (2005, 2007) (relying also on
Heim (2000)): in a nutshell, the idea behind these semantic accounts is that Neg-
Raising verbs come with a (lexically encoded, since Heim (2000)) presupposition
of Excluded Middle, formally represented in Gajewski (2005: 14) in the following
terms (where NRP is the semantic representation of a Neg-Raising predicate and
S that of its sentential complement):60
(292) NRP(S) ∨ NRP(¬S).
Once again, this is the same kind of presupposition advocated by Fodor (1979)
and Löbner (2000) to account for the behaviour of plural definites (p. 80) and, in
the case of the latter, also GIs (p. 182) with respect to negation. As I said before,
I take the objections raised when discussing the first case to extend also to the one
under examination here.
Finally, I will say only a few words about the chief pragmatic account of Neg-
Raising appearing in the literature, namely Horn’s (1989: §5.2). Horn’s idea is
essentially that Neg-Raising readings arise as R-implicatures (see Appendix A
for a definition) with some intensional predicates. Gajewski (2005) presents some
arguments against Horn’s account; a quite compelling one hits pragmatic accounts
of Neg-Raising in general and is based on the empirical observation that there
are cases, within one same language, of predicates sharing more or less the same
60Actually, there is a material error in Gajewski’s (2005: 14) original formulation of this pre-
supposition, since it appears as the following (291), i.e. as an instance of the Law of Excluded
Middle, which is of course not in question and does not need to be added as a presupposition:
(291) NRP(S) ∨ ¬NRP(S).
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meaning but such that one is Neg-Raising while the other is not, and also cases
of a predicate which is Neg-Raising in a language while its (closest) translation in
another language is not. The following couples are taken from Gajewski (2005: 90)
(with the exception of the Italian one, which exactly parallels the French one, and
the one comparing It. amare with Eng. love):
Neg-Raiser Non Neg-Raiser
Eng. supposeexpect
guess
anticipate Eng.
French souhaiter‘hope’
expérer
‘hope’ French
It. augurarsi‘hope’
sperare
‘hope’ It.
Hebrew xosev‘think’
maamin
‘believe’ Hebrew
German hoffen‘hope’ hope Eng.
It. amare‘love’ love Eng.
Table 7.2: Neg-Raiser and Non Neg-Raiser verbs in some languages.
In this regard, furthermore, the contrast between (288a) and (290) above, re-
peated here as (293) and (294) respectively, is particularly telling, since the verb
and the adjective seem to share essentially the same meaning:
(293) Gianni must not watch the match.
! ¬2: ‘it is not the case that Gianni {must / should} watch the match’
3 2¬: ‘it is necessary that Gianni does not watch the match’
(294) It is not necessary that Gianni watches the match.
3 ¬2: ‘it is not the case that Gianni must watch the match’
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7 2¬: ‘it is necessary that Gianni does not watch the match’
One should observe, however, that the etymology of necessary makes it derive from
a structure of the type not-possible, hence it is not surprising if its negation amounts
to something of the type possible-not; this is what we find in Klein (1966-7):
necessary, adj., certain to happen, inevitable, requisite. — ME. nec-
essarie, fr. L. necessa¯rius, ‘unavoidable, indispensable, necessary’, fr.
necesse, ‘unavoidable, necessary’, which stands for *ne-cezd-tis, *ne-
ce¯d-tis, lit. ‘(there is) no evasion, (it is) inevitable’, fr. negative pref.
ne- and ce¯dere, ‘to go away, yield’. For the first element see no, adj.,
and cp. nay, for the second see cede, for the ending see adj. suff. -ary
Within the tradition of modern philosophical logic and analytic philosophy, the
subclass of intensional verbs which has attracted scholars first was that of modal
predicates. At least since Carnap (1946) (his ideas were further articulated in
Kanger (1957), Prior (1957), Montague (1960) and, moreover, Kripke (1963); see
also Barcan (1946) and Carnap (1947)),61 the standard way to express modal no-
tions has been through quantification over accessible worlds or analogous abstract
objects (here, as I did before when discussing conditionals, I will also speak of situ-
ations, instead of worlds, but the specific ontological preferences do not matter for
present purposes). In particular, necessity has been understood to mean holding
in all accessible situations, while possibility holding in some possible situations.
Hintikka (1962) also extended this approach to other intensional predicates.
Hence, the notion of modal basis came to play a central role in this respect, since
61To take a look at the first modern insights on the semantics of modal operators, see MacColl
(1880), Lewis (1920), Becker (1930) and Lewis & Langford (1932).
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belief has been analyzed in terms of universal quantification over worlds accessi-
ble from a doxastic modal basis relative to the bearer of the belief, will has been
analyzed in terms of universal quantification over worlds accessible from a bouletic
modal basis relative to the bearer of the will, human laws have been analyzed
in terms of universal quantification over worlds accessible from a deontic modal
basis relative to a certain collection of norms, natural laws in terms of universal
quantification over worlds accessible from an epistemic modal basis relative to a
certain amount of perceived evidence, logical and mathematical laws in terms of
universal quantification over worlds accessible from an alethic modal basis, etc.62
Even if analyses of this kind have usually been developed under assumptions re-
jecting the sententialist approach to dependent clauses I endorsed before, recasting
them in sententialist terms does not give rise, as far as I can see, to any principled
difficulties.
The essential idea behind the present proposal on Neg-Raising is quite simple
(and, at this point, maybe easy to figure out): in the case of Neg-Raising verbs, the
traditional analysis in terms of universal quantification over situations or accessible
worlds should be replaced by an analysis in terms of generic variables ranging over
situations; in the case of non-Neg-Raising verbs, on the other hand, existential
quantification would be at work and, hence, negation could take scope over the
situation argument.
Let’s see how this idea can work for some particular cases of both sentences
containing non-Neg-Raising verbs and sentences containing Neg-Raising ones (a
62As this largely incomplete list suggests, universal force in the quantification over accessible
worlds of various kinds has been advocated in a predominant way. However, there are robust
exceptions to this trend, represented, to name but a few, by predicates expressing possibility, as
I said before, or predicates introducing indirect discourse, as we will see in a while.
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situation argument has been added here to the logical forms of verbs; I believe it
likely that such an argument coincides with the temporal one, even if the proposal
is also consistent with different assumptions):
(295) a. Gianni cannot watch the match.
(i) not [(some x: x is a situation {deontically / epistemically}
accessible from t) [there is a proof of length at most f(x) of
pJGianni watches the match in xKq]]
(ii) ¬(∃x ≤ t)(Acc{Deont/Ep}(x, t) ∧ Proof(x,
pwatch′(Gianni, the_match, x)q(Gianni, the_match, x)))
b. Luisa did not say that Gianni watched the match.
(i) not [Luisa said pJGianni watched the matchKq]
(ii) ¬said′(pwatch′(Gianni, the_match)q(Gianni, the_match))
c. Luisa does not know that Gianni watched the match.
(i) not [Luisa has a proof of length at most f(t) of pJGianni
watched the matchKq]
(ii) ¬(∃x ≤ t)(proof ′(x, pwatch′(Gianni, the_match)q(Gianni,
the_match)) ∧ have′(Luisa, x, t)))
(296) a. Gianni must not watch the match.
(i) (aGen w: w is a situation {deontically / epistemically} acces-
sible from t) [not [there is a proof of length at most f(w) of
pJGianni watches the match in wKq]]
(ii) Acc{Deont/Ep}(w, t)→ ¬Proof(w,
pwatch′(Gianni, the_match, w)q(Gianni, the_match, w))
b. Luisa does not want that Gianni watches the match.
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(i) (aGen w: w is a situation bouletically accessible to Luisa) [not
[Luisa has a proof of length at most f(w) of pJGianni watches
the match in wKq]]
(ii) AccBoul(w,Luisa)→ ¬(∃x ≤ t)(proof ′(x, pwatch′(Gianni,
the_match, w)q(Gianni, the_match, w)) ∧ have′(Luisa, x, t))
c. Luisa does not believe that Gianni watched the match.
(i) (aGen w: w is a situation doxastically accessible from t) [not
[Luisa has a proof of length at most f(w) of pJGianni watches
the match in wKq]]
(ii) AccDox(w,Luisa)→ ¬(∃x ≤ t)(proof ′(x, pwatch′(Gianni,
the_match, w)q(Gianni, the_match, w)) ∧ have′(Luisa, x))
Of course, the logical forms above could (actually, should) be refined under
several respects; however, they formally give substance to the idea I mentioned
before, namely that Neg-Raising verbs differ from non-Neg-Raising ones because
they contain a lexically encoded generic variable ranging over accessible situations
(or similar). Note that in the logical forms in (296), i.e. the logical forms of
sentences with Neg-Raising verbs, negation could not have been inserted in a higher
position without violating the BNCS: this is, again, the syntactic constraint I claim
to be at the basis of the attested semantic effects.
There is another consequence of an analysis of Neg-Raising verbs along these
lines which I consider to be quite nice: is the fact that it posits a distinction on
truth-conditional grounds between sentences containing a Neg-Raising predicate
and the corresponding ones with the negation appearing within the embedded
clause. I will illustrate this point with the verb believe, repeating here (296c) as
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(297a) and comparing it with (297b):
(297) a. Luisa does not believe that Gianni watched the match.
(i) AccDox(w,Luisa)→ ¬(∃x ≤ t)(proof ′(x, pwatch′(Gianni,
the_match, w)q(Gianni, the_match, w)) ∧ have′(Luisa, x))
b. Luisa believes that Gianni did not watch the match.
(i) AccDox(w,Luisa)→ (∃x ≤ t)(proof ′(x, p¬watch′(Gianni,
the_match, w)q(Gianni, the_match, w)) ∧ have′(Luisa, x))
The condition expressed by (297b-i) is actually stronger than the one expressed
by (297a-i), since, for the former to be true, it suffices that, for any situation
which Luisa is ready to acknowledge as possibly corresponding to the actual state
of affairs, she does not have any proof that Gianni watched the match in that
situation: it is not necessary, even if plausible, that for all and every situation
(and not even necessary for a single one) Luisa has at her disposal any proof that
Gianni did not watch the match in that situation, something which corresponds
to the meaning conveyed by (297b-i). It seems to me that this distinction reflects
indeed a real intuitive semantic difference between (297a) and (297b); besides, this
difference would remain slight enough to account for that closeness in meaning
ultimately justifying the label of “Neg-Raising” itself.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Summary
This dissertation has been structured in two major parts. In the first one, I gave a
brief outline of the philosophical background of finitism, a peculiar philosophical
view on mathematics which rejects the idea of an actual infinite and which, at least
in its most coherent derivations, also views traditional unbounded quantification
over infinite sets as meaningless. Then, I moved on to describe a formal system
which can be viewed as a foundation for arithmetic built on finitist assumptions,
namely (primitive) recursive arithmetic (RA); I further provided a version of RA
incorporating a special symbol which I anticipated to be required in order to estab-
lish the “anchoring” of semantic representations to the actual world once we had
applied RA to the modelization of meanings in natural language. I stressed the a
priori appeal of RA (especially when compared with systems of arithmetic based
on first order logic), which consists of theoretically desirable well-recognized fea-
tures of simplicity and elegance, accompanying themselves with expressive richness
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and flexibility.
In the second part, I first addressed the general problem of building a semantic
theory for natural languages, emphasizing the fact that one common feature shared
by all different approaches to natural language meaning on the market has been
that of employing some (more or less) formal semantic representations with which
to translate natural language sentences. Moreover, under the reasonable assump-
tion that differences in entailment relations with other sentences and different truth
conditions should also bring together differences in meaning, all semantic theories
(at least implicitly) acknowledge the relevance, for the empirical investigation, of
defining a formal notion of “entailment” between those semantic representations.
I argued that these rather uncontroversial assumptions suffice to make the use of
RA as the background system for building semantic representations in linguistic
semantics a priori worthy of being tested, in place of standard widespread systems
ultimately based on classical first order logic (CL). I also argued that the key fea-
tures distinguishing RA from CL were the absence of unbounded quantifiers (which
a sound philosophical interpretation of RA rejects as lacking a proper counterpart
in human reasoning and natural language as well) and the presence of generic vari-
ables, i.e. variables which are always free and trigger the application of the rule
of inference of Particularization and, for this reason, can be partly assimilated to
widest scope universal quantifiers in CL. As a consequence of that, I identified as
the main goal of this dissertation that of showing the existence of some linguistic
constructions, possibly across different languages, which should undergo a seman-
tic analysis involving generic variables instead of classically conceived universal
quantification in order to get a more natural mapping from syntax to semantics.
Before concretely exploring this possibility, I defined a notion of entailment in
232
RA terms corresponding to the intuitive one; in order to do this in a straightfor-
ward way, I assumed, following much literature, the existence of the illocutionary
operator ‘ASSERT’. Soon after, I moved on to some rough semantic descriptions
of many different linguistic categories and expressions, for which I proposed some
semantic representations in RA terms, which I globally qualified as “neutral” in-
sofar as they do not show any relevant difference between a formalization in RA
or CL terms. I also discussed some syntactic features regarding some expressions I
considered: in particular, aligning myself with observations previously made in the
literature, I formulated a ban on negation taking scope over coordinate structures
under unmarked readings (BNCS). I also gave an account of dependent clauses, by
extending the fundamental insights proper of the sententialist approach to comple-
ments of attitude reports: by endorsing the sententialist standpoint, after having
argued in its favour on independent grounds, I thus provided myself with a prin-
cipled motivation for an apparent counterexample threatening the validity of the
account I was going to develop in the subsequent part (being in a position to ex-
plain the effect of apparently having embedded generic variables in the scope of
other operators), moreover in a way seemingly in accordance with some central
notions of recent generative syntactic theory.
Then, I moved to the core of the dissertation, by discussing those linguistic
phenomena and puzzles I took to provide empirical evidence in favour of my claim
about the superiority of RA over CL as a background formal system for natural lan-
guage semantics. First of all, I set aside some classes of data previously discussed
in the literature to defend related claims, since they had already been attacked
with apparently sound arguments. Once this was done, I took into account the
relevant empirical data, addressing such topics as generic indefinites (for which I
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strongly relied upon Goodstein (1951, 1957), Hornstein (1984) and Löbner (2000,
2013)), conditionals, negative indefinites, habituals and Neg-Raising. Essentially,
I provided arguments of two general sorts: arguments based on the interaction
with sentential negation (bringing into play the previously stated BNCS) and ar-
guments based on anaphora (bringing into play the CSC). In both cases, thus, I
felt entitled to derive conclusions on the general format of semantic representations
by making reference to some (minimal and rather uncontroversial) assumptions of
syntactic nature. I maintained the account of the phenomena considered to be
superior to standard ones already pursued in the literature: to quantificational
ones (partly with arguments borrowed from Löbner (2000)) and to those based on
the Presupposition of Excluded Middle, which essentially I took to be an ad hoc
solution.
8.2 Open problems
There are, of course, plenty of problems left unresolved by the present account. I
take the following to be the most prominent ones:
a) even if offering a (unified) explanation to several still puzzling linguistic
facts, the account I developed is based on some syntactic assumptions (de-
spite them being quite minimal) which do not find an immediate correlation
with features of the formal system I employed. A more in-depth investi-
gation of the possible relations between those syntactic constraints and the
language ofRAt, arguably also relying on independently motivated cognitive
assumptions about computational efficiency in human reasoning, would be
strongly desirable in order to perhaps add plausibility to the main claim of
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this dissertation;
b) since, under the account just offered, clausal boundaries play a crucial role in
the explanation of some fine-grained phenomena involving generic variables
in the semantic representation, a much more detailed account of CP should
be provided, in order to carefully test predictions of the present theory and
compare them with those of its competitors; particular attention should be
payed to an analysis of those CPs not displaying an overt complementizer
(as with focus, focalizing adverbs and topic);
c) the range of empirical data covered here could hopefully be extended: all
natural language constructions displaying some correlations with modality
(just to mention but a few, future tense and imperative mood) are possible
candidates for a treatment based on the availability of elements with features
like those of generic variables in RA.
8.3 Interdisciplinary perspectives
As I have already said, the empirical data discussed in this dissertation is still
logically compatible with a semantic account where semantic representations are
logical forms in an extension of CL with free variables displaying a universal-alike
inferential behaviour. However, there would be no motivation at all behind a
system of this kind, given that universal quantifiers, as they are characterized
in CL, already cover the same functions that those free variables would play;
hence, we would need an explanation of why natural languages having determiners
and possibly other syntactic tools devoted to expressing universal quantification
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crosslinguistically also employ syntactically distinguished forms to mark elements
corresponding in the semantic representation to wide scope universal quantifiers.
Reversing the argument, if natural languages crosslinguistically display expres-
sions and constructions of this kind, it is plausible that they need them in order
to convey meanings which they could not otherwise convey. In other words, if
the picture just outlined is on the right track, it seems to provide an argument
in favour of the view that human reasoning can be successfully modelled through
(some version of) RA and that the philosophical standpoint about the nature of
mathematical entities related to it, namely finitism, is presupposed by any proper
foundation of mathematics itself. This should contribute to keeping alive an inter-
est towards a philosophical view which was commonly shared, implicitly or not,
by most mathematicians until the second half of the Nineteenth century. Hence,
not only linguistics, and natural language semantics in particular, would benefit
from achievements and insights coming from the philosophy of mathematics, as has
happened, through the mediation of logic and philosophy of language, for a long
time: it also could provide evidence to favour or disfavour specific philosophical
theories about mathematics and reasoning, moreover on solid empirical grounds;
and this would be, I believe, a welcome result.
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Appendix A
Quantity implicatures
The most important achievement of gricean pragmatic is probably the explanation
in terms of so-called quantity implicatures of some linguistic phenomena which
previously were only accounted for in terms of semantic ambiguity (see Geurts
(2010) for a recent overview on this issue).
The first explicit formulation of an argument based on a quantity implicature
was given by the Nineteenth century logician John Stuart Mill. This is a passage
of his (from Mill (1865: 501)) quoted in Horn (1989: 212):
If I say to any one, ‘I saw some of your children to-day’, he might be
justified in inferring that I did not see them all, not because the word
mean it, but because, if I had seen them all, it is most likely that I
should have said so: even though this cannot be presumed unless it is
presupposed that I must have known whether the children I saw were
all or not.
Grice’s first formulation of the pragmatic principle which lies at the base of
Mill’s argument has been given in Grice (1961), from which the following passage,
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which anticipates the famous Quantity maxim, is taken:
[O]ne should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one
unless there is a reason for so doing.
“[R]eason[s] for so doing” amount especially, if not exclusively, to reasons con-
nected with the notion of relevance, one central notion of all pragmatics. The
following quotation from Suppes (1973) is likely to show in a very immediate
manner the importance of this notion in the regulation of everyday discourse:
Suppose Gianni and Luisa are walking and Gianni notices a spider close
to Luisa’s shoulder. He says “Watch out for the spider”. He does not
say, “Watch out for the black, half-inch long spider that has a green
dot in its centre and is about six inches from your left shoulder at a
vertical angle of about sixty degrees.”
In the classic framework given in Grice (1975), relevance alone is responsible for
one conversational maxim, i.e. the maxim of Relation. However, as Horn pointed
out in Horn (1984), some other gricean principles can arguably be reduced, at
least in part, to that. Horn himself, in this way, offered a highly parsimonious
pragmatic framework to derive conversational implicatures, entirely based on the
following two simple principles:
(298) Q Principle
Contribute as much as you can [given R].
(299) R Principle
Contribute no more than you must [given Q].
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This formulation, as stated, is clearly affected by circularity, and so it always
leads to clashes. In order to avoid this consequence, we can reasonably rely on the
following suggestion by Huang (in Huang (2007)), which permits the assignment
of a priority ordering between the two principles (in particular by omitting the
part between square brackets in the formulation of R):1
[T]he R-principle generally takes precedence until the use of a con-
trastive linguistic form induces a Q-implicature to the non-applicability
of the pertinent R-implicature [. . . ].
Once we have obtained a sufficiently satisfactory formulation of these general
pragmatic principles, through them we can explain some widespread inferences
that one usually makes when he is the addressee of the utterances of certain sen-
tences. Suppose in fact that you are the addressee of an utterance of sentence α
and that there is a sentence β which, in the current context, implicates α while α
does not implicate β; in other words, in the given context, β is more informative
than α. So, if 1) β would be relevant whenever true, 2) you have at your disposal
enough evidence to maintain that the speaker knows if β is true or not, and 3)
you can maintain that the speaker is willing to be cooperative, i.e. to mould his
communicative behavior to something along the lines of Q and R, then you can
infer from the utterance of α, in the given circumstances, that β is false. In gricean
terms, you can derive ¬β from α as an implicature, which means that, even if it
is not an entailment of α, it is nevertheless conveyed by it in the given circum-
stances. So, in these circumstances, α and α ∧ ¬β are pragmatically, even if not
semantically, equivalent.
1Note, however, that this priority order is partly, even if not completely, implicit in Levinson’s
influential schema to derive quantity implicatures, given in Levinson (1983).
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Appendix B
Examples of derivations in
recursive arithmetic
B.1 Derivation-schemata of general utility
In this section, I wish to introduce some derivation-schemata which can be use-
ful for reducing the length of derivations. I will treat, in fact, these derivation-
schemata as if they were new rules of inference, labelling them with names which
are written between angle brackets, in order to distinguish them from true rules
of inference.
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Theorem B.1 α `PR A = A.
α(F0)
A+ 0 = A
α(F0)
A+ 0 = A(T ) 〈SI〉
A = A
Theorem B.2 A = B `PR B = A.
A = B
>〈SI〉
A = A(T ) 〈K〉
B = A
Theorem B.3 ϕ(A/B) = ψ(A/B), B = C `PR ϕ(A/C) = ψ(A/C).1
ϕ(A/B) = ψ(A/B)
B = C(S)
ϕ(A/B) = ϕ(A/C)
(T )
ψ(A/B) = ϕ(A/C)
B = C(S)
ψ(A/B) = ψ(A/C)
(T ) 〈Rl〉
ϕ(A/C) = ψ(A/C)
Theorem B.4 ϕ(A/C) = ψ(A/C), B = C `PR ϕ(A/B) = ψ(A/B).
ϕ(A/C) = ψ(A/C)
B = C〈K〉
C = B
〈Rl〉 〈Rr〉
ϕ(A/B) = ψ(A/B)
If in a derivation we apply 〈Rl〉 to the premises A = B and B = C to obtain
A = C (this is the particular case of the Cut rule; see n. 1), we could obtain an
equivalent derivation (i.e., one establishing the same ‘`PR’ relation) by inverting
the order of the two subtrees having the two premises as their roots and applying
〈Rr〉 instead of 〈Rl〉; in these cases, I will always choose the 〈Rl〉 option.
1The important rule of inference usually known under the name of Cut arises, in the present
system, as the particular instantiation of this schema with ψ(A/B) = B.
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Theorem B.5 φ(A/[B ϕ(p)]p0) `PR φ(A/B).
φ(A/[B ϕ(p)]p0)
φ(A/[B ϕ(p)]p0)
(F0) [B ϕ(p)]p0 = B
〈Rl〉 〈F0Rl〉
φ(A/B)
Theorem B.6 φ(A/[B ϕ(p)]pSC) `PR φ(A/ϕ(p/[B ϕ(p)]pC)).
φ(A/[B ϕ(p)]pSC)
φ(A/[B ϕ(p)]pSC)
(FS) [B ϕ(p)]pSC = ϕ(p/[B ϕ(p)]pC)
〈Rl〉 〈FSRl〉
φ(A/ϕ(p/[B ϕ(p)]pC))
B.2 A proof in PR
Here and in the following, I will employ the usual abbreviations for numbers; i.e.,
1 := S0, 2 := S1 = SS0, etc. The following schema, which closely reflects standard
computational practice, can easily be transformed into a proper derivation of PR
given these conventions:
• if A is the term appearing in the first row, then the first row corresponds to
the following derivation-schema:
α〈SI〉
A = A
• if A is the term appearing in the first row, then the following correspondence
holds (where 〈FxRl〉 is either 〈F0Rl〉 or 〈FSRl〉):
= B =
= C :=
A = B〈FxRl〉
A = C
• rule 〈FxRl〉 is always applied to the leftmost possible function.
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Theorem B.7 α `PR 4 · 1 + 2 · 3 = 10.
4 · 1 + 2 · 3 =
= 3 · 0 + 4 + 2 · 3 =
= 0 + 4 + 2 · 3 =
= S(0 + 3) + 2 · 3 =
= SS(0 + 2) + 2 · 3 =
= SSS(0 + 1) + 2 · 3 =
= SSSS(0 + 0) + 2 · 3 =
= 4 + 2 · 3 =
= 4 + (2 · 2 + 2) =
= 4 + (2 · 1 + 2 + 2) =
= 4 + (2 · 0 + 2 + 2 + 2) =
= 4 + (0 + 2 + 2 + 2) =
= 4 + (S(0 + 1) + 2 + 2) =
= 4 + (SS(0 + 0) + 2 + 2) =
= 4 + (2 + 2 + 2) =
= 4 + (S(2 + 1) + 2) =
= 4 + (SS(2 + 0) + 2) =
= 4 + (4 + 2) =
= 4 + S(4 + 1) =
= 4 + SS(4 + 0) =
= 4 + 6 =
= S(4 + 5) =
= SS(4 + 4) =
= SSS(4 + 3) =
= SSSS(4 + 2) =
= SSSSS(4 + 1) =
= SSSSSS(4 + 0) =
= 10
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B.3 A proof of the commutativity of sum in RA
In this section, I will establish a few further derivation-schemata, the last one of
which corresponds to a proof of the well-known commutativity property of the
sum operation. Differently from the schemata established in §B.1 above, however,
in these an essential role is played by some particular recursive functions. To
distinguish the latter from the former, then, I will write their labels within square
brackets, instead of angle ones.
Lemma B.1 (Goodstein’s (1954: 249) (6)) α `RA 0 + A = A.
α(F0)
A+ 0 = 0(P ) 0 + 0 = 0
α(FS)
A+ SB = S(A+B)
(P )
0 + SB = S(0 +B)
α〈SI〉
SA = SA
(U) [B.1]0 + A = A
Lemma B.2 α `RA SA = A+ 1.
α(F0)
A+ 0 = A(S)
S(A+ 0) = SA
α(FS)
A+ 1 = S(A+ 0)
〈K〉
S(A+ 0) = A+ 1
(T ) [B.2]
SA = A+ 1
Lemma B.3 (Goodstein’s (1954: 250) (7)) α `RA A+ SB = SA+B.
α[B.2]
SA = A+ 1
α(F0)
SA+ 0 = SA〈K〉
SA = SA+ 0(T )
A+ 1 = SA+ 0
α(FS)
A+ SB = S(A+B)
(P )
A+ SSB = S(A+ SB)
α(FS)
A+ SB = S(A+B)
(P )
SA+ SB = S(SA+B)
(U) [B.3]
A+ SB = SA+B
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Lemma B.4 α `RA SA+B = S(A+B).
α[B.3]
A+ SB = SA+B
α(FS)
A+ SB = S(A+B)
(T ) [B.4]
SA+B = S(A+B)
Theorem B.8 (Goodstein’s (1954: 18) (8)) α `RA A+B = B + A.
α(F0)
A+ 0 = A〈S〉
A = A+ 0
α[B.1] 0 + A = A
A+ 0 = 0 + A
α(FS)
A+ SB = S(A+B)
α[B.4]
SA+B = S(A+B)
(U) [B.8]
A+B = B + A
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= III B
Ohe, iam satis est, ohe, libelle,
iam pervenimus usque ad umbilicos.
. . .
iam lector queriturque deficitque,
iam librarius hoc et ipse dicit
“ohe, iam satis est, ohe, libelle.”
Martialis iv. 89
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